16/09/2026
Who Will Build the Corporate Venture Builder?
Why corporations may need an independent entrepreneurial team rather than another innovation department
I recently came across Maija Palmer’s article, *“Beyond the Venture Building Silo: How Bosch, Arup and Toyota Connect the Dots,”* based on a discussion with Axel Deniz of Bosch Business Innovations, Ralph Wilson of Arup Ventures and Jim Adler of Toyota Ventures.
The participants presented different models of Corporate Venture Building but converged on several important conclusions:
* Venture Building should be used to create Horizon 2–3 markets and businesses, not merely to improve existing products;
* new companies should be independent, founder-led and structured in a way that external investors understand;
* financial returns and strategic objectives should reinforce one another;
* entrepreneurial talent must also be sought outside the corporation;
* culture and risk appetite are often more important than formal organisational structures;
* Venture Building should not operate separately from CVC, venture clienting, technology scouting, IP commercialisation and commercial partnerships;
* AI will transform not only the technologies being created but also the Venture Building process itself, including IP discovery, market analysis, due diligence, portfolio construction and management.
I agree with these principles. But they lead us to another practical question:
- Who should build the Corporate Venture Builder itself?
A problem corporations are already encountering
Over the past few months, I have received several private messages from innovation directors at European corporations facing the challenge of launching a Corporate Venture Builder.
At the strategic level, everything appears logical. A corporation wants to create new businesses systematically by leveraging its technologies, data, IP, sector knowledge and customer relationships. The decision is made to launch a CVB, a project leader is appointed, and HR is asked to assemble the team.
But this is where much more difficult questions arise.
Where can a corporation find people who have actually built Venture Builders?
How can it distinguish technology entrepreneurship experience from experience managing corporate innovation programmes?
How can individual professionals be brought together into a team capable of working together for many years?
How can that team be given long-term financial motivation?
How much autonomy should it have?
And, most importantly, how can its ability to create companies be evaluated before the first results exist?
1. Europe has few people who have actually built Venture Builders
Experience in an accelerator, CVC, consultancy or corporate innovation department does not, by itself, mean that someone has the capabilities required for Venture Building.
Building a Venture Builder requires a combination of experience in:
* technology entrepreneurship;
* creating companies from scratch;
* venture investment;
* attracting and assessing founders;
* business-model development;
* technology commercialisation;
* working with IP and corporate assets;
* developing and validating investment theses;
* building partnerships;
* raising follow-on capital;
* constructing and developing portfolios of companies.
In practice, corporations need more than innovation managers. They need a team of technology entrepreneurs — preferably including serial entrepreneurs — capable of repeatedly taking an opportunity from an initial hypothesis to an independent, investable company.
There are still relatively few such professionals in the European market.
2. A Venture Builder cannot be assembled like a conventional corporate department
The obvious task for HR is to define the roles, identify candidates and build a department.
But a Venture Builder is not simply a collection of filled positions.
It is an entrepreneurial team that needs:
* a shared vision of how the sector will develop;
* complementary capabilities;
* its own methodology;
* the ability to make decisions under uncertainty;
* experience working together;
* access to founders, technologies, customers and investors;
* long-term motivation to create value.
A corporation may hire a Chief Venture Builder, an investment analyst, an innovation manager, a product manager and a business developer. But that does not mean these individuals will become a functioning Venture Builder when placed together.
An entrepreneurial team is not created solely through job descriptions and reporting lines. It is formed through shared experience, accountability for outcomes, jointly accepted risks and participation in the future value of the companies it builds.
Assigning the task exclusively to HR therefore does not solve the fundamental problem.
It also raises another question: how can HR assess a Venture Building team if the corporation itself has no previous experience in Venture Building and no clear understanding of the capabilities it should be looking for?
3. Even a strong team can lose its entrepreneurial capacity inside a corporation
Axel Deniz articulates an important principle of Bosch Business Innovations: **Backed by a corporate, but not blocked by a corporate.**
Corporations are very good at developing technologies, ensuring quality, scaling production and managing complex systems. But the mechanisms required to maintain reliability and control in a large organisation often make it difficult to build startups.
Long approval cycles, annual budgeting, procurement, compliance, internal KPIs and an institutional preference for minimising risk can deprive a Venture Builder of speed and entrepreneurial autonomy.
This leads to another question:
What is the point of finding an entrepreneurial team if, once hired, the corporation subjects it to the same processes and constraints that the team was expected to overcome?
Corporate Venture Building requires not only the right people but also a separate governance model.
