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PLJ 2026 CrC 624There is no cavil to the proposition of statutory interpretation that laws are to be construed as a harm...
16/08/2026

PLJ 2026 CrC 624

There is no cavil to the proposition of statutory interpretation that laws are to be construed as a harmonious whole,so that no provision thereof is rendered redundant. The statutory scheme of the law was examined in light of the stated principles, and while doing so, it emerged that the special procedure governing jurisdiction of a Special Judge, established for the purpose of trying offences under the Act of 1947, is regulated by the Act of 1958. Through its Section 4, the Act of 1958 confers jurisdiction on Special Judges to the limited extent of such territorial limits as fixed by the government concerned. The provision further goes on to state that a Special Judge can only take cognizance of any offence committed or deemed to have been committed within such territorial limits. This provision is followed by Section 6, which stipulates that the provisions of the Code shall apply to all proceedings under the Act of 1958, with some exceptions that are detailed therein. The provision of Section 6 supra starts with a non-obstante clause and thereby shows the intent of the Legislature that it shall have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Code,therefore, to the extent of the exceptions detailed therein, or in case of a conflict between the provisions of the Act of 1958 and the Code, the Act of 1958 will override the provisions of the Code. The Code, in its Section 177, states, and thereby commands a similar spirit to Section 4 of the Act of 1958, providing that ordinarily every offence shall be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offence was committed. These provisions, when read as a whole, in their essence and spirit, place a restriction when it comes to the ability of a Court to take cognizance when the offences have not been committed within its allocated territorial limits. In other words, it follows that if a Court lacks territorial jurisdiction over a matter, then it cannot ordinarily proceed with a case since it is not vested with the legal authority or power to hear and adjudicate on the matter and decide the same.
Criminal Revision No. 20366 of 2026
(Abdul Basit v. Senior Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Court, Lahore, etc.)

2026 CLC 1292  Whether an order of eviction can be passed on ground of expiry of the tenancy period/lease when the said ...
16/08/2026

2026 CLC 1292

Whether an order of eviction can be passed on ground of expiry of the tenancy period/lease when the said ground is not taken and the eviction petitions are only filed on the basis of default?

This Court is of the opinion that in principle, ejectment order can only be passed on the ground(s) taken in the eviction petition. However, in cases where the eviction is sought on grounds other than expiry and said other ground(s) are not proved but the period of tenancy expires during the pendency of eviction proceedings, before the Special Judge (Rent), or in appeal, or before this Court, question arises as to whether in such circumstances, the ejectment petitioners be asked to withdraw the ejectment petitions and file amended or fresh petition by adding/taking expiry of the tenancy as additional or fresh ground of eviction. In this regard, it is settled principle of law that once a tenant is always a tenant, nothing but a tenant. Directing the eviction petitioners to file a fresh eviction petition (with expiry of tenancy as a ground of eviction) would amount to lingering on the matter in a manner that the tenant is enabled to continue with the occupation of the rented premises, without consent of the landlord, for no beneficial outcome except that after fulfilling codal formalities of issuing notice on such fresh eviction petition, the same merits acceptance. Additionally, such fresh petitions would add to already piled up cases with the Courts for no just reason. Such an interpretation does not dovetail well with the object and purpose of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 ("the Act"), which aims at ensuring that the disputes, inter se, the landlord and tenant are resolved in a cost effective and expeditious manner as is evident form the preamble of the Act.
WP-2292-24
MUHAMMAD SALEEM MINHAS VS ASHFAQ HUSSAIN MINHAS ETC

2023 M L D 1875Non-adverse party---Cross-examination, right of---Dispute was with regard to deleting cross-examination c...
16/08/2026

2023 M L D 1875

Non-adverse party---Cross-examination, right of---Dispute was with regard to deleting cross-examination conducted by petitioner/defendant on a witness produced by respondent/co-defendant on the plea that both were not adverse parties---Validity---Only such party, which had obvious conflict of interest, could enjoy right of cross-examining witness of opponent parties---In the present case, interest of petitioner/defendant and that of respondent/co-defendant was the same and there was no conflict of interest between them, thus an opportunity of cross-examination to witnesses of respondent/co-defendant having no adverse interest to each other could not be given in order to prevent abuse of process of law as well as to prevent filling up lacunas occurring in the statement of witness through the sword of cross-examination---Lower Appellate Court did not commit any illegality in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---

JUDGMENT

.---Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has challenged the validity of judgment dated 12.11.2022 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore who accepted the revision petition of respondents Nos.1 and 2/plaintiffs, set aside the order dated 07.04.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore and struck off cross-examination conducted upon DW3 to DW5 by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as respondent No. 4.

