Threat Suppression, Incorporated

09/08/2026

An active assailant event lasts minutes. The aftermath lasts decades. Your organization is likely only preparing for one of them.

Two years after the September 4, 2024, shooting at Apalachee High School, at least seven lawsuits have been filed by families of students and teachers who were killed or injured. The lawsuits allege that school officials and others failed to protect students and staff. Those claims will now move through the civil court system for years to come.

For the families of those killed and the survivors who were wounded, the event continues in many forms. There may be criminal proceedings, civil litigation, investigative reviews, school-system responses, media attention, anniversaries, memorials, and ongoing medical and psychological treatment.

Survivors and family members may be required to repeatedly describe what happened, answer questions about their actions, revisit their injuries and losses, and listen to competing arguments about responsibility. Each proceeding can reopen trauma that never fully went away.

This is the reality most organizations do not prepare for. Your response plan covers the first hour, but does it cover the next decade?

Organizations need plans for immediate life safety, medical response, reunification, family assistance, crisis communication, evidence preservation, investigative cooperation, employee and student support, and long-term recovery. They also need to understand that decisions made before and during an event may later be examined in criminal investigations, administrative reviews, civil lawsuits, and public scrutiny.

Preparation is not only about what happens during the attack. It is also about what happens in the weeks, months, and years afterward. An active assailant event may last minutes. Its consequences can last for generations.

09/03/2026

Two Shootings. One Lesson: Preparation Stops Tragedy.

Yesterday brought two separate active-violence incidents. In downtown Minneapolis, two police officers were shot, three people killed, and four more injured during a Wednesday afternoon incident at an apartment complex in downtown. At Westwood Hills Elementary in Waynesboro, Virginia, a 19-year-old forced his way onto campus and shot a staff member before taking his own life.

The Virginia school had it right. Staff recognized a suspicious individual on campus and immediately alerted police. The school implemented lockdown procedures. Students were in classrooms when the suspect entered the library. The staff member was injured but survived with minor injuries. No students were harmed. The superintendent noted that "safety and security protocols and procedures worked."

The rapid response by the Minneapolis Police Department prevented further loss of life. Officers quickly moved to the gunfire, with two shot doing so. But this shooting reveals a different problem. Downtown areas present multiple threats that schools do not. People were targeted as they moved inside an apartment building. Those outside were exposed.

Glass storefronts offer no protection. Pedestrians cannot distinguish between gunshots and fireworks in the first seconds. Vehicles stuck in traffic cannot move. Occupants are trapped. Shoppers inside businesses face a choice: stay in place hoping the threat passes or attempt to exit into an active shooting zone.

These events happen with sudden ferocity. Research shows most people experience 30 to 60 seconds of disbelief when violence begins (the "deliberation gap"). They are confused and stunned. They try to process what is happening before acting. In that window, the threat moves and causes harm. The people who survive are those who have already decided what they will do.

This sends a message to multiple audiences. Businesses in commercial areas must train staff on immediate response: lock doors, shelter in place, communicate with law enforcement. Shoppers need to understand their environment: identify exits, note cover versus concealment, understand that running toward the sound is not a survival strategy. People sitting in traffic need to know if shots are fired nearby, attempt to safely and quickly leave the area. Drivers need to understand traffic patterns and know alternate routes if an area becomes unsafe.

Preparation is not paranoia. It is the difference between disbelief and response. It is the difference between freezing and moving. It is the difference between tragedy and survival.

09/02/2026

A viral “Cat in the Hat” trend involving disturbing AI-generated images has prompted stern warnings from multiple law-enforcement agencies and school districts. Some posts identify specific schools, communities, or students. In Colorado, a 14-year-old was arrested after allegedly creating a post suggesting someone dressed as the character would appear at a school. Police found no credible threat, but the post still created fear and required investigation.

The fact that multiple agencies and school districts have issued public warnings demonstrates the seriousness of what is happening. This is not simply an odd internet trend when the content begins targeting schools, communities, or individual students.

This illustrates a critical distinction schools must make: viral trend versus prank versus hoax versus genuine threat. Disturbing content alone does not establish violent intent. But when a post names a school, identifies a person, specifies a time or location, or describes an act of violence, it cannot be dismissed as internet noise.

