Near East Energy Associates Ltd

12/06/2026

Greece has replaced Russian and Azeri gas with LNG, while draws a new strategy to shield its energy infrastructure

Greece is rapidly weaning itself off Russian natural gas, with liquefied natural gas emerging as the dominant energy source in the first five months of 2026, according to data released by the Green Tank think tank.

LNG covered 64.3% of domestic demand from January through May, while Russian gas fell to a 24.4% share – down sharply from 44.6% at the end of 2025.

Russian gas imports entering the Greek system through the Sidirokastro crossing totaled 7.2 TWh, a 39.3% drop from the same period last year.
Azerbaijani gas, delivered via the TAP pipeline through the Nea Mesimvria entry point, also lost ground, slipping to a 14.7% share with imports of 4.3 TWh, down 4.5%.

LNG imports through the Revythoussa terminal and the Alexandroupolis floating storage and regasification unit reached a combined 18.9 TWh for the period, a record for that timeframe.

> Greece is on track to achieve full independence from Russian gas by end-2027, though the transition is coming at a cost, as increased LNG imports have been hit by elevated prices driven by renewed tensions in the Middle East.
A further concern, shared across Europe, is the growing dependence on American LNG, which at times accounted for as much as 80% of Greece’s total LNG imports during the period.

The data also highlighted Greece’s expanding role as a regional gas exporter. Exports in the first five months quadrupled compared to the same period in 2025, reaching 8 TWh, with 83.6% – some 6.7 TWh – flowing north through Sidirokastro to Balkan countries.

Domestic gas consumption held steady at 29.35 TWh, with power generation accounting for 63.1%, household and small business networks 25.4%, and heavy industry 11.6%.

Speaking at the annual FuelsEurope Conference in Brussels on Wednesday (10 June 2026), NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska underlined the critical role of energy and fuel supplies in supporting the Alliance’s deterrence and defence.

Ms Shekerinska highlighted that defence depends on secure access to fuel and energy, and emphasised the importance of ensuring that fuel supply chains remain secure, resilient, and able to support miliary operations in times of crisis. The Deputy Secretary General stressed the need to reduce strategic vulnerabilities and strengthen the protection of critical energy infrastructure. She also noted that close cooperation between the defence and energy sectors remains essential to strengthen Allied security and resilience.

Greece is advancing a national plan to strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure against a growing range of hybrid and cybersecurity threats, with a particular focus on energy facilities that officials regard as increasingly vulnerable amid geopolitical tensions.

A central pillar of the effort will be a new General Secretariat for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, to be established under the supervision of the Ministry of Citizen Protection.
The body will be responsible for coordinating, monitoring and implementing a national security plan covering a broad range of sectors, including energy, telecommunications, water networks, transportation and health services.

The pace of the initiative is expected to be shaped by a broad meeting scheduled for Wednesday under Thanos Dokos, national security adviser to the prime minister.
Companies and organizations that manage critical infrastructure, and representatives from the ministries of Citizen Protection and National Defense, will present proposals, studies and operational plans.

> Officials involved in the process have highlighted coordination as the main challenge. A country’s resilience against hybrid attacks is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain, participants in the process have emphasized.

The framework foresees strict penalties, including fines of up to €10 million for companies that fail to comply with security requirements.

The initiative is linked to Greece’s obligation to align with the European Union’s directive calling on member-states to identify critical infrastructure and contribute to a broader European resilience strategy against natural disasters, terrorism and hybrid threats.

Energy infrastructure has emerged as a key concern. Power generation facilities, transmission networks, natural gas pipelines, LNG terminals, refineries, cross-border interconnections and subsea electricity cables are viewed as increasingly exposed to hybrid threats.

According to the text, Europe recorded 219 hybrid warfare incidents between 2014 and 2024, with 86% occurring after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and 45% recorded in 2024 alone.

Greek energy companies have already begun adapting. DESFA strengthened measures following a 2022 cyberattack and secured no-fly-zone status for the Revythoussa LNG facility against drone threats.

