02/08/2025
Peace in a Triangle of Tension: Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar
Peace is not merely the absence of war; it is a layered and measurable condition of stability, security, and social harmony. One of the most comprehensive global tools to assess this condition is the Global Peace Index (GPI), a ranking system developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The GPI uses a set of 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators, grouped under three broad domains, to evaluate the level of peace in 163 countries across the globe.
The first domain is Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict, which captures the presence of organized conflict within a state or between nations. The second domain is Societal Safety and Security, examining levels of violence, crime, terrorism, and political instability within a country. The third is Militarization, which assesses a country's investment in military capability relative to peaceful development and the involvement of armed forces in public life.
Now, where do Bangladesh and its immediate neighbors—India and Myanmar stand within this framework?
In the 2024 Global Peace Index, Bangladesh ranks 96th, India at a troubling 135th, and Myanmar near the bottom at 139th out of 163 countries. These rankings are not just numbers; they reflect deep, persistent tensions and unresolved issues within each country, particularly in their border regions.
Bangladesh is slightly more peaceful than India and far more so than Myanmar, yet stability remains elusive. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, indigenous communities still protest land disputes, political marginalisation, and a continued military presence despite the 1997 peace accord. Cox’s Bazar has transformed into a humanitarian hotspot with over one million Rohingya refugees; stalled repatriation and waning international aid make the area susceptible to crime and extremism. India’s northeast has pockets of calm, yet states such as Manipur and Nagaland are unsettled by ethnic militancy and uneven development. Myanmar remains deeply destabilised by the junta’s post‑coup violence and repression. So, what drives these repeated cycles of violence? According to the IEP, two of the most dangerous accelerants of civil conflict are ethnic exclusion and external support, both of which are present across this triangle.
Ethnic exclusion creates the foundation for deep social resentment. When ethnic or minority groups are deliberately left out of political power, denied cultural rights, or subject to surveillance, a dangerous “us versus them” mentality takes root. These communities often begin to see the state as an oppressor rather than a protector. In response, the state may perceive the ethnic group as a threat, reacting with indiscriminate force, collective punishment, and repression. This is the tragic reality in Rakhine, mirrored in little forms in the CHT, and echoed through the long-standing alienation of tribal communities in India’s Northeast.
But exclusion alone doesn’t tell the whole story. External support, whether from foreign states, armed groups, or even private military contractors, can dramatically escalate conflict. The flow of weapons, intelligence, funding, and military training prolongs wars that might otherwise have ended. Rebel groups that receive outside backing often gain enough strength to resist compromise. Such support mechanisms are often invisible in mainstream narratives but deeply embedded in the region’s geopolitical realities.
In this context, peace becomes more than a political slogan; it becomes a strategic necessity. The people of CHT, Manipur, and Rakhine live not just near one another geographically, but within the same ecosystem of unresolved grievances, regional mistrust, and unacknowledged trauma. Improving the peace index for these countries will require more than counterinsurgency or development projects; it will require an honest reckoning with how power is distributed, how people are included, and how external influences are regulated.