Parents need to discuss trends like this with their children, particularly if they believe their child is participating in the activity or has encountered related content. Children need to understand that pranks and online trends can result in serious criminal charges, disciplinary action, suspension, expulsion, and other school consequences. What may seem like a joke to one person can be perceived as a genuine threat by others. When that happens, the conduct can cross the boundary into criminal behavior.

A Behavioral Threat Assessment team should preserve the original content, identify who created or shared it, determine whether a specific target exists, assess the subject’s intent and capability, review any history of concerning behavior, and coordinate with law enforcement.

Schools must also communicate carefully. Parents and staff need timely, factual information about what is known, what is being investigated, and what to do if they encounter related content. Students should be taught not to repost threatening material for attention. They should save it and report it to a trusted adult or law enforcement.

The danger lies in two mistakes: treating every rumor as proof of an imminent attack, or dismissing a specific threat because it appears to be part of a trend. Threat assessment requires context, behavior, intent, capability, and continuous reassessment.

A viral trend may be nothing more than a hoax. But when someone uses it to target a school or frighten a community, the behavior has crossed a line and must be taken seriously.

08/31/2026

In 2013, Threat Suppression created the ABC²s of fire-as-a-weapon: ambush, barricade, civil unrest, and complex coordinated attacks. The ABC²s have since been adopted by ALERRT, federal agencies, and multiple NATO countries to train responders for fire-as-a-weapon events.

Thirteen years later, fire-as-a-weapon is not theoretical. It remains a recurring operational problem for law enforcement, fire, EMS, and security personnel. However, many law enforcement agencies and fire departments have not trained on this type of attack.

A non-inclusive list of recent events includes: the Grand Blanc LDS church attack involving gunfire, vehicle ramming, and arson; barricade fires in Kingwood, Texas; Kearny, New Jersey; Blachly, Oregon; Dallas, Texas; Mableton, Georgia; and Suisun City, California; the Temple Israel attack in West Bloomfield, Michigan, involving a vehicle fire and explosives concern; and the Grand Haven, Michigan and West Billings, Montana family-annihilation scenes involving shootings and intentionally set fires.

Since creating the ABC²s, Threat Suppression has conducted more than 75 live-fire structural burns, training law enforcement officers to enter burning structures, conduct hostage rescues, and neutralize threats under the conditions that make these incidents so dangerous: heat, smoke, limited visibility, compromised access and egress, victim entrapment, and an ongoing armed threat.

The lesson is simple: fire changes the fight. If agencies do not train for it, they will be forced to figure it out during the worst possible moment.

Check out our training here: https://www.threatsuppression.com/fire-as-a-weapon

08/27/2026

The August 27, 2025, mass shooting at the Church of the Annunciation in Minneapolis offers two important takeaways: one for schools and one for public safety.

According to law enforcement, the suspect entered the church, placed 2x4 lumber through two exit-door handles to prevent students from escaping, deployed a smoke bomb, and began firing into the church during Mass. Two children were killed and 17 people were wounded.

The school had trained students and staff for an active-assailant attack inside the school. They had not trained for an attack inside the church.

For schools, the takeaway is clear: training must extend beyond the classroom or primary school building. Students and staff may gather in churches, auditoriums, cafeterias, athletic facilities, buses, parking areas, and other shared spaces. Each location creates different challenges involving access, evacuation, sheltering, communications, medical response, and law-enforcement operations.

A plan that works in a classroom may not work in a church.
For public safety, there is another critical lesson: responders must be prepared to encounter more than an armed attacker. They may face barricaded exits, smoke, obscured visibility, trapped victims, unfamiliar building layouts, and rapidly changing conditions. Many agencies train for the active attacker but do not routinely train for the combination of an attacker, barricades, smoke, and blocked escape routes.

Those conditions can affect entry, rescue, movement, communications, ventilation, fire suppression, medical access, and the location of victims. They also require close coordination among law enforcement, fire, EMS, school officials, and facility personnel.

The question for schools is not simply, “Have we trained for an active assailant?” The question is, “Have we trained for an active assailant in every place our students and staff may be?”

The question for public safety is not simply, “Can we reach the threat?” It is, “Can we reach the threat, locate and remove victims, and operate effectively when exits are barricaded and visibility is compromised?”

Every space requires a plan. Every plan must account for the conditions responders may encounter.

08/26/2026

A man accused of threatening to “shoot up” five Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools was released on bond just days before students returned to class. That understandably frightened parents and teachers. Yesterday WBTV News relied on Dr. Mike Clumpner and Threat Suppression, Incorporated, for expert advice about how families and schools should respond.