2. Brief facts of the case are that Arfeen Ejaz etc. respondents Nos.1 and 2/plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration with permanent injunction against the petitioner and respondents Nos.3 to 6/defendants in respect of plot No.12-C, Gulshan Ravi Scheme, Lahore with the claim that the above said plot was owned by three brothers namely, Ijaz Ali (father of the plaintiffs), Mumtaz Ali/defendant No.1 and Nawazish Ali (died issueless) and a suit for declaration was instituted for declaration of legal heirs. The said suit was decreed by declaring Razia a Sultana, Safia Sultana, Bushra Parveen and Shahnaz Parveen as well as the father of the plaintiffs and respondent No.3/defendant No.1 as legal heirs of the deceased and accordingly the property was devolved upon all the legal heirs as per their respective shares; that Mst. Razia Sultana, Safia Sultana, Bushra Perveen and Shahnaz Perveen (sisters of the deceased) transferred their shares in favour of Ijaz Ali, father of the plaintiffs and Mumtaz Ali/defendant No.1 through registered sale deed No.6616 dated 11.08.1998, thus the above said Ijaz Ali and Mumtaz Ali became exclusive owners of the suit property. In the year 2003, Mumtaz Ali/respondent No. 3 sold his share in favour of Ijaz Ali (father of respondents Nos.1 and 2) and accordingly transfer letter dated 09.05.2003 was issued by the LDA in favour of Ijaz Ali. In 2005, said Ijaz Ali transferred the suit property/plot in question in favour of (respondents Nos. 1 and 2) and this transfer was incorporated the record of LDA (respondents Nos. 5 and 6/defendants Nos. 4 and 5) through transfer letter dated 28.07.2005 and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 became owners of the suit property.

That Mumtaz Ali, the father of respondent No.3/defendant No.1 submitted his undertaking that he had no concern with the suit property as he has transferred his share in favour of Ijaz Ali (father of respondents Nos. 1 and 2).

That Imtiaz Ali, respondent No.3/defendant No.1 allegedly executed general power of attorney dated 20.02.2007 in favour of Muhammad Ramzan who by using the said power of attorney transferred a portion of the suit property in favour of his son, Muhammad Umar Ramzan through registered sale deed No.5037 dated 27.09.2007. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiffs challenged the said general power of attorney as well as registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner through civil suit which was contested by the petitioner through filing a written statement. As per respective divergent pleadings of the contesting parties, the learned trial court framed issues. The plaintiff adduced their evidence and similarly the petitioner/defendant No.2 had also got recorded statements of DW-2 to DW-5; that the learned counsel for the petitioner/defendant started cross-examination of the witnesses (DWs) of the co-defendants. Plaintiff/respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed objection that a co-defendant having shared common interest is debarred to conduct cross-examination on the witness of other co-defendants as it is amounted to filling up the lacunas. The said objection petition was contested by the petitioner/defendant No.3 and the learned trial court vide order dated 07.04.2022 rejected the said objection petition. Respondents Nos.1 and 2 challenged the said order through revision petition which was accepted by the learned revisional court who vide judgment dated 12.11.2022, set aside the above said order of the learned trial court and struck off the cross-examination conducted on DWs by the petitioner/defendant No.3 from the record. Hence, this writ petition.

3. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties at full length and gone through the entire record with their assistance.

4. Admittedly the petitioner is son of Muhammad Ramzan/ respondent No.4 who (defendant No.4) on the basis of alleged general power of attorney executed by Mumtaz Ali, respondent No.3/defendant No.1 transferred the portion of the suit property in favour of his real son/petitioner. The stance of respondents Nos. 1 and 2/plaintiff is that petitioner and respondent No.4 (defendant) have common interest and are not adverse to each other, as such the witnesses (DW2 to DW-4) were produced by respondent No.4 to prove his version which is amounted to prove the stance of petitioner/defendant No.3. Though different counsel filed written statements which are same ditto copies of each other. The main point before this Court is whether the non-adverse parties having common/joint interest may cross-examine the witness of each other or otherwise. Article 132 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 relates to examination-in-chief etc. of a witness of a party. The initial statement of a witness with regard to the matter in issue is called his examination-in-chief and the examination of a witness by the adverse party is called his cross-examination. As per Sub-Article (1) of Article 132 of the Order ibid, witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examine him, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examines the witness. For ready reference, Articles 132 and 133 of Order 1984 are reproduced as under:-

"132. Examination-in-chief, etc.---(1) The examination of a witness by the party who calls him shall be called his examination-in-chief.

