What are the opening hours?

Monday 8am - 5pm Tuesday 8am - 5pm Wednesday 8am - 5pm Thursday 8am - 5pm Friday 8am - 5pm

http://www.ThreatSuppression.com/

Threat Suppression, Incorporated, Charlotte, NC (2026)

10/23/2026

“They Were Looking Right Through Me” – The Psychopathic Stare

The psychopathic stare is a well recognized concept in psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder. The term is often used to describe prolonged, intense, unusually still, or emotionally detached eye contact. It may be combined with a flat expression, limited blinking, or behavior that appears designed to intimidate. They are often able to hold this gaze without visible discomfort.

This often feels unnerving and even threatening. What does it mean? This stare is often initially an unconscious behavior by the individual. They are sizing the other person, looking for any signs of weakness. They do not appear to be engaged in the actual conversation, instead giving a vacant or flat look. Consciously, this gaze can also be used for intimidation. Staring is a way to maintain power and attempt to control social interactions.

But a stare alone does not establish psychopathy, violent intent, or danger. Psychopathy is a personality construct involving patterns such as callousness, manipulation, lack of remorse, emotional detachment, and persistent disregard for others. It cannot be identified from someone’s eyes, facial expression, or a single interaction.

An intense stare can have many explanations:
- Anger or intimidation
- Focus or concentration
- Anxiety or social discomfort
- Trauma-related responses
- Autism or other differences in social communication
- Cultural differences in eye contact
- Substance use, medication, fatigue, or emotional distress

The more important question is what accompanies the stare. Is the person making threats? Fixated on a target? Testing boundaries? Stalking someone? Escalating after being confronted? Displaying grievance, entitlement, violent fantasies, weapon access, or leakage? Attempting to intimidate others into silence?

Behavioral threat assessment must focus on observable behavior, content, intent, capability, and escalation. Although intense staring or glaring is not always actionable, it should raise concern and potentially warrant further observation.

10/21/2026

The Tennessee Titans released defensive tackle Jordan Elliott today after a reported practice dispute escalated to the point that Elliott went to the players’ parking garage to retrieve a fi***rm from his vehicle.

According to reports, another veteran player intervened and helped deescalate the situation before anyone was injured. The Titans confirmed an incident occurred but did not disclose details. Metro Nashville Police reportedly said no report had been filed and no charges were brought.

Elliott had signed a two-year contract worth up to $8 million. That detail is important, not because money caused the incident, but because it challenges a common assumption about violence. A person can be wealthy, successful, respected, employed, and professionally accomplished, yet still respond to conflict in a dangerous way.

Charlotte Pastor Talbot Davis once said, “How well a man is doing is no indication of how good he is doing.”

Individual wealth is not a reliable protective factor against violence. Neither are status, intelligence, education, athletic ability, or professional success. Dr. Amy Bishop demonstrated this when she opened fire at the University of Alabama at Huntsville. Dr.
Henry Bellow demonstrated this when he opened fire at Bronx Lebanon Hospital. These are just two of many examples.

Behavioral threat assessment cannot focus only on people who appear unsuccessful or visibly troubled. It must examine behavior, context, grievances, fixation, escalation, access to weapons, and the subject’s ability to move from anger to action.

This incident also demonstrates why workplace violence prevention cannot be limited to policies stored in a handbook. Organizations need clear reporting pathways, trained supervisors, threat-management protocols, coordinated security responses, and intervention strategies that address concerning behavior before it becomes violence.

Fortunately, someone recognized the danger and helped de-escalate the situation. Behavioral threat assessment and management must explore all potential threats

10/16/2026

Thoughts and prayers are not enough.

Yesterday, a 16-year-old gunman entered Silver Rail Elementary School in Bend, Oregon, and killed three children and a teacher. Two additional victims were critically injured.

The attack ended when an armed community member confronted and fatally shot the gunman. That intervention likely prevented further loss of life. It was courageous, but it should not be mistaken for a preparedness strategy.

Communities cannot rely on courage, luck, or an armed good Samaritan to stop the next attack. They need dedicated and diligent planning for prevention, response, and recovery. That means identifying vulnerabilities, developing clear command relationships, training law enforcement, fire, EMS, schools, hospitals, and emergency management together, planning for family assistance and reunification, and exercising the plan before a real event tests it.

NFPA 3000 provides more than 75 specific planning considerations for communities preparing to prevent, respond to, and recover from an active shooter or hostile event. It is not a checklist to download and ignore. It is a framework for building an integrated community response.

The challenge is straightforward: How much time has your community spent studying and applying NFPA 3000?

Not how much time has been spent sending thoughts and prayers. Not how much time has been spent discussing school safety after the latest tragedy. How much time has been spent identifying gaps, assigning responsibility, training together, exercising the plan, and correcting what does not work?