Parents should remember an important fact: schools remain statistically among the safest places for children. Less than 2% of youth homicides occur on school grounds, on the way to or from school, or at school-sponsored events (CDC, 2024). That does not make school violence unimportant. It provides necessary perspective.

The known threat is frightening. The unknown threat is often scarier. When a specific person, target, location, or pattern is identified, schools and law enforcement can make informed decisions. They can increase security, coordinate intelligence, review access control, notify appropriate personnel, prepare staff, and develop targeted protective measures. The unknown threat creates a different problem because decision-makers do not know who may be involved, what they intend, whether they have the capability to act, or whether the threat has already entered the planning or preparation phase.

We also have to be careful not to assume we know the subject’s intent without knowing all the facts. There is a difference between a howler and a hunter. A howler may make threats to frighten, intimidate, gain attention, or express anger without taking meaningful steps toward violence. A hunter often deliberately conceals intent, gathers information, selects targets, acquires capability, and moves toward an attack without making a public threat. That distinction cannot be made from a headline or a criminal charge. It requires a disciplined behavioral threat assessment based on facts, behavior, intent, capability, target selection, pathway, and protective factors.

This is also not the first time someone accused of threatening a school has been released on bond. In May 2026, a former charter-school teacher was reportedly released on $50,000 bond after being accused of threatening to shoot up the school. In December 2025, a Texas high-school student was reportedly released on $100,000 bond after being accused of threatening to shoot his school. Although uncommon, suspects bonding out is not rare.

Parents should trust the safety plans schools have spent years developing. They should also ask whether those plans address what happens after an alleged threat-maker is released.

Threat assessment is not a one-time event. It is an ongoing process of information gathering, risk formulation, communication, management, and reassessment.

Watch the report here:

Court records show that Drew Owens—the man accused of threatening to “shoot up” five Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools last year—was released on bond Aug. 21

08/25/2026

Accused of threatening to attack five Charlotte schools, a man was released just days before students returned after a judge cut his bond from $200,000 to $75,000.

According to WSOC-TV, Drew Owens is accused of threatening Garinger, West Charlotte, Ardrey Kell, Community House, and Hawk Ridge schools. He is now under electronic monitoring and has been ordered to stay away from the schools.

This case raises important questions for every school district:
- Do you increase security at the five targeted schools, at every school in the district, or maintain the same security posture?
- What information and messaging do you provide to concerned parents, teachers, and staff?
- Do you conduct additional training with school employees, particularly those working at the schools specifically identified in the alleged threats?

A school-based Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management team should not wait for the next threat or assume that an arrest has eliminated the risk.

The team should:
• Gather and verify available information about the threats, the subject, intended targets, access, capability, and current conditions.
• Coordinate with law enforcement, prosecutors, probation or pretrial services, and other appropriate partners.
• Understand the conditions of release and establish how schools will be notified of violations or new concerning behavior.
• Conduct a current, evidence-based risk formulation rather than relying solely on the original arrest or charge.
• Identify specific protective measures for each potentially targeted school.
• Review access control, arrival and dismissal procedures, communications, emergency response, and law-enforcement coordination.
• Establish clear reporting and escalation procedures for new concerning behavior.
• Provide appropriate support and information to affected staff, students, and families without spreading unverified details.
• Reassess the situation as new information emerges.

A BTAM team does not determine bond, prosecute the case, or replace law enforcement. Its role is to manage the school-related risk that remains before, during, and after the criminal-justice process.

Release from custody does not automatically mean a person is safe. An arrest does not automatically mean the threat has been resolved. And a stay-away order is only effective if schools understand it, communicate it, and have a plan for responding when it is violated.

Threat assessment is not a one-time event.

08/24/2026

When School Staff Are the Threat

We spend so much time assessing students as potential threats that we often overlook an uncomfortable reality: teachers and other employees can pose threats, too.

Last week, police arrested a 58-year-old substitute teacher in Louisiana for allegedly sending false active-shooter alerts through a school district's emergency-management system. The fraudulent alerts involved five schools, triggered immediate security responses, and created genuine fear and disruption across multiple campuses.

This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, we have seen multiple media reports of threats of violence made by school board members, high school teachers, middle school teachers, and elementary school teachers. In multiple cases, the teachers threatened to shoot students in the school. In 2022, an SRO discovered loaded handguns in a box on school property in Parkland, Florida, left there by a principal who claimed he inadvertently brought them from home.