(2) The examination of a witness by the adverse party shall be called his cross-examination.

(3) The examination of a witness, subsequent to the cross-examination by the party who called him, shall be called his re­examination.

(emphasis supplied)

133. Order of examinations.---(1) Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined.

(2) The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.

(3) The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination, and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine that matter."

The word "Adverse party" has garnered a material significance and as this word is not defined in the very ordinance ibid, thus its plain ordinary meaning is to be imported/borrowed from Dictionary. In Black's Law Dictionary "Adverse party" is defined as under:-

"Adverse party. A party whose interests are opposed to the interests of another party to the action."

Thus, as per the above meaning of word, only such a party which has obvious conflict of the interest can enjoy the right of cross-examining the witness of the opponent parties. As per available record, pleading, the interest of the petitioner and that of respondent No.4 (defendants Nos.2 and 3) being father and son is quite common/one and the same. Respondent No.4 being father transferred the property in favour of his son on the basis of alleged general power of attorney and the witnesses of the father/defendant No.2 took same stance as taken by the petitioner/defendant No.3 as such the petitioner's case does not fall adverse to interest of his father, thus the petitioner cannot be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses of his father. Reliance is placed on a case titled as Barkat Ali v. Additional District Judge Dadyal and 4 others (2022 YLR 868) wherein it is held as under:-

"Article 132(2) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 postulates that examination of a witness by the adverse party is cross-examination. Article 133(1) of Qanun-e-Shahadat refers to cross-examination if the adverse party so desire after the witness is first examined in chief. These two provisions of Qanun-e­Shahadat Order make it clear that a party has a right of cross-examination if feels adversely affected. As a general rule, evidence is not legally admissible against a party who at the time it was given, had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness who recorded such evidence. It is now well settled principle of law that no evidence should be read against one who was not given opportunity of testing it by cross-examination. On the basis of same principle, it would be unjust, unfair and unsafe not to allow a co-defendant to cross-examine a witness called by the other co-defendant whose case was adverse to him, produce evidence which incriminates other defendants, thus later have a right to cross-examine those witnesses. If there is no conflict of interest, then such an opportunity needs not to be given. Therefore, the condition precedent for giving an opportunity to a co-defendant to cross-examine the other co-defendant is, that there should exist conflict of interest between them either from the pleadings or during the course of evidence. Once it is demonstrated that their interests are not common or there is a conflict of interest and evidence has been adduced affecting the interest of co-defendant then the Court cannot rely on that evidence without giving the opportunity of cross-examination to the party affected by it. The person against whom the evidence is given should have opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, so that ultimately, truth may emerge, on the basis of which the Court can decide the matter....."

(emphasis supplied)

Reliance is also placed on the case cited as Muhammad Imran Khan and 4 others v. Haji Muhammad Akhtar and others (PLD 2021 Sindh 510) and Sadhu Singh v. Sant Narain Singh Sewadar and others (AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 319).

5. As the interest of the petitioner and that of respondent No.4 is the same and there is no conflict of interest between them, thus an opportunity of cross-examination to the witnesses of co­-defendant having no adverse interest to each other could not be given in order to prevent the abuse of process of law as well as to prevent filling up the lacunas occurred in the statement of the witness through the sword of cross-examination. Resultantly the learned revisional court has rightly accepted the revision petition of respondents Nos.1 and 2/plaintiffs and has committed no illegality.

6. It evinces from the record that the instant Constitutional petition arises from the judgment passed by the learned Revisional Court and ordinarily, this Court avoids to interfere with such Revisional orders in its constitutional jurisdiction unless the same is found to be patently illegal and without jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on a case titled as Muhammad Khan and 6 others v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 12 others (1991 SCMR 970) held as under:-

"The learned High Court observed that a revisional order arising out of civil litigation could not be challenged in the Writ Petition and relied upon Ghulam Hussain v. Malik Shahbaz Khan 1985 SCMR 1925; Muhammad Bakhsh v. Ghulam Hussain 1989 SCMR. 443 and Muhammad Zahoor v. Lal Muhammad 1988 SCMR 322."