New companies must remain close enough to the corporation to access its technology, data, expertise, customers and industrial capabilities. At the same time, they need sufficient independence to make decisions quickly, attract founders and raise external capital.
The cultures of individual business units must also be considered. Even a strong venture may fail to develop if its level of maturity does not match the risk appetite of the corporate unit expected to work with it.
The challenge is therefore not only startup–market fit. It is also the fit between a new venture and the specific corporate teams with which it will have to collaborate.
4. CVC and CVB are not opposing directions, but parts of one architecture
The distinction between CVC and a Corporate Venture Builder cannot be reduced solely to outside-in versus inside-out activity.
A traditional CVC primarily invests in external companies. Venture clienting helps a corporation adopt external solutions. Technology scouting identifies technologies, teams and startups in the market.
A Corporate Venture Builder can address the inside-out challenge by identifying promising technologies, data, knowledge and IP inside the corporation and turning them into independent companies.
But this is only one part of its role.
The second, more complex task of a CVB is to formulate concepts for future sector platforms, identify the missing components required to build them, and combine technologies from multiple sources.
Such a platform may include:
* corporate technologies, IP and data;
* solutions developed by existing external startups;
* university and clinical research;
* companies created specifically by the Venture Builder;
* digital services and operational partners;
* distribution channels and corporate customers;
* investors and strategic partners.
In this case, the process does not begin with an isolated technology that needs to be commercialised or an individual startup identified by the CVC.
It begins with a platform thesis:
* What complex sector problem needs to be solved?
* Which participant groups need to be connected?
* What value will they create for one another?
* Which technologies and business models are required?
* Which elements already exist inside the corporation?
* Which elements should be sourced externally?
* Which companies need to be created from scratch?
* What should the corporation invest in?
* How can all these elements be combined into a scalable business model?
The key difference between CVC and CVB is therefore not only the source of the technology.
**CVC primarily selects from existing investment opportunities. A Venture Builder can create and assemble investable assets that do not yet exist in the market.**
This is where a Venture Builder becomes more than a mechanism for commercialising corporate IP. It becomes a technology entrepreneur and Platform Architect.
It can take a corporate technology, complement it with solutions from several external startups, recruit founders and clinical or industrial partners, develop a new business model and create an independent PlatformCo.
Inside-out and outside-in should therefore not be treated as opposing approaches. The task of the CVB is to connect both flows within one entrepreneurial system.
5. The Bosch model may already contain part of the answer
Bosch is not attempting to conduct all of its Venture Building activity exclusively through internal resources.
The company is allocating approximately €200 million over five years to create new businesses and aims to have a portfolio of 20 operating ventures by 2030. Its initial focus areas include software-defined manufacturing, remote health monitoring, and the capture, utilisation and storage of greenhouse gases.
Bosch Business Innovations is also adopting a partnership-based model:
* the corporation defines its strategic focus areas;
* it provides capital, technology, IP, prototypes, laboratories and sector expertise;
* external Venture Studios help build the companies;
* entrepreneurs become involved at an early stage and receive genuine responsibility;
* external investors are brought in before the later stages;
* the companies must be capable of raising capital independently;
* Bosch retains a minority position, while the ventures remain founder-led and VC-friendly.
In some vehicles, Bosch assumes a role similar to that of a Limited Partner, while an established Venture Studio acts as General Partner, builds the startups and participates in the investment risk.
This is a crucial distinction.
The corporation is not simply purchasing consulting services to create startups. It is establishing a system in which independent entrepreneurial teams share both the risks and the future value.
The original question can therefore be reframed:
**What is more effective: spending several years assembling an internal Venture Builder, or identifying, assessing and capitalising an existing independent team?**
6. A Venture Builder should not be a consultant
If an external team is paid only to run a programme, develop a strategy or launch a pilot, its motivation ends when the contract ends.
A genuine Venture Builder must participate in the value it creates.
Its output should not be measured by the number of workshops conducted, applications reviewed or presentations prepared. The results should be:
* new companies;
* recruited founders;
* validated business models;
* independent funding rounds;
* commercial contracts;
* growth in portfolio value;
* integrated sector platforms.
A Venture Builder should therefore have skin in the game: it should invest its own resources, receive equity in the companies it creates, and share the financial outcome with the corporation and the founding teams.
This is what distinguishes a Venture Builder from an accelerator, innovation agency or consultancy.
Axel also emphasises the importance of combining financial and strategic metrics.
If a Venture Builder is assessed only according to strategic alignment with corporate interests, it risks creating projects that never become independent, investable businesses.
If it is assessed only against short-term financial metrics, Horizon 2–3 projects may not receive the time required to develop.
