Giri&associates

14/11/2023

Am advocate at allahabad high court any body can take advice on this number during 6 pm to 7 30 pm free of cost

28/09/2018

FROM EVERY VICTIM WIFE एक विरक्त पत्नी को हक्क नहीं अपने साथ हुए धक्के के खिलाफ लड़ने का. जिस घर के लड़के की उंगली पकड़कर विदेश लेके गयी जिसे खुद पक्का करवाया जिसका लाखों का कर्ज़ा भरा उस औरत को नौकरी से छुड़वाकर धोखे से भारत बुलाकर भागने वाले पति से कुछ भी पूछने का हक्क नहीं क्यूंकि वह पत्नी है ?????
लेकिन एक प्रेमिका जो पति पत्नी के बीच बहिन बनकर रही फिर भगोड़े पति की उसी दिन से पार्टनर बन गई. उस प्रेमिका को पूरा हक्क है की वह फेसबुक पर फ़र्ज़ी खाते बनाकर लोगों को जो मर्जी मैसेज भेजे जितना मर्जी उस लड़की को बदनाम करे जिसके पति के साथ पहले खुद बहिन बनकर घूमती रही फिर प्रेमिका बनकर गुलछर्रे उड़ाने लगी.
एक तो खुद ही अपने नाजायज रिश्तों का खुलासा करना फिर खुद ही धमकियाँ देना किस क़ानूनी धारा में लिखा हुआ है?????????? अदालत में आकर जवाब दे अगर दम है
जब अपने प्रेमी की पत्नी को लुटेरी चरितरहीन कहकर लोगों को मैसेज भेजे तो क्या अब अदालत में जाकर पत्नी दुवारा पारदर्शी जांच और आमने सामने सबूतों के साथ जांच करवाने का भी हक्क नहीं? ????????????????????
ऐसी लड़की जो वक़त के साथ अपने रिश्ते कभी भी बदल सकती है या जो खुद हर जगह आगे है तो उसके माँ बाप की कोई ज़िम्मेदारी नहीं की वह आकर अपने बयान दें. अदालत में आकर बताएं भी उनकी लड़की के प्रेमी जिसके साथ वह ३ साल से रह रही है उसका पत्नी ने क्या लूटा है और अगर पति सही भी है तो भी उनकी लड़की बिना तलाक़ हुए एक मर्द की पार्टनर कैसे बन गयी इतने समय से.
इन सारे केसों में शामिल ऐसी हर "औरत" और उसके परिवार की मिलीभुगत की जांच होनी चाहिए ताकि ऐसे लोग किसी और लड़की की ज़िन्दगी और घर न ख़राब कर सकें.
पत्नी कोई कुछ भी बोलने, सबूत पेश करने, लड़ने का हक्क नहीं लेकिन एक प्रेमिका जो मर्जी करे?
कानून अपना काम करेगा , जांच सबकी होगी, पुलिस को ऐसे मामलों में तीनो परिवार, पंचायत रिश्तेदार सबको आमने सामने बैठा कर जांच करनी होगी नहीं तो फिर ऐसी पीड़ित पत्नियां माननीय हाई कोर्ट का दरवाजा खटखटाने को मजबूर होंगी.
लोगों भी देखें की कैसे आजकल बिना डर लोग अपने रिश्तों की खुद ही खुलासे करते हैं क्यूंकि इनको पता है इनकी अपनी इज्जत्त है नहीं घरवालों की रहने नहीं देंगे और समाज का क्या जो मर्जी सोचे
हर केस की जांच सभी पक्षों को बुलाकर हो. यही हमारी बिनती है तभी इंसाफ हो सकता है नहीं तो कोई फायदा नहीं
आधे से जायदा NRI विवाहों के केसों में यह प्रेमिका वाला तथ्य शामिल है पर कानून पत्नी के लिए भी बना है उसको पूरा हक्क है की वह सच और इन्साफ के लिए जांच करवाए

28/09/2018

29/08/2014

invalid as per the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 as under Section 3 of the said Act; no State Government or public sector undertakings of the State Governments are eligible for mining coal for commercial use. The Court elucidated upon the said provision and said that only an undertaking satisfying the eligibility criteria referred to in Section 3(3) of the CMN Act, viz., which has a unit engaged in the production of iron and steel and generation of power, washing of coal obtained from mine or production of cement, is entitled to the allocation in addition to Central Government, a Central Government company or a Central Government corporation.