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has neither pointed out any illegality, material irregularity while passing the impugned judgment nor identified any jurisdictional defect calling for interference by this Court.

8. In view of above, this writ petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits.

2025 Y L R 2794Right of cross-examination by adverse party, closing of---Propriety---Petitioner/plaintiff challenged the...
16/08/2026

2025 Y L R 2794

Right of cross-examination by adverse party, closing of---Propriety---Petitioner/plaintiff challenged the legality of judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court whereby appeal filed by one of the eight defendants (respondent) was accepted and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court giving permission to the respondent to cross-examine upon the seven witnesses produced by her (petitioner)---Validity---Record revealed that after framing of the issues the statement of three witnesses of the plaintiff were recorded, thereafter, right of one defendant to cross-examine the said witnesses was closed whereas ex-parte proceedings were initiated against five defendants, all the said six defendants were other than the respondent---On next date of hearing, in the presence of the counsel for petitioner/plaintiff, the respondent and another defendant, the case was adjourned for recording of remaining evidence of the plaintiff---On the date fixed, counsel of respondent /defendant was present but the case was adjourned; on the next date, in presence of the counsel for respondent /defendant the statements of three witnesses of the petitioner / plaintiff were recorded but no opportunity was given to respondent for cross- examination upon the witnesses of the plaintiff whereas neither any ex-parte order was passed against it nor penal provision under O.XVII, R.3 of C.P.C was invoked against respondent /defendant and case was adjourned---Trial court had not passed any order for closing the right of respondent for cross-examination, whereas the Trial Court was under obligation to require the adverse party to cross-examine the witness which shows existence of a serious flaw in trial proceeding as the right of cross-examination on the witnesses of adverse party is a kind of fundamental right which can not be frustrated on the basis of mere technicalities rather fair opportunity should have been afforded but this fundamental right had been circumvented without any justiciable reason which renders the order of the Trial Court as illegal and erroneous in nature, which has rightly be reversed by the Appellate / District Court---No illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect had been identified /noticed in the impugned remanding order passed by the Appellate / District Court---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Remand order passed by Appellate /District Court, assailing of---Revisional jurisdictional of High Court---Scope---Petitioner/plaintiff challenged the legality of judgment passed by the Appellate/ District Court whereby appeal filedby one of the eight defendants (respondents) was accepted and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court giving permission to the respondent to cross-examine upon the seven witnesses produced by her (petitioner)---Validity---Present civil revision is instituted against a remand judgment whereas, ordinarily, civil revision is not maintainable against a remand order---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances.

Judgnent.---Through this civil revision, the petitioner has challenged the legality of judgment dated 27.01.2020, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Lahore who accepted the appeal of respondent No.1/DHA and remanded the matter to the trial court and gave permission to DHA to cross-examine upon the witnesses PW1 to PW7.

2. Brief facts of the case as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that the petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, possession, mandatory and permanent injunction contending therein that plaintiff purchased agricultural land measuring 22-Kanals 03-Marlas comprising Khasra Nos.764, 765/2, 771/2, 774, Khewat No.23/1, Khatooni No.72 situated in village Jalalabad, Tehsil Cantt. District Lahore from defendant No.6 through registered sale deed No.94 dated 26.11.1999 against consideration of Rs.5,00,000/- and obtained possession of this land from Muhammad Tariq-respondent/defendant No.6. The sale deed was finalized between the parties 26.11.1999 but it was entered on 06.01.2003. In the month of February, 2003, plaintiff approached the concerned revenue officials from where it revealed that respondent No.5 being attorney of respondent No.6 had sold out the property through sale deeds No.14140 dated 09.09.2000 and also got sanctioned mutation No.266 dated 26.09.2000 in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2, who further alienated the land through sale deed No.16027 dated 14.10.2000 and mutation No.276 dated 19.10.2000 in favour of defendant No.3, who also alienated the said land through sale deed No.13177 dated 17.09.2002 and mutation No.458 in favour of defendant No.4. That plaintiff became absolute owner in possession of the suit property after payment of consideration amount to defendant No.6. The general power of attorney executed by defendant No.6 in favour of defendant No.5 was of no legal effect as with the alienation of suit property the general power of attorney issued by the ex-owner stand automatically terminated. The subsequent sale deeds allegedly executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendants Nos.1 and 2 and sale deed executed by defendants Nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant No.3 and sale deed executed by defendant No.3 in favour of respondent No.1/defendant No.4/DHA have no legal footing in the eyes of law.