Our prayers are with the entire Bend community, but prayers alone are not enough. They must be matched by deliberate planning, preparation, training, and action.

The time to prepare is before the next call.

10/14/2026

Family mass killings are a scenario responders should specifically train for.

On Friday, October 9, 2026, an acoustic gunshot-detection alert brought police to a home on Perry Street in Erie, Pennsylvania. Officers found two women dead outside the residence. Six additional victims were found inside, including a pregnant woman and two young children. The 45-year-old shooter was also found dead from an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound. All eight victims and the shooter were deceased before police arrived.

An almost identical event occurred on August 23, 2026, near Billings, Montana. Officers responded to gunfire at a home during a family dinner and encountered a structure fire. Eight family members, including four children, were killed. The shooter died from an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound after confronting responding officers.

The AP, USA Today, and Northeastern University database tracks mass killings involving four or more victims intentionally killed within 24 hours, excluding the offender. Its data shows that family-on-family shootings make up 48% of mass-killing events, with many of these incidents occurring in private homes rather than public spaces.

Responders should train for these scenes specifically:
- Victims outside the structure. In Erie, victims were found both outside and inside the home. Crews must search the perimeter, surrounding property, vehicles, and interior spaces before assuming all victims have been located.
- A deceased or incapacitated offender. In both incidents, the shooter was dead before the scene was secured. Responders must consider that the immediate threat may have ended, but they cannot assume it without verification.
- Acoustic gunshot detection. Alerts can bring officers to a scene quickly, but dispatchers and responding crews must understand what the alert indicates and what it does not confirm.
- Fire and secondary hazards. The Billings attack involved a structure fire, complicating entry, search, rescue, evidence preservation, and accountability.
- Responder wellness. Officers and other responders may encounter scenes involving multiple victims, children, family members, and su***de. Peer support, behavioral-health resources, and formal post-incident care should be built into the response plan before they are needed.

These events are not simply active-shooter scenarios. They may combine family violence, murder-su***de, fire, barricade conditions, mass casualty response, and complex crime-scene operations. Training should reflect that reality.

10/13/2026

When the Threat Lives Nearby

“He is here” is a concept in behavioral threat assessment that suggests a threat is imminent, either in proximity or time. But what does it mean when the person of concern lives adjacent to critical infrastructure, such as a school, workplace, or government building?

This creates additional complexity, but it may also provide a tactical advantage. The saying “the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know” can apply in this context. Knowing about a person who may pose a threat is often better than confronting an unknown threat whose identity, location, and intentions are unclear.

A person who poses a threat and lives nearby may have:
- Familiarity with school routines, access points, traffic patterns, and security weaknesses
- Line-of-sight access to classrooms, athletic fields, parking lots, and playgrounds
- Legitimate reasons to be near the school, or the ability to use proximity to intimidate staff and students
- Rapid access to weapons and am******on

Although these factors may increase potential risk, proximity alone does not make someone a threat. The first question must be: What has the person actually done?

Is the behavior protected speech, nuisance behavior, trespassing, harassment, intimidation, or a credible threat of violence? Each category requires a different response and different legal considerations. Protective measures must also be carefully calibrated so they do not unnecessarily stigmatize or target other nearby residents.

A historical example is the 1979 shooting at Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego. Sixteen-year-old Brenda Spencer lived in a home directly across the street from the school and used that position to fire on students and staff outside the building. She killed two adults and wounded eight children and a responding police officer.

There is no indication that Spencer was a known or identified threat to the school before the shooting. The case therefore does not demonstrate a failure to manage a documented threat through behavioral threat assessment. It demonstrates the physical-security challenges created by proximity, line of sight, familiarity, and access to a fi***rm.

How can proximity provide a tactical advantage to law enforcement or the affected organization?

It creates an opportunity for focused observation, counter-surveillance, and closer coordination between the organization and law enforcement. Responders may be able to monitor the exterior of the facility, identify changes in the person’s behavior or routine, and better understand how the property relates to the school or workplace.

Surveillance and proximity are a two-way street. The person of concern may know the facility, but the facility and law enforcement may also have a better opportunity to understand the person.

The key is disciplined assessment. Proximity should increase awareness and planning, not automatically produce fear, overreaction, or unlawful action.

10/12/2026

Two important events over the past several days deserve close attention from professionals who conduct behavioral threat assessment and management in K–12 schools.

The first involves an issue we have addressed before: threats from school employees. A Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools teaching assistant was recently arrested after allegedly threatening to shoot employees at Metro School. She was fired by the district and charged with making a threat of mass violence on educational property.

