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21/08/2026

Weekly Korea–ASEAN Business Insight — 22 Aug 2026

Korea and ASEAN Are Moving From Investment Attraction to Industrial Capability

A common theme emerged across Korea and ASEAN this week: governments increasingly want investment to create domestic technology, companies and industrial capabilities, rather than simply production and jobs.

In Korea, the AI semiconductor boom continues to strengthen. Semiconductor exports surged during the first 20 days of August, while Samsung Electronics reportedly raised prices for some advanced foundry processes by up to 15% amid stronger demand. Seoul is also looking to channel resources generated by the semiconductor boom into AI and other future growth industries.

Indonesia is moving in a similar direction through EVs.

President Prabowo Subianto wants Indonesia to begin mass production of domestically developed electric cars by 2028. Jakarta is also seeking greater influence over the value of strategic resources such as nickel.

The direction is clear: Indonesia wants to use its natural resources and foreign investment not simply to manufacture foreign products, but to develop Indonesian suppliers, technologies and eventually national brands.

Vietnam and Malaysia are pursuing similar ambitions in semiconductors and AI.

Vietnam wants AI to become widely embedded across government and businesses while investing in strategic technology research and semiconductor capabilities. Malaysia, meanwhile, aims to move beyond its traditional strength in semiconductor assembly and testing toward chip design and intellectual property, with the ambition of developing “Made by Malaysia” chips.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, sees these developments as part of a broader shift from competition for FDI to competition for industrial capability.

“Indonesia wants to turn nickel and foreign automotive investment into its own EV industry. Malaysia and Vietnam want to move from semiconductor assembly toward design and technology. Korea is also trying to extend its semiconductor strength into a broader industrial ecosystem,” Moon said.

“The question governments are asking is changing from ‘How much investment can we attract?’ to ‘What capabilities will that investment leave behind?’”

This change also has implications for Korean companies operating in ASEAN.

Building factories or selling products may increasingly be insufficient. Companies that combine investment with local supplier development, joint R&D, technology partnerships, workforce development and regional market expansion could become more strategically valuable partners.

The most important Korea–ASEAN business question may therefore be changing.

Not simply:

“How much did you invest?”

But:

“What industrial capabilities did we build together?”

That could increasingly define the next stage of Korea–ASEAN economic cooperation.

Sources: Reuters, Aug. 13, 19 and 21, 2026; The Straits Times, Aug. 21, 2026; VnExpress, Aug. 18–20, 2026; The Edge Malaysia, Aug. 21, 2026; Vietnam Government Portal, Aug. 21, 2026; Kontan, Aug. 18, 2026.

19/08/2026

ASEAN Business Insight — 19 Aug 2026

베트남, AI를 ‘산업’이 아니라 ‘국가 운영체계’로 바꾼다

Vietnam Is Turning AI From an Industry Into a National Operating System

Card Insight: Vietnam’s new AI strategy goes beyond building startups or attracting data centres. By 2030, Hanoi wants AI to support 60% of government executive and administrative decisions, assist all digital public services, and be used by at least 500,000 SMEs and family businesses.

Vietnam is taking a more ambitious approach to artificial intelligence.

According to VnExpress, the government’s National AI Transformation Strategy targets AI support for 60% of executive and administrative decisions across state agencies by 2030. Ministries and local governments will be required to develop their own AI transformation roadmaps, while all digital public services are expected to incorporate AI assistance.

The private-sector target is equally significant. Vietnam wants AI technologies to reach at least 500,000 SMEs, household businesses and cooperatives, while nurturing 100 domestic AI startups valued at more than $10 million each. The country also plans to train 10,000 high-level AI specialists by 2030.

This is not an isolated policy. Vietnam has already adopted its first comprehensive AI law, which took effect in March 2026, approved a national digital-transformation strategy centred on data and AI, and identified Vietnamese large-language models, AI cameras and digital twins as strategic technology products.

The direction can be summarised as:

AI industry → AI adoption → AI-enabled government → AI-enabled economy

That distinction matters.

Singapore has focused heavily on becoming a global AI hub, while Indonesia is preparing to embed AI in major government programmes including healthcare and its national free-meals initiative. Vietnam appears to be pushing toward something broader: integrating AI directly into the operating architecture of government and the domestic economy. Reuters has similarly reported that Indonesia is pursuing government-wide AI adoption, illustrating how quickly AI policy competition is intensifying across ASEAN.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, sees an important opportunity for Korean companies.