Two groups of KPIs are therefore needed:
* financial metrics: portfolio value growth, MOIC, IRR, follow-on rounds and commercial revenue;
* strategic metrics: entry into new markets, use of corporate technologies, creation of new business models and development of long-term options for the corporation.
7. The first criterion is not the technology, but the founding team
In the Bosch approach, the first stage gate is not based solely on the technical characteristics of the project.
The key question is whether strong founders have been attracted who are prepared to dedicate years of their lives to building the company.
Despite Bosch’s enormous number of engineers and researchers, it primarily looks for founder talent outside the corporation. For CEO roles, serial entrepreneurs who have already built companies are particularly valuable.
This again demonstrates that internal technical experts and future founders play different roles.
A corporate expert can:
* transfer knowledge;
* provide access to technology;
* join a supervisory board;
* support product development;
* assist the technical team.
But that does not necessarily mean this person should become the CEO or entrepreneur.
A Venture Builder must therefore do more than create companies. It must systematically identify, attract and assess the people capable of leading them.
This brings us back to the team behind the Venture Builder itself: who will identify and evaluate the founders if the corporation is creating this mechanism for the first time and has not yet developed the necessary experience?
8. A Venture Builder must be able to stop weak projects quickly
Bosch applies the principle of **“get to no fast”**:
* do not fall in love with a corporate technology too early;
* conduct external validation as early as possible;
* verify that a strong team can be assembled;
* confirm interest from real customers;
* test whether the company can attract independent capital.
A venture should not continue indefinitely simply because it has access to a corporate budget.
One of the most important indicators of its viability is whether it can prepare for an independent seed round, ideally led by an external investor, within approximately 12 months.
When assessing a Venture Builder, corporations should therefore ask:
* Can the team define transparent stage gates?
* Can it stop a project despite the presence of an internal corporate sponsor?
* Can it obtain external market validation?
* Can it distinguish technological value from investment attractiveness?
* Can it attract external capital without permanent corporate support?
The ability to close weak projects is as important as the ability to launch new ones.
9. How should an independent Venture Builder team be evaluated?
If a corporation decides to work with an existing team, the next question is how that team should be selected.
In my view, the assessment should consider not only the number of ventures launched, but the broader combination of capabilities:
* sector expertise and an independent view of how the market will develop;
* entrepreneurial and investment track record;
* the ability to formulate Venture Building theses;
* a methodology for evaluating technologies and teams;
* access to potential founders;
* the ability to conduct early market validation;
* an understanding of IP, governance and cap tables;
* access to corporate customers and sector partners;
* the ability to attract external capital;
* its own financial participation and aligned incentives;
* experience working internationally;
* the ability to combine multiple technologies and companies into platforms;
* readiness to apply AI to scouting, IP mining, due diligence and portfolio management.
The final platform-related criterion is particularly important.
Not every promising technology can become a standalone company with the scale required by a traditional VC model. It may, however, become an important component of a broader platform alongside other technologies, data, services and market-access channels.
A Venture Builder must therefore be capable of creating not only individual startups but also the architecture through which they can work together.
10. The search for the team must be international
In many European countries, it is practically impossible to find a complete domestic team with experience spanning technology entrepreneurship, investment and Venture Building.
Corporations must therefore be prepared to:
* search for teams across Europe;
* support their relocation;
* adopt distributed operating models;
* choose the country in which each venture should be built based on the availability of founders, customers, clinical and research partners, and investors.
Axel describes this capability as **venture–market fit**.
A new company does not necessarily need to be created where the corporate headquarters is located. The Venture Builder should determine which country or regional ecosystem gives a particular project the best chance of succeeding.
But are corporate HR, procurement, legal and governance processes prepared to identify and assess established international entrepreneurial teams rather than individual local employees?
11. Europe still lacks clearly understood benchmarks
When successful European Venture Builders are discussed, NLC in the Netherlands is most often cited as a reference point.
Other scaled and repeatable models are mentioned with far less confidence.
This creates a vicious circle:
* investors and corporations do not know how to evaluate Venture Builders;
* independent teams do not receive enough capital to scale;
* without capital, they cannot build a convincing track record;
* the absence of a track record is then used as an argument against investment.
Europe may therefore possess technologies, research centres, hospitals, corporations and capital, yet still lack the teams capable of continuously turning these elements into new companies and platforms.
12. How should a corporation finance its Corporate Venture Builder?
Once a corporation decides to launch a CVB, another organisational question arises that, in my view, receives insufficient attention:
**Where should the funding for a Corporate Venture Builder come from, and who should make the investment decisions?**
If the CVB is funded exclusively through the corporation’s annual operating budget, it risks remaining a cost centre.