ADMIE has launched surveillance of critical transmission infrastructure and is examining additional safeguards for subsea electricity links, which experts consider among the most vulnerable components of modern energy systems.

09/06/2026

As Israel’s gas exports to Egypt and Jordan have stopped and restarted three times since October 2023, Azerbaijan’s state oil company, known as SOCAR, has moved into every layer of Israel’s energy business at once.

SOCAR now runs the largest new exploration zone in Israeli waters, holds 10% of the Tamar gas field, ships roughly three cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Egypt each month, partners with a Qatari company to restart power plants in Syria using Azerbaijani gas piped through Turkey, and is in talks to expand further into Egypt and Jordan. No other foreign company holds that many positions in or around Israeli gas.

Those positions came together publicly this week at the 31st Baku Energy Forum and the first Azerbaijan-US Economic Dialogue, held on Tuesday. They provide backup supply when Israeli gas goes offline, as it did for 32 days during the Hormuz war. They also allow gas produced in Israeli waters to reach customers who refuse to buy directly from Israel.

“It is our first East Mediterranean investment, and we are definitely interested in developing it further,” Vitaliy Baylarbayov, SOCAR’s deputy vice president for investments and marketing, told The Media Line at SOCAR headquarters on Monday, referring to the Tamar stake closed in June 2025 for $510 million. The Tamar position is one of five pieces SOCAR has built in or around Israeli gas.

Israeli energy security analyst Elai Rettig of the Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University wrote about the pattern in a paper published May 6. The 32-day shutdown of Leviathan and Karish during the Hormuz war was the third major disruption of Israeli gas exports since October 7, 2023.

Jordan, which draws roughly 68% of its electricity from natural gas and gets more than half of that from Israeli pipelines, paid an estimated $2.5 million a day in extra fuel costs during the March-April shutdown. Egypt’s bill for imported LNG tripled in the first quarter of 2026, from $560 million to $1.65 billion. Leviathan resumed exports on April 2, and Karish followed a week later. But the shift is permanent, Rettig told The Media Line. Egypt and Jordan are lining up alternatives in case Israeli gas goes offline again.

The newest piece is Cluster I, a 660-square-mile exploration zone in the northern part of Israel’s waters, next to the Leviathan gas field and west of Energean’s Karish field. Israel’s petroleum commissioner awarded six exploration licenses there in October 2023, weeks after the Hamas attack froze the broader bid round. SOCAR leads the project. BP and NewMed Energy hold the remaining stakes, each at roughly one-third.

Tamar is operated by Chevron, the American oil major that also operates Leviathan, the field shut for 32 days during the Hormuz war. Chevron took over both fields in 2020 with its purchase of Noble Energy and approved the Leviathan expansion in January. SOCAR’s 10% Tamar stake puts the Azerbaijani state company inside a Chevron-run field. On Tuesday in Baku, SOCAR and Chevron signed a joint study agreement to assess oil and gas potential in the Middle Caspian Basin, one of two cooperation tracks with American majors that Baylarbayov flagged Monday, alongside ExxonMobil. Both American majors are now tied to SOCAR’s portfolio while operating Israeli production.

Nearly half of Tamar under foreign ownership
Mubadala Energy of Abu Dhabi holds 11% of Tamar, bought from Delek in 2021 in the largest commercial deal after the UAE-Israel normalization agreement. Combined with Chevron’s 25% and SOCAR’s 10%, foreign ownership of Tamar now stands at 46%, split across an American operator and Emirati and Azerbaijani partners.

The same Gulf-Azerbaijan business ties run in the other direction. ADNOC International holds 30% of the Absheron gas field, where SOCAR, TotalEnergies, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, and BOTAŞ signed a 15-year, 33 billion-cubic-meter supply agreement with Turkey on Tuesday. Masdar, the Abu Dhabi state renewables developer, operates a 230-megawatt solar plant at Garadagh and broke ground in 2024 on another gigawatt of solar and wind capacity. SOCAR holds an upstream stake in the SARB and Umm Lulu fields off Abu Dhabi. The Israel-Azerbaijan partnership sits inside a wider Gulf-Azerbaijani business web from the Abraham Accords era.