The order of the Court came upon the subject matter of group Public Interest Litigations by Manohar Lal Sharma appearing-in-person and Common Cause represented by Prashant Bhushan. Goolam E. Vahanvati, arguing on behalf of the Central Government, vehemently argued in order to justify the allocation of coal blocks by saying that the Central Government was not only empowered but was duty bound to take the lead in allocation of coal blocks and that is what it did. The said contentions of the respondents were rejected by the Court, thereby, declaring the allocation of coal blocks to be illegal; however, it was held that the issue relating to consequences of declaring the allocations illegal and arbitrary required further hearing. [Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 120 of 2012, decided on 25.08.2014]

gift deed transferring the corpus to the donee gives no right of claim to donor’s legal heirs


Supreme Court: In the instant case the question arose that whether transfer of the gifted property was a transfer of the corpus or mere transfer of usufruct. In the instant case the appellant was transferred the property whose previous owner (deceased) had received it as gift/Hiba through a gift deed. After the owner’s demise, the legal heirs of the donor challenged the validity of the transfer to the appellant and claimed ownership over the gifted property and argued via their counsel A.D.N. Rao that the owner only had a life interest over the property. The appellant counsel G.R. Prasad relied on various interpretations and commentaries of Muslim law on the subject of Gift/ Hiba.

On perusing the arguments furthered by the counsels, referring various treatises of Muslim law on Hiba, and taking into account the language of the gift deed, the Court observed that it is necessary to look into the fact that whether the gift deed contemplated a transfer of the corpus or of the usufruct only. Distinguishing between transfer of the corpus and usufruct the Court said that transfer of corpus refers to change in ownership whereas transfer of the usufruct denotes the change in rights of property’s use and enjoyment. Taking the language of the gift deed in consideration, the Court noted that the language clearly states the transfer of absolute ownership to the donee (deceased owner) and recognised donee’s and her successors’ rights over the property and bear all its liabilities and also extinguishing the donor and his successor’s rights of claim and transfer therein. The deed further gives donee the right to further alienate the property to her children or any other person as she deems fit. Therefore, the Court held that the gift deed transferred the corpus to the owner; therefore, the further alienation to the appellant is valid. [V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani v. Shaik Abdul Rahim, Civil Appeal No. 2364/2005, decided on 21.08.2014]

29/08/2014

Married daughters born before 2005 have equal rights on ancestral property

Bombay High Court: In a landmark judgment, a full bench comprising of Mohit Shah CJ, MS Sanklecha and MS Sonak, JJ. held that the daughters alive on September 9, 2005 would be entitled to equal rights in ancestral property. Earlier, a division bench in the case of Vaishali S. Ganorkar vs. Satish Keshavrao Ganorkar 2012 (5) Bom CR 210 had upheld the prospective operation of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which in effect disentitled all daughters born before 9 September 2005 to claim their equal interest in the Joint HUF. A single bench comprising of RG Ketkar, J. disagreed with the decision of the Ganorkar case and concluded that the amended Section 6 had retrospective effect from the date of the enactment of the Principal Act and is applicable to all daughters who are born before or after 2005 as a daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right by her birth itself. When the matter was referred to this Court, the Court agreed with the decision of Justice Ketkar.

The Court clarified that in case the coparcener had died before 2005, then the pre-amended law was applicable but by passing of the Amendment Act, 2005 all daughters who are alive ipso facto become coparceners, thus settling the interpretation of the amended Section 6. The Court observed that the only requirement was that when an Act was being sought to be applied, the person concerned must be alive as the Legislature had specifically used the word ‘on and from the commencement of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. This was done so as to ensure that rights which are already settled are not disturbed by virtue of person claiming as an heir to a daughter who had passed away before the Amendment Act came into force.