Threats from school employees are not isolated incidents. School districts must be prepared to assess and manage threats from anyone inside the organization, including teachers, administrators, contractors, and support staff. The person’s position does not make the threat less credible. In some cases, it may provide access, familiarity with the facility, and knowledge of emergency procedures.

The second incident occurred near an Eden Prairie, Minnesota, high school football game. An 18-year-old was arrested after allegedly shooting two teenagers during a confrontation involving multiple individuals and vehicles near the school’s homecoming event. He was later released on a $100,000 bond. Law enforcement has indicated that the incident may be connected to an ongoing conflict involving rival Somali groups, although the investigation remains active and additional charges or arrests are possible.

This is not the first time gunfire near a high school football game has forced an evacuation or disrupted an event. Tracking by the K-12 School Shooting Database found in the first 60 days of the 2023-2024 school year, there were 15 shootings at high school football games. In the first 60 days of the 2024-2025 school year, there were seven shootings at high school football games.

These two incidents give school BTAM teams several issues to consider:
- Threats can come from staff members, not only students or outsiders.
- Districts need a clearly defined process for receiving, assessing, documenting, and acting on threats from employees.
- School-sponsored events do not end when the final whistle blows. Parking lots, surrounding streets, and nearby gathering areas require planning and coordination.
- A shooting connected to an ongoing conflict may create continuing concerns involving retaliation, additional targets, social-media threats, and attempts to identify or locate witnesses.
- When an arrested suspect is released before trial, schools and law-enforcement partners may need to reassess safety concerns, communication strategies, and protective measures.

BTAM cannot operate in isolation. These cases may require coordination among school administrators, threat-assessment professionals, law enforcement, prosecutors, probation or pretrial services, mental-health providers, and community partners.
The larger lesson is straightforward: school violence prevention must account for threats from within the organization and violence that occurs around school-sponsored events. Both require planning before the next warning or incident occurs.

10/07/2026

Newly released law enforcement body-camera footage from the 2023 shooting of Richneck Elementary School teacher Abby Zwerner provides disturbing insight into the immediate aftermath of the incident.

The footage shows the six-year-old student after he shot his teacher, cursing at officers and attempting to fight teachers and law-enforcement personnel. He also proudly stated that he had stolen the handgun from his mother.

The case received national attention because a six-year-old student intentionally shot his teacher after reportedly taking the fi***rm from home. In 2025, a civil jury awarded Zwerner $10 million after finding former assistant principal Ebony Parker grossly negligent. In 2026, however, a judge dismissed all eight felony child-neglect charges against Parker, ruling that prosecutors had not established a criminal offense under Virginia law.

When people struggle to understand how a six-year-old could carry a fi***rm into school and shoot a teacher, the body-camera footage provides important context. It shows a child displaying profound behavioral dysregulation, homicidal aggression, and apparent familiarity with violence.

The footage does not, by itself, explain why the shooting occurred. But it reinforces a critical point: age alone should never cause adults to dismiss credible warning signs, violent behavior, access to weapons, or a child’s demonstrated capability.

Read the article here: https://hoodline.com/2026/10/newport-news-video-shows-boy-6-cursing-officers-after-shooting-his-teacher/

10/05/2026

Yesterday morning, two people were killed and as many as 35 others were injured during a homecoming-weekend block party in rural Vienna, Georgia. More than 1,000 people were reportedly present when more than 50 shots were fired from at least two locations about a block apart. The scene extended across approximately four blocks. Deputies were already on scene monitoring the crowd when the shooting began.

Two people were pronounced dead at the scene. At least 25 injured people were transported to area hospitals, including victims with gunshot wounds and others reportedly injured while trying to escape. As of the latest reports, no suspects have been arrested, and investigators have not identified a motive.

This incident highlights several recurring challenges associated with mass shootings at large, informal gatherings:
• Law enforcement may already be on scene managing crowds when the shooting begins.
• Events can overwhelm smaller communities and local hospitals within minutes.
• Multiple shooting locations can expand the crime scene and complicate command, communications, evidence collection, and victim identification.
• Some victims and witnesses may leave the scene or self-transport before responders can establish an organized triage and transportation operation.
• Witness cooperation may be limited, making investigators dependent on video, shell-casing evidence, forensic analysis, and delayed witness interviews.
• Initial reports may not clearly establish the number of shooters, requiring investigators to avoid premature conclusions.

Similar incidents include:
• June 2, 2024: Akron, Ohio, one person was killed and 27 others were wounded during a block party.
• July 2, 2023: Baltimore, Maryland, two people were killed and 28 others were wounded during a block party.
• June 18, 2023: Willowbrook, Illinois, one person was killed and 22 others were wounded during a Juneteenth celebration.
• April 15, 2023: Dadeville, Alabama, four people were killed and 32 others were wounded at a block birthday party.
• July 22, 2020: Charlotte, North Carolina: four people were killed and 10 others wounded at Juneteenth block party.