Beyond the exploration deals, SOCAR’s trading business had been selling LNG to Egypt for nine months before the contract with the Egyptian Petroleum Corporation was formally signed in Cairo on March 31. Three SOCAR cargoes reached Egypt in March 2026 alone, worth roughly $146.5 million, putting SOCAR alongside Hartree and IRH as one of Egypt’s largest gas suppliers.

Egyptian lawmaker Mohamed Fouad, who sits on the Economic Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in Cairo, said SOCAR is meant to supplement Israeli pipeline gas, not replace it. Egypt’s December 2025 agreement with Israel for 130 billion cubic meters of pipeline gas over 15 years, worth roughly $35 billion, remains “structurally irreplaceable” in Cairo’s calculus, Fouad said. What SOCAR provides instead is what Fouad calls “resilience engineering around Leviathan dependence.”

SOCAR Trading ships more cargoes when Israeli production drops or summer demand peaks, and fewer when Israeli supplies return to normal. Fouad estimates Egypt’s basic need at two to four cargoes per month, with more in summer. Egypt’s own gas production was still falling through March 2026, down to about 3.80 billion cubic feet per day.

Cairo does not treat SOCAR and ExxonMobil as competitors. ExxonMobil is the long-term play, drilling new gas off Cyprus. SOCAR is the short- and medium-term backup, providing cargoes when Israeli supply drops. The two could overlap later, Fouad noted, if Egyptian production recovers and Cypriot exports move forward.

Egypt and ExxonMobil put that arrangement in writing at Egypt’s energy conference earlier this year. John Ardill, ExxonMobil’s vice president for global exploration, told The Media Line at the Baku Convention Center on Tuesday that the company signed a preliminary agreement with Egypt’s petroleum ministry to ship Cypriot gas through Egypt’s existing LNG terminals rather than build new export terminals.

ExxonMobil has finished evaluating its Glaucus gas find off Cyprus and is wrapping up Pegasus. ExxonMobil holds 60% of the block, and QatarEnergy holds 40%. ExxonMobil recently confirmed that the gas is commercial. Ardill said moving from discovery to actual production typically takes five to 10 years. “Rather than building all of this from scratch, that would let us move more quickly and more cost-effectively,” Ardill said. The same Egyptian terminals SOCAR uses for backup cargoes today will, by the early 2030s, handle Cypriot gas Egypt has helped develop.

02/06/2026

https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/06/02/gas-pipeline-from-turkey-to-north-to-be-operational-in-2028?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwZnRzaASMAUZleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAo2NjI4NTY4Mzc5AAEez9oposRq6kkv0OPnRnepg0pwBm_Zk3B2PjL8IXNCeWXHSxMSVMGGsrX7nrY_aem_KF8__EpEQFcX_PuuhRta5w =1780408853

The planned natural gas pipeline linking Turkey and northern Cyprus will be operational in 2028, the north’s ‘public works minister’ Erhan Arikli told the Turkish Cypriot legislature on Tuesday. “This project will be implemented through around 97 kilometres worth of pipelines, starting in Al...

23/05/2026

https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/05/23/cronos-gas-development-a-viable-project-for-companies-but-will-cyprus-benefit?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwZnRzaAR-igBleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAo2NjI4NTY4Mzc5AAEe4spBawokUrRG6m89bTLPXXgigquMV4A2Q3OszkXEid2t0cYcMfWZ7cwv4Lk_aem_Tuxh1CnhP8yX6m0dsAUBvg =1779528810

On 19 May Cyprus approved the Development and Production Plan of the Kronos gasfield in block 6 by the ENI-TotalEnergies consortium. This focuses on a fast-track, subsea tie-back to the existing Zohr and Egyptian gas infrastructure, to be liquefied at the Damietta LNG plant for export. The estimated...