The Court also denied the reference of the Sheeladevi judgment, clarifying that principle laid down in Sheeladevi vs. Lalchand (2006) 8 SCC 581 that the Amendment Act of 2005 is prospective and would have no application where succession opened prior to the Amendment Act of 2005 coming into force, does not militate against the view taken by them. The Amendment Act of 2005 applies to a daughter of coparcener who is born before 9 September 2005 and alive on 9 September 2005, on which date the Amendment Act of 2005 came into force, and obviously there is no dispute about the entitlement of daughter born on or after 9th September 2005. [Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, Second Appeal No. 566 of 2011, decided on August 14, 2014]

29/08/2014

Bombay High Court: In a landmark judgment, a full bench comprising of  Mohit Shah CJ, MS Sankle

14/08/2013

On the eve of the Independence Day, I salute our Nation, freedom fighters, countrymen, jawans, kisans, brothers and sisters and all our ‘Maa, Maati, Manush’.

“सारे जहां से अच्छा हिंदुस्तान हमारा ...”

09/09/2012

Home
Search for people, places and things

Santosh Giri
Home
Account Settings

Suggested Groups
See All
Suggested Groups
MISSION SCHOOL ADMISSION 2012
Jai Bhagdev and 108 other friends joined
Join Group
TROUBLE SHOOTER
Monika Sharma and 157 other friends joined
Join Group
Majlis Law
Adv Prasanna Kutti and 64 other friends joined
Join Group
Sponsored
Create an Ad
Sponsored
Nayan Parekh and Mukul Agnipal like Juneja Legal.
Juneja Legal
Like
Risk Management Seminar
APRMC 2012 will provide the latest ERM development, featuring more than 10 risk experts.
Facebook © 2012
English (US) · Privacy · Terms · Cookies ·
More

Harish Katyal
9 hours ago ·

A Chief Justice of India says “I am sorry” but 30 years too late
Sep 16, 2011
When a former Chief Justice of India apologises for a judgement, that’s big news. And Justice P N Bhagwati was not just apologising for any judgement.
He was admitting his “mistake” about a case the New York Times called close to the Indian Supreme Court’s “utter surrender” to an absolutist government.
That case was ADM Jabalpur, popularly known as the Habeas Corpus case. On 28 April, 1976, during the Emergency, the Supreme Court had to decide if the Court could entertain a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person challenging his detention. The High Courts had already said yes. But the Supreme Court went against the unanimous decision of all the High Courts and upheld the right of Indira Gandhi’s government to suspend all fundamental rights during the Emergency. Four judges ruled for the government. One of them was Justice P N Bhagwati.
The lone dissenter was Justice H R Khanna. The New York Times wrote at that time:
If India ever finds its way back to freedom and democracy that were proud hallmarks of its first eighteen years as an independent nation, someone will surely erect a monument to Justice H R Khanna of the Supreme Court. It was Justice Khanna who spoke out fearlessly and eloquently for freedom this week.
Justice Bhagwati was admitting his “mistake” about a case the NY Times called close to the Indian Supreme Court’s “utter surrender” to an absolutist government. Reuters
Now 30 years later Justice Bhagwati says in an interview with MyLaw.net his judgment was “an act of weakness.” He also says, “it was against my conscience…That judgment is not Justice Bhagwati’s.”
This might sound like a brave mea culpa on his part. But unfortunately it leaves a lot to be desired.
First of all there is Justice Bhagwati’s own track record of having his ear finely tuned to the prevailing political winds.
Justice Bhagwati has praised Indira Gandhi government during the Emergency and later criticized her during the tenure of Janata government. When Indira Gandhi came back to power, he wrote a letter congratulating her.
Here’s an excerpt from that letter:
“May I offer you my heartiest congratulations on your resounding victory in the elections and your triumphant return as the Prime Minister of India…I am sure that with your iron will and firm determination, uncanny insight and dynamic vision, great administrative capacity and vast experience, overwhelming love and affection of the people and above all, a heart which is identified with the misery of the poor and the weak, you will be able to steer the ship of the nation safely to its cherished goal.”
What this really shows is that CJI Bhagwati might have gone against his conscience but certainly not against his career trajectory. Justice H R Khanna, who dissented in that Jabalpur case should have become the CJI because of his seniority. But he paid the price for that dissent. He was superceded by Justice Beg. Justice Bhagwati would likely have met with the same fate of Justice H R Khanna had he dissented.
This is not the only issue where Justice Bhagwati has made a volte face.
Take the mysterious collegium system by which Supreme Court justices are appointed which has come under heavy criticism for being an unaccountable opaque cabal. It was Justice Verma who created the collegium system but in the First Judges Case (the SP Gupta case) Justice Bhagwati wrote about it: “There must be a collegium to make recommendation to the President in regard to appointment of a Supreme Court or High Court Judge”.
Justice Bhagwati’s mind has now changed about that as well and he says he is against the collegium system in toto.
His own track record as a judge has also raised legal eyebrows.
Noted constitutional law jurist HM Seervai has criticised Justice Bhagwati for merely copying justice Krishna Iyer’s judgment in the Som Prakash case and incorporating it into his judgment in the Ajay Hasia case.
In a landmark case of constitutional law, popularly referred to as the Minerva Mills judgment, Justice Bhagwati wrote: “Unfortunately we could not be ready with our judgment and hence 9 May,1980 being the last working day of the Court before the summer vacation we made an order expressing our conclusion but stating that we would give our reasons later.”
A judge of the Apex Court saying “I am not ready with my reasons but this is my conclusion” anyway sets a deplorable standard for the Indian judiciary.
Justice Bhagwati writes, that after the Emergency he realized the mistake of Jabalpur and he practically rewrote Part III and Part IV of the Constitution; particularly Articles 14, 19, 21 and 32. A judge claiming that he is “writing” the Constitution, as opposed to interpreting it is unorthodox to say the least.
These days Justice Bhagwati is more in the news because he is a trustee with the beleaguered Sathya Sai Trust. As financial scandals rock the Sai Baba’s spiritual empire, the trust relies on people of the eminence of a former CJI to give it some credibility. Immediately after the demise of Satya Sai Baba Justice Bhagwati was appointed as chancellor of the Sri Sathya Sai Institute of Higher Learning (Deemed to be University). Recently in an interview given to The Times of India Justice Bhagwati said: “Sai Baba, my god, dictated my every single judgment”.
People will make of that what they will. But the real question now is what does this apology mean for the Indian judiciary. Some will think its proof of the self-correcting mechanism of the Indian judiciary. But it’s also proof of something much more damning – that political equations play a crucial role in the appointment of judges and the judgments these judges deliver.
What happened in the Habeas Corpus case was not a momentary lapse in judgment. It was a disgrace to the Supreme Court, and more so because Justice Bhagwati says it went against his conscience, even then.
This belated apology does not restore the faith of people in judiciary. The only way to do that is to have an independent judicial commission appoint judges and bring in transparency in every stage of their appointment.
It may save us from a Bhagwati-style apology another 30 years later