“Vietnam’s AI market should not be viewed only as a market for GPUs, cloud services or large language models. If AI is embedded into government, SMEs and manufacturing, the larger opportunity will emerge in the applications built on top of that infrastructure.”

For Korea, that could mean opportunities in manufacturing AI, smart factories, industrial vision, healthcare AI, cybersecurity, public-sector digital systems and Vietnamese-language enterprise solutions.

The strategic question is therefore changing.

It is no longer simply:

Who will build Vietnam’s AI infrastructure?

The more important question may soon become:

Who will build the applications that Vietnam’s government and businesses actually use?

That is where the next stage of Korea–Vietnam digital cooperation could emerge.

Sources: VnExpress, Aug. 18, 2026; Government of Vietnam, Aug. 12 and July 2026; VietnamPlus, July–August 2026; Reuters, June 22, 2026.

17/08/2026

Korea Business Insight — 18 Aug 2026

한국, 반도체·AI 다음을 준비한다…7대 미래산업에 국가 역량 집중

Korea Looks Beyond Chips and AI to Seven Next-Generation Industries

Card Insight: Korea is preparing for the industries that may come after today’s semiconductor and AI boom. The government has selected seven strategic fields—including SMRs, quantum technology, space, advanced biotech and critical materials—as new national growth engines. For ASEAN, this could open a new phase of technology and investment cooperation beyond traditional manufacturing.

South Korea is beginning to look beyond the industries that currently drive its economy.

On August 12, the government unveiled its Seven Major SEED initiative, covering small modular reactors, fusion energy, renewable energy, quantum technology, space and aviation, advanced biotechnology, and advanced materials and components.

The message is significant.

Korea’s recent economic strength has been heavily supported by semiconductors and the global AI investment boom. Semiconductor exports have surged, while Samsung Electronics and SK hynix are committing massive investments to new AI-chip capacity.

But Seoul does not want its next decade of growth to depend only on memory chips.

The SEED strategy sets specific technology targets, including commercial deployment of small modular reactors by 2035, development of a 100-qubit quantum processor by 2029 and a lunar landing by 2030. Korea also plans to strengthen strategic materials and equipment supply chains, backed by approximately KRW 10 trillion in investment.

The strategy can be viewed as a progression:

Semiconductors → AI → Deep Tech → New Industrial Platforms

For ASEAN, this matters because many of these technologies will eventually require overseas markets, production bases and demonstration projects.

SMRs and renewable energy could connect with ASEAN’s rapidly growing electricity demand. Advanced biotechnology could link with Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia’s healthcare ecosystems. Materials and components could deepen cooperation with Indonesia’s mineral-processing industries, while space and quantum technologies may create new research partnerships.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, sees an important opportunity in this transition.

“Korea should not develop these new industries only for the Korean market. ASEAN can become a testing ground, production partner and future market for many of these technologies.”

The implication is that Korea–ASEAN cooperation may gradually move beyond conventional areas such as electronics, automobiles and consumer products.

The next opportunity could increasingly be about building emerging industries together before those industries become mature global markets.

That may be where Korea’s next generation of ASEAN partnerships begins.

Sources: Korea Ministry of Science and ICT/Korea.net, Aug. 12–13, 2026; Reuters, Aug. 12, 2026; Maeil Business Newspaper, Aug. 12, 2026.

15/08/2026

Weekly Korea–ASEAN Business Insight — 15 Aug 2026

Korea and ASEAN Shift From Investment Attraction to Industrial Capability

This week, Korea and ASEAN showed a common direction in industrial policy: countries increasingly want not only investment, but also technology, suppliers and value creation to remain at home.

Korea announced a KRW 5 trillion semiconductor fund targeting materials, parts, equipment and fabless companies, alongside another KRW 5 trillion in trade finance. The message is clear: Korea wants to strengthen not just major chipmakers such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix, but the entire semiconductor ecosystem.

Indonesia is moving in a similar direction in EVs.

President Prabowo Subianto said Indonesia aims to begin mass production of domestically developed electric cars by 2028. After successfully attracting Hyundai, LG, BYD and other global companies through its nickel and downstreaming policies, Jakarta now wants those investments to help develop Indonesian suppliers, technology and eventually national automotive brands.