These examples point to a critical gap often present in school threat assessments. Threats do not come only from students. They come from anyone with access to the campus, authority over students, institutional knowledge, or understanding of emergency procedures. An insider with legitimate credentials can exploit trust and institutional systems far more credibly than an outsider.

A comprehensive behavioral threat assessment program must evaluate concerning behavior regardless of the person's position. Status, tenure, professional role, and popularity should never replace objective evaluation. Schools need systems that identify warning signs, protect reporting employees and students, restrict access when justified, and distinguish legitimate emergencies from malicious or reckless misuse of emergency protocols.

The goal is not to create a culture of suspicion toward staff. The goal is to stop assuming they cannot be a threat.

08/21/2026

We strongly support classroom doors closed and locked during the school day.

A recent report yesterday by active shooter researcher Dr. David Riedman, said that locked doors do not work in schools. He advocates that “the best option is to leave the doors open.” We could not disagree more.

Lockdowns should not be the only response option. Students should not be trapped in unsafe areas. Schools should not spend millions on complicated technology without evidence that it improves safety. But a basic barrier should be in place before an attack begins.

We want to recognize our friends at Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) and Dr. Hunter Martaindale for conducting and publishing a comprehensive study on the role of locked doors and access control in school-based active-shooter events. The study does not claim that locked doors are perfect or prevent every attack. It examines how doors function in real incidents, including where they succeed, where they fail, and how compliance and response time affect outcomes.

Dr. Riedman's argument against locked classroom doors and his dig at ALERRT's research relies on a flawed premise: if a locked door did not prevent every shooting, then it did not work.

That is not how physical security works. A locked classroom door is intended to deny or delay access, limit attacker movement, protect occupants, and buy time for information, and law enforcement response. Those benefits matter most when the attacker is in the hallway and trying to reach occupied classrooms.

There is also a significant inconsistency in Dr. Riedman's recent report.

In a public post less than three weeks ago he treated locked doors and training as the established baseline for school safety. Yet in this new report, he argues schools should leave classroom doors open. These positions are fundamentally inconsistent. He cannot reasonably rely on locked doors as the standard against which new technology must be measured while simultaneously dismissing locked doors as ineffective.

In 2025, following the Covenant School attack, Dr. Riedman posted that since 1966, only 200 of 2,400 school shootings occurred inside a classroom. He said with the broad application of lockdowns, an active shooter event inside a classroom only occurred in 5 of 316 school shooting events in the 2022-2023 school year. He stated the majority of perpetrators are moving through the halls, which is true. This demonstrates that most classrooms are safe when the door is shut and locked. We've observed this first hand watching videos of real school shooting events.

Classroom doors should be closed and locked during the school day. Schools should also train for evacuation, sheltering, hallway movement, communication failures, medical response, and changing conditions.

08/19/2026

Law Enforcement Contingency Pre-Planning

A routine warrant service can become a mass-casualty incident in seconds.

Video released by NBC News shows a second-floor deck collapsing during a U.S. Marshals operation in Missouri. Nine officers fell several feet, became trapped in the debris, and five were hospitalized. Fortunately, none suffered life-threatening injuries.

But consider how quickly this could have become far worse. What if the subject had been home? What if he had been armed, hostile, and prepared to attack officers while they were injured, disoriented, and trapped?

A structural collapse could have immediately created:
- Multiple injured officers
- An active threat
- A rescue operation
- A need for additional law-enforcement resources
- A mass-casualty response
- Conflicting priorities between rescuing victims and containing the threat

This is why fire and EMS should be part of the planning process and, when appropriate, pre-staged nearby during high-risk raids and warrant services. They do not need to be in the immediate operational area. But they should be close enough to respond rapidly if officers are injured, a structure collapses, a fire starts, or the operation becomes a mass-casualty incident.

Planning cannot stop every unexpected event. It can establish what happens when the original plan fails. Agencies should be prepared for structural collapse, fire, hostile subjects, barricades, officer injuries, civilians on scene, communications failures, and the rapid transition to a mass-casualty response.

The question is not whether the operation is expected to become complicated. The question is whether your team is prepared when it does.

Media here:

What was supposed to be a routine arrest took an unexpected turn for a U.S. Marshals task force in Missouri when a deck collapsed underneath them. NBC News' Marquise Francis reports.