Respondents Nos.2, 3,4 and 5 filed separate contesting written statements whereas respondent/defendant No.6 filed consenting written statement while remaining defendants were proceeded against ex-parte. Out of divergent pleadings of the parties, issues were framed, pro and contra evidence was recorded. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated 08.05.2018 decreed the suit of the petitioner. Respondent No.1/DHA challenged the said judgment and decree through an appeal which was accepted by the appellate court vide impugned judgment dated 27.01.2020 and remanded the matter to the trial court and gave permission to DHA to cross-examine upon the witnesses PWI to PW7. Hence, this civil revision.

3. Arguments heard. Record perused.

4. As per available record after framing of the issues the statement of three witness P.W1 to P.W3 of the plaintiff were recorded on 14.07.2011 and right of defendant No.8 to cross-examine the said witness was closed whereas ex-parte proceedings were initiated against defendants Nos.2,3,5,6 and 7. Thereafter, on 07.09.2011 in the presence of learned counsel for plaintiff and respondent No.1/defendant No.4/DHA as well as 6 the case was adjourned for 17.09.2011 for recording of remaining evidence of the plaintiff. On the date fixed, counsel of defendant No.4/DHA was present and the case was adjourned for 15.10.2011. On the said date, in presence of the counsel for respondent No.1/defendant No.4 the statements of three PWs were recorded but no opportunity was given to respondent No.1/DHA for cross-examination upon the witness of the plaintiff whereas neither any ex-parte order was passed against it nor penal provision under Order XVII Rule 3 of C.P.C was invoked against respondent No.1/DHA and case was adjourned for 24.10.2011. The trial court has not passed any order for closing the right for cross-examination on PW1 to PW7 of DHA rather the trial Court was under obligation to require the adverse party to cross-examine the witness but this was not done which show existence of a serious flaw in trial proceeding as the right of cross-examination on the witnesses of adverse party is a kind of fundamental right which could not be frustrated on the basis of mere technicalities rather fair opportunity should have been afforded but this fundamental right have been circumvented without any justiciable reason which render the order of this trial court as illegal and erroneous in nature, which has rightly be reversed by the lower appellate court.

5. Even otherwise, the instant Civil Revision is instituted against a remand judgment whereas ordinarily, civil revision is not maintainable against a remand order. Reliance in this regard is placed on the cases titled as Abdul Majid and another v. Muhammad Hanif (2008 SCMR 335), Noor Ahmad through L.Rs and others v. Province of Punjab and others (2016 SCMR 2174) and Phool Zeb Khan and another v. Additional Deputy Commissioner/Collector Mansehra and others (2017 YER Note 152).

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has neither pointed out any illegality or material irregularity, in the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court nor identified any jurisdictional defect.

7. In view of above, this civil revision is dismissed being devoid of any force with no order as to cost.

P L D 2020 Supreme Court 334Art.10-A---"Right to fair trial"---Scope and essential ingredients---Constitution mandated a...
16/08/2026

P L D 2020 Supreme Court 334

Art.10-A---"Right to fair trial"---Scope and essential ingredients---Constitution mandated a "fair trial and due process"---Person arrested for an offence must be informed of the grounds of his arrest; must be permitted to consult with and be defended by a lawyer; must be provided with the information of the offence he was charged for; must be provided with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who deposed against him; must be given an opportunity to explain the circumstances disclosed in evidence against him; and must also be provided an apportunity to produce evidence in his defence---Said ingredients were necessary to ensure the fairness of a trial.

Right of cross-examination---Scope---Right to cross-examine was the right of the adverse party which right he/she may forego but one which he/she could not be deprived of---Criminal trial of an accused must be coducted with utmost fairness---Fundamental right of fair trial which the Constitution guaranteed was violated if any accused was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness deposing against him.

Joint cross-examination of a witness by counsel representing more than one accused---Legality---Conscept of joint cross-examination was one which was not recognized by the law---Courts and counsel should not resort to methodologies which were not sanctioned by the law as in doing so they may inadvertently create unnecessary complications and may undermine the prosecution case and benefit the accused---Supreme Court stated that in cases where there were more than one accused, the presiding officer while recording the cross-examiantion of a witness should mention the name of the accused and/or his lawyer who was cross-examining the witness.