The direction is becoming clear:

Nickel → Battery → EV production → Indonesian technology and brands

Indonesia is applying similar thinking to natural resources, with plans for a new commodity exchange designed to give the country greater influence over the pricing of strategic commodities such as nickel, tin and gold.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, sees a common thread in these developments.

“Korea wants to deepen its semiconductor ecosystem, while Indonesia wants to turn its resources and foreign investment into domestic industrial capability. Both reflect the same change: countries no longer want simply to participate in global supply chains. They want to capture more technology and value within those supply chains.”

For Korea–ASEAN cooperation, the next question therefore should not simply be how much Korea invests in ASEAN, but what industrial capabilities Korea and ASEAN can build together.

That shift—from investment to joint ecosystem building—could define the next generation of Korea–ASEAN business opportunities.

Sources: Reuters, Aug. 10, 13–14, 2026; ANTARA, Aug. 13–14, 2026; Kontan; The Straits Times; Korea MOTIE.

14/08/2026

ASEAN Business Insight — 14 Aug 2026

인도네시아 EV 전략, 외국기업 유치에서 ‘자국 산업 육성’으로

Indonesia’s EV Strategy Is Moving Beyond Foreign Investment

Indonesia’s electric-vehicle strategy is entering a new phase. After years of using its vast nickel reserves and investment incentives to attract global battery and automobile companies, Jakarta is beginning to focus on a more ambitious objective: building an EV industry of its own.

President Prabowo Subianto said on August 13 that Indonesia aims to begin mass production of domestically developed electric cars by 2028. The government is also promoting a national electric motorcycle initiative and developing an EV industrial complex in West Java.

The announcement is significant because Indonesia’s EV policy has so far been largely driven by foreign investment.

Indonesia used its position as the world’s leading nickel producer to encourage global companies to move downstream into refining, battery materials, batteries and eventually vehicle production. Korean companies were among the earliest major participants in this strategy.

Hyundai Motor and LG Energy Solution opened Indonesia’s first EV battery-cell plant in West Java in 2024 with an initial annual capacity of 10 GWh. Hyundai subsequently began producing EVs in Indonesia using locally manufactured batteries.

Chinese companies have also moved aggressively into the market, investing across battery materials and EV manufacturing.

These investments helped Indonesia move beyond its traditional role as a supplier of raw materials. But Prabowo’s latest initiative suggests that Jakarta now wants to take the next step.

The direction can be described simply:

Nickel → Battery → EV production → Indonesian technology and brands

Indonesia does not want foreign companies simply to manufacture vehicles in the country. It increasingly wants those investments to help create domestic suppliers, engineering capabilities, technology and eventually Indonesian automotive brands.

There is another reason behind this strategy: energy security.

Indonesia has long depended on imported petroleum products despite being rich in natural resources. Expanding electric mobility could therefore reduce fuel imports while simultaneously creating a domestic manufacturing industry. EV policy in Indonesia is increasingly becoming not only an environmental policy, but also an industrial, energy-security and trade strategy.

For Korean companies, this shift deserves particular attention.

Hyundai and LG have already established an important position in Indonesia’s EV ecosystem. But the next phase of competition may be very different from the first.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, assessed the change as a transition from an “investment attraction strategy” to an “industrial capability strategy.”

“Indonesia’s objective is no longer simply to attract Hyundai, LG, BYD and other global manufacturers,” Moon said. “The more important objective is to use foreign investment to develop Indonesian suppliers, engineers, technologies and eventually its own automotive industry.”

This changes the question Korean companies need to ask.

Until now, the main question has often been whether to invest in Indonesia and how to take advantage of its large market, nickel resources and investment incentives.

The next question should be different:

How can Korean companies become part of Indonesia’s effort to build its own EV industry?

Moon argues that this could create opportunities well beyond vehicle manufacturing.

Battery materials, motors, power electronics, thermal-management systems, automotive semiconductors, charging infrastructure, factory automation, testing equipment, software and engineering services could all become important areas of Korea–Indonesia cooperation.

In this sense, Korea’s strategy should gradually move from “investing in Indonesia” to “building Indonesia’s EV ecosystem together.”

There are, however, significant challenges.

Creating a competitive national automobile industry requires much more than batteries and assembly plants. Indonesia will need vehicle platforms, software capabilities, sophisticated supplier networks, quality-control systems, financing, after-sales services and sufficient production scale. Developing an internationally competitive Indonesian EV brand by 2028 will therefore not be easy.