These events require more than a traditional response plan. Agencies must prepare for crowd management, multiple shooting locations, rapidly expanding crime scenes, self-transporting victims, overwhelmed hospitals, limited witness cooperation, and the possibility that the incident will continue after the first shots are fired.

10/01/2026

All of our active assailant practical training includes scenarios involving attacks on school buses.

We began incorporating school-bus scenarios in 2021 after an armed Fort Jackson recruit hijacked a school bus carrying 18 children in Columbia, South Carolina. The children and driver were ultimately released unharmed, but the incident demonstrated that school transportation must be included in active assailant and emergency response training.

The United States has a long history of violence, threats, and other dangerous incidents involving school buses. These vehicles present unique operational challenges. They are mobile, enclosed, difficult to evacuate quickly, and often operate away from the school campus and its established security systems.

A recent incident in Indianapolis reinforces that concern. On September 16, a 19-year-old woman allegedly followed a school bus carrying 37 children after believing the bus had caused her to strike a construction sign. She reportedly drove around the bus, positioned her vehicle to block it from leaving, and approached while armed with a handgun.

According to police and court documents, the woman allegedly waved the gun, demanded that the driver exit the bus, forced open the bus door, and entered while still armed. The driver remained focused on protecting the children and contacted dispatch. The woman eventually left the bus before law enforcement arrived. She faces multiple felony charges, including criminal confinement with a deadly weapon, criminal confinement involving a vehicle, and pointing a fi***rm at another person.

The incident reportedly began as road rage. That is an important lesson. A threat to a school bus does not have to begin as a planned attack against children. It can develop rapidly from a traffic conflict, an angry parent, a custody dispute, a criminal pursuit, a vehicle collision, or another confrontation near the bus.

Drivers and school personnel should not be expected to improvise their response to a violent incident on a bus. They need practical training that reflects the limitations of the vehicle, the presence of children, the possibility of movement, and the need to protect students while communicating with responders.

School safety planning cannot stop at the schoolhouse door. Every school district should ask whether its active-assailant plans, exercises, and training specifically address school buses and other student transportation.

Read the Indianapolis news article here: https://headlinesmart.com/armed-woman-storms-school-bus-carrying-37-children/ #

09/30/2026

Today, we conclude our review of the after-action report regarding the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. The report identified several important lessons that we examined throughout this week. We wrap up with the following findings:

• Technology must support real-time operations, not just investigations. UVU had cameras, access-control systems, emergency-notification systems, and other useful tools. However, those systems were not fully integrated into a common operating picture. During major events, someone must be specifically assigned to monitor, interpret, and communicate information from relevant systems.

• Social listening is not protective intelligence. Monitoring public sentiment and media coverage does not replace subject-focused intelligence work. UVU needs trained personnel, approved investigative accounts, documentation standards, legal and privacy controls, and defined escalation pathways.

• Mutual aid should be pre-arranged and operationally integrated. The report recognized important cooperation from local and state partners. However, capabilities such as drones, additional law-enforcement personnel, fire and EMS resources, emergency management, traffic control, and investigative support should be identified, requested, and incorporated into event planning before an incident occurs.

• Organizational structure and staffing must match the risk environment. A large university hosting major events needs appropriately positioned campus-safety leadership, sufficient staffing, a formal training plan, and strong integration among police, emergency management, threat assessment, communications, and executive leadership.

• External-threat planning must supplement traditional BTAM. UVU’s behavioral threat-assessment system was oriented largely toward students, employees, and other insiders. The incident demonstrated the need to connect BTAM with event-specific protective intelligence, open-source intelligence, law-enforcement information sharing, and speaker-protection planning.

These findings reinforce a broader lesson: a university can possess policies, technology, trained personnel, and capable partners and still experience gaps when those resources are not integrated into one operational system.

Security planning for significant events must connect technology, intelligence, command, staffing, communications, mutual aid, and executive decision-making before the event begins. Preparation is not simply having resources available. It is knowing who will use them, how information will move, who has authority to act, and how the entire system will function under pressure.

Read the report here:https://www.uvu.edu/external.../docs/after-action-report.pdf

Threat Suppression, Incorporated

10/23/2026

10/21/2026

10/16/2026

10/14/2026

10/13/2026

10/12/2026

10/07/2026

10/05/2026

10/01/2026

09/30/2026

Address

Opening Hours

Telephone

Website

Alerts

Contact The Business

Shortcuts

Share

Category

Listing takedown request

Monday	8am - 5pm
Tuesday	8am - 5pm
Wednesday	8am - 5pm
Thursday	8am - 5pm
Friday	8am - 5pm