ORDER Muhammad Waseem Raza was murdered on 22nd March 2018 at 5.15 pm and the crime was reported to the police the same day and FIR No. 96 was registered at Police Station Ustarzai, District Kohat at 6.40 pm. The crime was reported by the deceased's uncle, Muhammad Bashir, who is the petitioner herein. Four persons were nominated in the FIR of which two were identified as Rukhsar and Suhail.

2. The learned counsel representing the petitioner states that statement of the complainant Muhammad Bashir (PW-6) was recorded in Court on 20th April 2019 and on the same date his joint cross-examination (at pages 29 to 30) was conducted by the counsel representing the accused Rukhsar and Suhail. However, subsequently, Rukhsar, through his counsel, submitted an application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("the Code") stating that he had not been provided an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner-witness therefore an opportunity to do so be provided. This application was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kohat. The petitioner assailed the same by filing a criminal revision petition before the Peshawar High Court however the learned Judge of the High Court upheld the impugned order and dismissed the revision. The order of the Sessions Judge and the judgment of the High Court allowing the cross-examination by Rukhsar of the petitioner-witness have been assailed herein.

3. Mr. Aatif Ali Khan, learned Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, opposes this petition and states that joint cross-examination is not prescribed under any law and that the cross-examination of the petitioner does not disclose on which accused's behalf it was conducted and by which counsel. He states that the Court can exercise powers vested in it by section 540 of the Code to recall a witness and had exercised this power in accordance with the said section and supports his submission by relying on the cases of Muhammad Murad Abro v. the State (2004 SCMR 966), Ansar Mehmood v. Abdul Khaliq (2011 SCMR 713) and Muhammad Amjad v. the State (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 704).

4. We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel representing the petitioner. We inquired from the learned counsel what prejudice will be caused to the petitioner if he is cross-examined by the accused Rukhsar and he says that since the petitioner has already been subjected to joint cross-examination there is no reason to summon him and again be subjected to cross-examination. We then asked him to show us from the record whether the counsel of Rukhsar was given an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner, however, the learned counsel was unable to do so. Suhail and Rukhsar are represented by separate counsel before the Trial Court and the record does not disclose that Rukhsar or his counsel was given an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.

5. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan prescribes important safeguards against depriving a person of his "life or liberty"1 and with regard to arrest and detention2, which includes "the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice"3. The Constitution also mandates a "fair trial and due process"4. A person arrested for an offence (1) must be informed of the grounds of his arrest; (2) must be permitted to consult with and be defended by a lawyer; (3) must be provided with the information of the offence he is charged for; (4) must be provided with an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses who depose against him; (5) must be given an opportunity to explain the circumstances disclosed in evidence against him; and (6) must also be provided an opportunity to produce evidence in his defence. These are also necessary ingredients to ensure the fairness of a trial.

6. Chapter X of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 sets out the methodology for the examination of witnesses. Examination of witness by the party calling him is the "examination-in-chief"5 which is followed by "cross-examination"6 by the defence and then such witness' "re-examination"7 may take place. The right to cross-examine is the right of "the adverse party"8 which right he/she may forego but one which he/she cannot be deprived of. Since the accused Rukhsar was not granted an opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner who had deposed against him he submitted an application under section 540 of the Code to summon the petitioner-witness and to permit him to cross-examine the petitioner-witness. The application allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and his decision was upheld by the High Court. Rukhsar was deprived of a valuable right to cross-examine the petitioner-witness therefore allowing him to be summoned and cross-examined fully accorded with the law. A criminal trial of an accused must "be conducted with utmost fairness"9. The Fundamental Right of fair trial which the Constitution guarantees is violated if an accused is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness deposing against him.

7. The learned counsel stresses that the petitioner-witness had already been subjected to joint cross-examination. However, this concept of joint cross-examination is one which is not recognized by the law. We may observe that courts and counsel should not resort to methodologies which are not sanctioned by the law as in doing so they may inadvertently create unnecessary complications. They must also realize that resort to novel concepts may undermine the prosecution case and benefit the accused.

8. We take this opportunity to state that, in cases where there are more than one accused, the presiding officer while recording the cross-examination of a witness should mention the name of the accused and/or his lawyer who is cross-examining the witness.

9. For the reasons mentioned above no case is made out to grant leave, therefore, this petition is dismissed.

Address

Lahore High Court
Lahore

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