But the timetable may be less important than the direction of policy.

Indonesia is signalling that it does not want to remain simply a source of nickel, a production base for foreign companies or Southeast Asia’s largest automotive market.

It wants to capture a much larger share of the EV value chain.

For Korean companies, understanding that ambition may be more important than simply watching Indonesia’s EV sales numbers.

As Moon puts it, “Korea should not look at Indonesia only as a place to sell cars or build factories. It should look at Indonesia as a country determined to build an automotive industry of its own—and position itself as a partner in that process.”

That may define the next phase of Korea–Indonesia EV cooperation.

Sources: Reuters, August 13, 2026; ANTARA, August 13–14, 2026; The Jakarta Post, July 28, 2026 and March 2026; Reuters reporting on Hyundai–LG and Indonesia’s EV supply chain.

12/08/2026

Korea Needs to Look Beyond Vietnam in ASEAN

Korea’s exports are gaining strong momentum again. During the first ten days of August, exports rose 45.3% year-on-year, while semiconductor exports surged 155.4% to USD 10 billion.

One number, however, deserves particular attention: Korea’s exports to Vietnam increased 45.4% during the same period.

Vietnam has been Korea’s biggest success story in ASEAN. Large-scale manufacturing investment, led by Samsung Electronics and followed by numerous Korean suppliers, has created a deeply integrated industrial ecosystem. Vietnam is no longer simply an export market for Korean companies; it has become a critical part of their global production network.

But Vietnam’s success also raises an important question.

Has Korea’s ASEAN business strategy become too concentrated on Vietnam?

ASEAN is not a single, homogeneous market. Indonesia offers a huge domestic consumer market and growing EV and resource-based industries. Thailand has established strengths in automotive manufacturing, food, bio-health and advanced manufacturing. Malaysia is increasingly important in semiconductors, electronics and data centers, while Singapore remains the region’s leading hub for finance, technology and regional headquarters.

Korea’s next ASEAN strategy, therefore, should not be about finding a “second Vietnam.”

The manufacturing-led model that worked successfully in Vietnam cannot simply be replicated across the region. Korean companies need different strategies based on each country’s industrial structure, competitive advantages and domestic demand.

Indonesia could play a larger role in consumer markets, natural resources and the EV ecosystem; Thailand in automotive, bio-health, food and advanced manufacturing; Malaysia in semiconductors and data centers; and Singapore in finance, technology and regional business functions.

Moon Ki B**g, President of the ASEAN Business Center and Korea–ASEAN Business Strategist, sees Vietnam’s success as both an asset and a strategic challenge for Korea.

“Vietnam has become one of Korea’s most important economic partners in ASEAN, but that success has also increased Korea’s concentration on a single market,” he said.

“The next step should not be to search for another Vietnam. Korea needs to build an ASEAN portfolio that takes advantage of the different strengths of each economy.”

The 45.4% increase in exports to Vietnam is clearly good news for Korea.

But the more important long-term question is how Korea can extend its success in Vietnam across the wider ASEAN region.

Korea’s next ASEAN strategy should move from a Vietnam-centric model to a diversified ASEAN portfolio.

12/08/2026

Indonesia’s Banks Are Profitable — But Liquidity Is Becoming the Next Constraint

Indonesian banks have enjoyed strong profits, but a new challenge is emerging: credit is expanding faster than the funding base needed to support it.

This is more than a banking story. It may be part of a broader shift in Indonesia’s economic strategy.

Bank Indonesia reported that bank lending grew 12.67% year-on-year in June 2026, while investment loans surged 24.90%. But the expansion has been highly uneven. State-owned banks have been doing much of the heavy lifting, reflecting the government’s push to accelerate economic growth.

The government has also placed Rp200 trillion of state funds into state-owned banks to strengthen liquidity and encourage lending.

At the same time, Indonesia has tightened its DHE-SDA policy, requiring natural-resource exporters to retain export proceeds within Indonesia’s financial system.

Put these policies together, and an interesting architecture begins to emerge:

DHE-SDA → More funds retained onshore → Stronger bank liquidity → Credit expansion → Investment → Higher economic growth

In other words, Indonesia is not simply trying to attract more capital. It is increasingly trying to mobilize domestic liquidity and channel it into productive investment.

This helps explain why state-owned banks are becoming increasingly important as a transmission mechanism for President Prabowo Subianto’s ambitious growth agenda.

But there is a risk.

