27/08/2014
Technical Developments Changing Coin Strategies And Tactics
Increasingly the counter-insurgency operations are throwing up new tactical and strategic challenges for the commanders and the political leadership as they seek to de-centralise tactical decisions to ground commanders and provide the forces technology rich, stand-off weaponry.
Pravash Kumar Mishra
At present due to various technical developments in COIN, particularly in weapons, ammunitions, field uniform, air cover, surveillance/technical/ communication equipments, anti-ballistic, anti-mine and anti-blast all terrain vehicles, the strategies and tactics in counter insurgency operations in Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Assam and all Maoist affected states require a change.
The impact of such developments also depends upon the new tactics adopted by various militant groups (own and foreign mercenaries) operating in India including the Maoists. The Maoist insurgency had spread to 20 of the 28 states. As of now, 182 districts are disturbed by Maoists, 83 partially and 35 badly. The whole of J&K and the entire north-east keep Army and paramilitary forces occupied in countering various Indian and foreign militant groups. At present, the uses of helicopters are mostly for casualty evacuation, troop mobility and other logistics roles. Air Force, BSF, civil helicopters and UAVs are now deployed in support of all COIN.
The tactics now adopted in a COIN is, maximum de-centralisation of control, leaving the command to field commanders to take decisions. Maoist insurgency is a pan-Indian problem. As a strategy, CRPF along with BSF, RPF, CISF, ITBP, NSG, state IRB/commando forces and SSB are deployed to contain insurgency. The strategy of insurgents varies from state to state excluding Maoists’, which is common in all the affected states. The new training tactics adopted by the COIN troops include hostage crisis, rescuing citizens abducted by Maoists, providing proximate security to VIPs on visit to infested areas, resolving su***de attacks, counter terrorist operations, casualty evacuation by air and quick reaction in providing logistics and reliable communication to the spot. Additional 15 Nishant Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and about 50 OFB Kolkata made counter-land mine vehicles had been provided to field areas to protect troops from hidden mines.
First time the drone camera was used at Saharanpur on 27 July 2014 to keep riot affected areas under surveillance. Economic, political factors and nexus between Maoists-politicians-police-bureaucrats and businesspersons provided tactical gain to insurgency. Indirect finance provided to insurgents gave them superior technology, arms and modern equipments and latest communication devices.