31/12/2025
PRESS RELEASE
Structure and Financial Implications of the Bank of Ghana’s Gold Operations:
Energy and Associates Ghana issues this statement to bring clarity to ongoing public discussion surrounding the Bank of Ghana’s gold activities and the reported financial losses associated with them. Our assessment is that much of the current debate fails to distinguish between two separate and deliberately structured gold supply chains operated by the central bank.
We note that the Bank of Ghana’s gold strategy is not a single, uniform operation. It is built around two distinct streams, each with its own policy purpose, risk profile and accounting treatment. Treating these streams as one inevitably produces a distorted picture of outcomes.
The first stream is designed to support foreign exchange liquidity. Under this arrangement, the Bank of Ghana purchases unrefined gold doré from artisanal and small-scale miners through the Ghana Gold Board. This gold is not added to the country’s official reserves. It is sold on international markets to generate foreign exchange for market interventions, including support for oil importers and commercial banks. This activity is transactional, operates on high volumes and thin margins, and is exposed to short-term price movements and operational costs.
The second stream is dedicated to long-term reserve accumulation. Here, the Bank of Ghana acquires refined and certified gold from large-scale mining companies. The gold is processed by refineries accredited by the London Bullion Market Association and added directly to Ghana’s official gold reserves, currently estimated at about 40 tonnes. This gold is held as a strategic monetary asset and not intended for rapid trading.
When the reserve portfolio is properly considered, the financial position appears materially stronger than is often suggested. Based on prevailing global prices, we estimate the market value of Ghana’s reserve gold at approximately US$6.1 billion. Using a conservative average acquisition cost of about US$1,600 per ounce, the corresponding book value is roughly US$2.06 billion. This reflects substantial unrealised gains embedded in the reserve position.
While unrealised gains do not finance public spending, they significantly strengthen reserve adequacy, enhance collateral capacity and improve the central bank’s ability to support the currency through swaps and other liquidity instruments.
Against this background, we believe it is important to question the methodology behind the Fund’s reported US$214 million loss attributed to the Bank of Ghana’s gold activities. It remains unclear whether this figure reflects a full, disaggregated assessment of both gold streams or whether it is limited to realised trading outcomes from the forex-focused operations alone.
In our view, any credible evaluation must be based on a full-chain accounting approach that clearly separates artisanal and large-scale gold flows, tracks costs independently and recognises both realised trading results and unrealised reserve gains.
We emphasise that Ghana’s gold policy rests on two pillars: a tactical instrument for managing foreign exchange pressures and a strategic programme for building long-term monetary strength. Balanced analysis and informed public discourse must reflect both pillars if conclusions about gains or losses are to be fair, accurate, and useful.
Energy and Associates Ghana
Research and Communications Desk
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