31/08/2012

SC: RIGHT TO CONTEST ELECTION, NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The right to contest election or to question the election by means of the election petition is neither common law nor fundamental right. Instead, it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions contained in Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951),. The Act is complete and self-contained code within which the rights claimed in relation to an election or election dispute must be found. The consequences of death of candidate has therefore to be found in the Act or Rules. S. 52 which provides for such situation takes care of the situation only in case of death of a candidate of recognized political party before poll. The electoral law as enacted in 1951 Act does not contemplate cognizance of the death of an independent
candidate after publication of list of contesting candidates in Section 38. In absence of provision under Act the plea that display of name of independent candidate despite his death before poll has materially affected results does not disclose cause of action and is liable to be struck down. It is imperative for an election petition to contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the election petition relies. All basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of cause of action or defence are material facts. The bare allegations are never treated as material facts. The material facts are such facts which afford a basis for the allegations made in the election petition. SC: RIGHT TO CONTEST ELECTION, NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The right to contest election or to question the election by means of the election petition is neither common law nor fundamental right. Instead, it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions contained in Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951),. The Act is complete and self-contained code within which the rights claimed in relation to an election or election dispute must be found. The consequences of death of candidate has therefore to be found in the Act or Rules. S. 52 which provides for such situation takes care of the situation only in case of death of a candidate of recognized political party before poll. The electoral law as enacted in 1951 Act does not contemplate cognizance of the death of an independent
candidate after publication of list of contesting candidates in Section 38. In absence of provision under Act the plea that display of name of independent candidate despite his death before poll has materially affected results does not disclose cause of action and is liable to be struck down. It is imperative for an election petition to contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the election petition relies. All basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of cause of action or defence are material facts. The bare allegations are never treated as material facts. The material facts are such facts which afford a basis for the allegations made in the election petition.

31/08/2012

[email protected]

31/08/2012

HELLO FRIENDS GUD EVENING