As lending expands faster than deposits, banks must compete harder for funding. That pushes up funding costs and puts pressure on net interest margins. If aggressive credit expansion eventually compromises lending standards, today’s liquidity pressure could become tomorrow’s asset-quality problem.

So the indicators worth watching are no longer just GDP growth or headline loan growth.

Watch:

Deposit growth → Cost of funds → NIM → NPL

For Korean companies, however, this shift could create an interesting opportunity.

Investment lending is expanding rapidly. If Indonesia succeeds in directing more domestic liquidity toward manufacturing, industrial automation, data centers, power and ESS, logistics, food processing and downstream industries, Korean companies could participate not only as investors but also as suppliers of equipment, technology and industrial solutions financed by Indonesian banks.

MOON SAYS

Indonesia’s emerging growth model can increasingly be understood as:

Export earnings retained at home → Government liquidity support → State-bank lending → Productive investment → Economic growth

The critical question is not simply how much money Indonesia puts into its banking system.

The real question is where the money goes.

If credit flows into productive manufacturing, infrastructure and FDI-linked projects, it could become a powerful engine for Indonesia’s next stage of growth.

If it flows into low-productivity or policy-driven lending, the consequences may eventually appear in shrinking margins and rising bad loans.

For Korean businesses, this means Indonesia should increasingly be viewed not only as an export or investment destination, but as a market where Korean technology exports can potentially be connected with Indonesia’s expanding domestic investment finance.

12/08/2026

ASEAN Is Becoming China’s Premium Brand Testbed

China’s export strategy is entering a new phase.

For decades, the formula was simple:

Made in China → Low Cost → Mass Exports → Market Share

Now it is changing to:

Technology + Design + Brand → Premiumization → Global Brand

Southeast Asia is becoming the testing ground for this transformation.

For Chinese companies, ASEAN offers something increasingly difficult to find elsewhere. The U.S. market faces high political and trade barriers, while Europe has strong regulations and deeply established premium brands.

ASEAN is different.

It is geographically close to China, deeply connected to Chinese supply chains, relatively accessible to Chinese brands, and home to a rapidly expanding middle and upper-middle class.

This is why we are beginning to see a new globalization pathway:

China → ASEAN → Global

The significance goes far beyond automobiles or consumer goods.

Chinese companies are moving up the value chain across EVs, electronics, machinery, robotics, semiconductors, beauty, fashion and lifestyle products. They are no longer satisfied with competing primarily on price. Increasingly, they want to compete on technology, design, customer experience and brand value.

For Korea, this is an important strategic signal.

For many years, Korean companies benefited from a relatively comfortable position in Southeast Asia:
Chinese products < Korean products < Japanese/European premium products

That positioning can no longer be taken for granted.
The real threat is not that Chinese brands will suddenly become more expensive than Korean brands. They do not need to.

If a Chinese product that once sold for $100 can offer a comparable experience to a $200 Korean product at $160–180, the competitive landscape changes dramatically.
So the key question for Korean companies is no longer:

“How do we compete with low-cost Chinese products in ASEAN?”

It is:
“Where should Korean brands position themselves when Chinese companies themselves are moving premium?”
MOON SAYS

ASEAN is no longer merely an export destination for China. It is becoming the laboratory where Chinese companies learn how to become global premium brands.

11/08/2026

Japan’s Record Izakaya Bankruptcies: The End of the After-Work Drinking Economy?

Japan is seeing record bankruptcies among izakayas, its traditional Japanese-style pubs.

But this is more than a restaurant industry problem.

For decades, the izakaya business model was closely connected to Japan’s corporate culture:

Office → Nomikai → First round → Second round

That relationship is weakening.

Younger workers are less interested in obligatory company drinking, work-life balance matters more, and consumers are drinking less. At the same time, restaurants face higher food, electricity and labor costs.

The result is a difficult equation:

Fewer customers × Less drinking × Fewer company gatherings × Higher costs.

Japan may also be a leading indicator for Korea.

Korea is seeing similar changes: fewer mandatory company dinners, less second- and third-round drinking, smaller gatherings, and growing interest in highballs, wine, premium drinks and low/no-alcohol alternatives.

But drinking less does not necessarily mean the alcohol business is disappearing.

The market may simply be moving from:

Volume → Value

More Alcohol → Better Experience

This is where the business opportunity begins.