19/05/2026

https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/05/18/regulatory-safeguards-essential-for-cyprus-electricity-market-expert-warns?fbclid=IwZnRzaAR5oLBleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAo2NjI4NTY4Mzc5AAEerQFG_Mo6XNcYlapKTmioGMSsk5CL-jRmGyuQO4EIoEPzHCw6lZ2KvkefZJk_aem_zntqQkP1VYUaXGgONZcnsg

The launch of Cyprus’ competitive electricity market represents an important modernisation step, but stronger regulatory safeguards are essential to prevent market distortions and protect consumers, according to energy expert Andreas Poullikkas. Poullikkas, professor of energy systems at Frederick...

19/05/2026

Cyprus advances plans for first natural gas production.

13/05/2026

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Negotiations on Cronos are in their final stages with first gas expected by mid 2028, Energy Minister Michalis Damianou said on Wednesday. Speaking after chairing a meeting under Cyprus’ presidency of the Council of the EU, he added that while natural gas can support energy security in the short t...

10/05/2026

CASUS BELLI 2.0: Let's go back to the old ways...
While the Athens Declaration is dying, Turkey is worried that it may be left out of the new architectural security in the wider region and plans its renewed attack to its "usual suspect".

Turkey is reportedly preparing legislation to formalize maritime claims in disputed parts of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, a move that could revive tensions with Greece and Cyprus over energy resources.

According to a Bloomberg report, the draft bill would be submitted to the Turkish parliament as part of Ankara’s effort to reinforce its jurisdictional claims and assert rights over potential offshore natural gas reserves.

Earlier this week, Devlet Bahceli, a close ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, warned against regional energy and security cooperation involving France, Greece, Cyprus and Israel.
“Turkey is not a country that seeks tension,” Bahceli told parliament, while warning that any move disregarding Turkish maritime claims or Turkish Cypriot rights would prompt a “strong response.”

Bloomberg noted that Washington has encouraged dialogue between Athens and Ankara, while the European Union has previously threatened sanctions over Turkish hydrocarbon exploration activities in the region.

The report did not say when the bill would be submitted to parliament.

Μonitoring the Turkish escalation...

Athens is focusing on Turkey’s reported plans to incorporate into domestic law the outer limits of the continental shelf Ankara says it possesses.

Greek officials are primarily concerned with the continental shelf because it concerns the exercise of sovereign rights and, depending on the final form of the Turkish initiative, could become another source of deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and an attempt to impose those claims in practice.

The issue comes after tensions surrounding the Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection project, the Great Sea Interconnector, intensified from July 2024 onward, nearly 18 months after the beginning of a period described as “calm waters” in the Aegean and eight months after the signing of the Athens Declaration in December 2023.

Athens’ public response is expected to depend on the final form of the bill that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government submits to Parliament. The proposed legislation is expected to follow positions outlined in a map published about a year ago by the National Research Center for Maritime Law at the University of Ankara, known as DEHUKAM.
That map included Turkish claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean involving the continental shelf, exclusive economic zones, territorial waters, search-and-rescue areas and permanent firing ranges.

Nevertheless, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, in a completely different tone from Ankara's intentions, defended his government’s overall “calm waters” policy towards Turkey, saying it has already yielded practical results, lowering tensions with the neighboring country.

Speaking to New Democracy members at the party’s pre-conference in Thessaloniki on Saturday said “Our foreign policy, above all, consolidates peace and justice in the region. Our goal – and we have achieved it – is to restore a functional relationship with our neighbors, with Turkey.
This policy has practical results. Fewer violations in our airspace, smaller migratory flows, but also more visitors from Turkey who strengthen the local markets of our islands. These are tangible elements that also respond to the hypocritical voices of those who question the choice of calm waters.
Calm waters, my friends, mean free waters, waters in which International Law prevails and waters that will always remain blue and peaceful, the colors, that is, of our flag and our sovereign rights. After all, with this policy, since 2019, Greece has been growing,” he added.
Finally, the prime minister went on to defend the government’s tough stance on migration, saying its twofold goal to reduce flows and increase returns have been achieved.

Why Now?

Turkey, however, has not retreated from its "Casus Belli" position, adopted by the Turkish Parliament in 1995 after Greece ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ankara has also continued developing additional interpretations of international legality, while citing the United States’ non-adoption of the convention without noting that Washington accepts its principles regarding islands and island formations.

Turkey has pursued a maritime policy in recent years. In 2019, it informed the United Nations of the outer limits of its claimed continental shelf up to the 28th meridian, followed by the Turkish-Libyan memorandum and maps showing exploration blocks for the state energy company TPAO.

Ankara is also seeking to answer Greek initiatives, including maritime parks, maritime spatial planning and agreements with US big oil Exxon Mobil and especially Chevron for research south of Crete. Incidents such as the obstruction of research by a Dutch vessel in international waters east of Crete two weeks ago reflect the prevailing climate in Ankara.

Turkish officials believe Greece has strengthened its position through maritime spatial planning, marine parks and closer alignment with NATO operations.

Some analysts asses that Ankara’s goal is not immediate escalation but a gradual effort to “define its own terms.”

Ankara's past warning...

Senior Turkish officials had warned that Ankara will turn its full diplomatic and military attention to the Aegean Sea and Cyprus once the conflict involving Iran concludes.

More specifically, a senior Turkish diplomat had said that Greek Patriot missile systems recently deployed to Karpathos and the Evros region, along with a permanent fighter aircraft presence on Limnos, are among the core issues Ankara intends to address. Turkey will demand a return to the pre-conflict status quo and “will not accept faits accomplis.
As soon as developments with the war and the Iran negotiations are over, all the attention of our defense and foreign ministries will turn to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean,” the diplomat had added, warning that recent moves in the islands and Cyprus “will be examined carefully and their reversal will be sought.”

Officials in Ankara believe that Athens is trying to change the status quo in the Aegean to its advantage. They see the deployment of Greek F-16 jets to Cyprus as a lesser problem, as on the one hand Greece is one of Cyprus’ guarantor powers and on the other Turkey holds a strategic advantage in the region.

The biggest "thorn" for Turkey is the cooperation between Greece -Israel and with France as well...

The front that concerns Greece and Greek-Turkish relations is, of course, the Eastern Mediterranean. All of Ankara's latest initiatives, whether they have been implemented or are being planned, are influenced to some extent by the extreme rivalry with Israel.
Therefore, Turkey is particularly incensed at the strong French and Israeli military footprint on Cyprus.

It is recalled that Ankara reacted harshly after the 22 December 2025 tripartite Summit of Greece, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus held in Jerusalem. At that time, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Nikos Christodoulides were presented by Ankara as “proxies” for Mr. Netanyahu, who of course did not miss the opportunity to level accusations against Turkey, speaking of some who wish to re-establish empires.

Ankara is also reacting very strongly to Greece's defense cooperation with Israel. The agreements related to the development of the "Achilles Shield", as well as other cutting-edge technological weapons (PULS, Spike N'Los and advanced software), are currently under scrutiny.

Ankara is also promoting, with particular effort, the image of Greece as Israel's political "squadron" in the EU, even painting Athens as a "black sheep" in a Europe that is generally against the Netanyahu government. Of course, this claim is pretentiously general and is not supported by the data, especially at the level of interstate relations, but it is also used as a kind of lever of influence in the political dialogue within Turkey.
(see: Turkish opposition: "Greece is doing very well in foreign and defense policy"…https://www.facebook.com/tsiplacos/posts/pfbid0CAWNoXLygsjV6TV73sLHezakDx3qQ5Cz2UN5MWzxWVKJgEr2Udmmpcygu7WedLL4l )

Next field of confrontation: Cyprus...?

The relationship between Greece, Israel and the Republic of Cyprus, as it has evolved in recent years, also functions as a kind of "confirmation" of the hard nationalist core of the Turkish deep state, which feels that an international anti-Turkish conspiracy is taking place to surround Turkey with hostile forces.
It is recalled that Ankara has been moving along the same wavelength for the past few months, with the presence of European and other forces in Cyprus as the main focus, with the claim that the balance of power on the island, where 40,000 Turkish soldiers are already deployed, is being altered.