Traditional alcohol-centered restaurants may struggle, while new formats combining premium beverages, food pairing, low/no-alcohol options, smaller spaces and stronger experiences could grow.

And ASEAN adds another dimension.

While Japan and Korea are rapidly aging, many ASEAN markets have younger populations, expanding middle classes and growing dining-out cultures.

For Korean F&B companies, the opportunity may therefore not be simply exporting the traditional Korean pub.

A more interesting model could be:

K-Food + Social Dining + Low/No Alcohol + Entertainment

MOON SAYS

Japan’s record izakaya bankruptcies are not merely a restaurant crisis. They signal the decline of the after-work drinking economy and a shift from volume drinking toward experience-driven consumption.

10/08/2026

🇰🇷 KOREA BUSINESS INSIGHT | 11 AUG 2026

한국, 반도체 경쟁을 ‘대기업 투자’에서 ‘생태계 전쟁’으로 확대

Korea Expands Its Chip Race from Mega-Fabs to the Entire Ecosystem

KEY TAKEAWAY

South Korea is moving beyond simply building more Samsung Electronics and SK hynix fabs. On August 10, the government announced a new KRW 5 trillion (US$3.5 billion) semiconductor fund targeting materials, components, equipment and fabless companies, together with another KRW 5 trillion in trade finance for export-oriented suppliers.

The signal is important for ASEAN: Korea now wants to strengthen the layers surrounding its semiconductor champions—not just the champions themselves.

CARD 1 | Why Korea is doubling down now

The timing reflects an extraordinary AI-driven export cycle.

Korean exports rose 63% year-on-year in July, while semiconductor exports jumped 179%. Computer exports surged more than 400% as global hyperscalers continued investing heavily in AI infrastructure.

The boom is already changing Korea’s macroeconomic outlook. The government now says the probability of 3% GDP growth in 2026 has increased significantly, after growth of only 1.1% last year.

This is not simply another memory-chip upcycle.

AI → HBM → Advanced Packaging → Materials → Equipment → Power → Data Centres

is becoming an industrial system.

CARD 2 | The scale is much larger than the new fund

The KRW 5 trillion fund is only one component of Korea’s semiconductor strategy.

Samsung Electronics, SK hynix, suppliers and local governments are expected to mobilize more than US$576 billion in semiconductor-related investment. Korea also plans major infrastructure support, including 14.7 GW of electricity for the Yongin semiconductor cluster by 2041 and large-scale water infrastructure for new manufacturing zones.

That tells us something important.

Semiconductor competitiveness is increasingly determined not only by chip technology, but also by:

Power + Water + Infrastructure + Suppliers + Talent + Capital

CARD 3 | Why ASEAN should care

ASEAN countries are simultaneously trying to move deeper into the semiconductor value chain.

Malaysia is strengthening its position in packaging, testing and increasingly higher-value semiconductor activities. Singapore remains a major semiconductor and equipment hub. Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines are also seeking larger roles in electronics, IC design, advanced manufacturing and semiconductor supply chains.

Korea’s latest move therefore creates both competition and opportunity.

ASEAN does not necessarily need to reproduce Korea’s mega-fab model.

A more realistic opportunity is to connect to Korea’s expanding semiconductor ecosystem through:

Materials and components
Equipment manufacturing
PCB and electronics production
Advanced packaging and testing
Data-centre infrastructure
Engineering and technical services

MOON SAYS

> Korea’s semiconductor strategy is changing from “building fabs” to “building an ecosystem.”

For ASEAN policymakers, the wrong question may be:

“How can we attract a Samsung or SK hynix fab?”

A better question is:

“Which part of Korea’s rapidly expanding semiconductor ecosystem can we capture?”

A Korean materials or equipment company supplying Samsung and SK hynix may eventually need additional manufacturing capacity, regional customers, engineering support or supply-chain diversification.

That is where ASEAN can enter.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATION

There may therefore be a more practical Korea–ASEAN semiconductor partnership model:

Korea: technology + equipment + materials + process know-how
ASEAN: manufacturing locations + regional markets + talent + supply-chain diversification

The opportunity is not necessarily to compete with Korea in leading-edge fabs.

It is to become part of the Korean semiconductor ecosystem as that ecosystem expands beyond Korea.

One line to remember

The next Korea–ASEAN semiconductor opportunity may not be the chip itself—it may be everything required to make the chip.

Sources: Reuters, August 1, 6 and 10, 2026; Korea Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

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