An important official in Turkey’s governing party expressed the belief that “the next conflict in the region may be on Cyprus, as Turkey cannot allow the current situation to continue, mostly concerning the cooperation and presence of Israel on the island, and will react.
Israel wants to move the conflict there, as it believes it would have the advantage in an aerial and naval confrontation, while in Syria such a confrontation would involve greater difficulties,” he said. “Cyprus is a crucial point. Also, the presence of France there will cause further reactions.”

Another experienced diplomat said an effort might be made to resolve the Cyprus issue, but if that proves fruitless then Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership “will weigh the situation and will be able to take important decisions on the next step.
Do not rule out the possibility of a decision to declare [the breakaway Turkish Cypriot north] as Turkey’s 82nd city,” he said, adding that the situation has changed since 1983, when Turkey avoided making such a move, as it will currently not accept being “made a fool of” for so many years.

03/05/2026

The geostrategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean for the EU’s energy security: Cyprus' Aphrodite Block...

President Nikos Christodoulides on Wednesday called for an “acceleration” of plans to extract natural gas off the coast of Cyprus, following a meeting with a delegation from American multinational energy corporation Chevron, which was headed up by its emerging countries chairman Javier La Rosa.

He said during that meeting that “the internal process in relation to the agreement” with Chevron, Israeli energy company NewMed Energy, and the BG Group, which is owned by Royal Dutch Shell, concerning the Aphrodite gas field on Block 12 of Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is “close to completion”.

“In light of international developments, the need to accelerate the implementation of the Republic of Cyprus’ energy plans is becoming even more urgent,” he said.

He added that those plans are “of particular importance for the wider region and for the European Union”, saying they are being devised and executed “at a time when energy security, diversification of sources, and the energy autonomy of Europe are at the heart of the European agenda”.

He said the matter had been discussed at last week’s informal European Council summit in Nicosia, with leaders from across Europe paying increased attention to the issue of the supply of energy after the conflict in the Middle East led to Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, stemming the global flow of oil.

References to Cyprus’ natural gas supplies at last week’s summit, he said, “underlined the geostrategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean for the EU’s energy security”.

He added that within the coming weeks, “internal procedures” with regard to a new agreement over the Aphrodite field “are expected to be completed”.

“Decisions are to be taken by his cabinet which are part of the action plan which had been set.”

He said that he had discussed the matter with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who also attended last week’s European Council summit, and that this “confirms the importance of regional cooperation for the promotion of specific energy projects and the interconnection of the region’s energy with the needs of Europe”.

Chevron signed a memorandum of understanding with the governments of Cyprus and Egypt, as well as with NewMed Energy and the BG Group, last year, with the Cypriot government saying at the time that the memorandum “establishes the framework for the effective commercialisation of the natural gas which will come from the field”.

In November last year, Cyprus’ energy minister of the day George Papanastasiou had said that a “techno-economic study” on Block 12 is being prepared and will be submitted by the end of this year.

After that study is complete, he said, a final investment decision will be made and gas from the Aphrodite field will be transported to the Segas liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in the Egyptian port city of Damietta for liquefaction.

Seabed surveys to find a sinking point for the pipeline which will take natural gas from Cyprus’ EEZ to Egypt for liquefaction began in June last year, with the initial aim being for natural gas from the Aphrodite gas field to be taken to Damietta.

11/04/2026

https://cyprus-mail.com/2026/04/11/gas-deal-with-egypt-marks-turning-point?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwZnRzaARGw9xleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZAo2NjI4NTY4Mzc5AAEelCkCoasR2qGAUPqNwx9kCwlkzTSOFoRgIZO6gRPfZARHkDKu_M42eiJpzOc_aem_GiMGnrnBFdCbG966DBtzHQ =1775870720

With Cyprus’ energy policy entering a decisive phase, Energy Minister Michalis Damianos in an interview with the Cyprus Mail laid out a strategy that hinges on a delicate balance, pushing ahead with hydrocarbons, expanding renewables and managing the realities of an isolated grid, all while consum...