Its development then depends on annual budget cycles, changes in corporate strategy and decisions made by managers who may have no long-term incentive to create new companies.
At the first sign of failure or a change in leadership, the budget may be reduced before the portfolio has had time to demonstrate results.
The financing model must therefore reflect the long cycle required to build companies and should be connected not only to operating expenses but also to the future value of the portfolio being created.
Several models are possible.
- Model 1: The CVC invests in an independent Venture Builder
A corporate venture fund can become a strategic investor in an independent Venture Builder company.
The CVC would receive:
* equity in the Venture Builder itself;
* access to the pipeline it develops;
* preferential rights to review the companies it creates;
* participation in the growth of the entire portfolio, rather than only individual startups;
* access to the Venture Builder’s sector expertise and methodology.
The Venture Builder, in turn, receives long-term capital to assemble its team, develop investment theses, identify technologies and build its first companies.
This model allows the CVB to be treated not as a contractor or temporary corporate programme, but as an investable asset in its own right.
- Model 2: The CVC becomes an anchor investor in a dedicated Venture Building vehicle
The corporation can establish a specialised investment vehicle or fund focused on a particular area, such as remote health monitoring, homecare or software-defined manufacturing.
The CVC becomes its anchor investor, while an independent Venture Builder receives a mandate to:
* formulate the sector thesis;
* identify internal and external technologies;
* create new companies;
* invest in existing startups;
* construct the portfolio;
* combine its participants into a platform.
External funds, family offices, strategic investors and sector partners may also join the vehicle.
This reduces the CVB’s dependence on the corporation’s annual operating budget while introducing external market validation into its investment decisions.
- Model 3: The CVC invests in startups created by the Venture Builder
Under this model, the corporation finances the operating activities of the CVB separately, while the CVC treats the companies it creates as a source of new deal flow.
At the pre-seed stage, the CVC may act as the first or a co-investor. In subsequent rounds, the new company should attract an external lead investor who confirms its investment attractiveness.
This model separates two functions:
* the CVB is responsible for creating the company and its initial value;
* the CVC makes the investment decision and finances its further development.
However, the CVC should not become an automatic buyer of every project produced by the Venture Builder. Independent investment decisions and external validation must be preserved.
- Model 4: The CVB receives a mandate to manage part of the CVC portfolio
The corporation may give the Venture Builder responsibility not for the entire CVC, but for a dedicated thematic investment mandate or portfolio sleeve.
For example, a sector-focused CVB may receive a budget to invest in startups required to build a particular platform.
This would allow the Venture Builder to:
* invest in existing external companies;
* gain access to their technologies;
* build strategic relationships between them;
* create joint products and business models;
* complement the portfolio with newly created companies;
* assemble the platform progressively.
In this model, the CVB becomes not only a company creator but also an active Portfolio Architect.
Its task is not simply to accumulate minority stakes in unrelated startups. It must understand the function each asset performs within the future platform and the additional value created through interaction between portfolio participants.
- Model 5: The CVB receives responsibility for the CVC or a joint investment mandate
A deeper model gives the Venture Builder team a substantial role in managing corporate venture capital.
This could include:
* a joint Investment Committee;
* a delegated thematic mandate;
* management of a specialised sub-fund;
* responsibility for developing the CVC investment pipeline;
* responsibility for constructing and developing a particular part of the portfolio.
Full transfer of the CVC to the Venture Builder is also possible, but it requires especially clear governance.
The following interests and decisions must be separated:
* the interests of the Venture Builder itself;
* the interests of the corporation;
* the interests of the founders;
* decisions on investing in related companies;
* valuation of the assets being created;
* follow-on financing;
* exit conditions.
In practice, a dedicated thematic mandate or specialised vehicle may therefore be more manageable than immediately transferring the entire corporate venture fund to the CVB.
13. How can conflicts of interest be avoided?
Connecting CVC and CVB creates significant opportunities, but it also requires clear rules.
The following must be defined in advance:
* a separate budget for Venture Builder operations;
* capital for investment in newly created and external companies;
* the authority of the Investment Committee;
* stage-gate criteria;
* rules for related-party investments;
* company valuation principles;
* requirements for external co-investors;
* the allocation of equity between the corporation, CVB and founders;
* follow-on rights;
* financial and strategic KPIs;
* criteria for closing weak projects;
* rules for creating platforms from portfolio companies.
It is essential that a Venture Builder should not be incentivised to create companies merely to obtain financing from an affiliated CVC.
At the same time, the CVC should not evaluate projects solely according to their relevance to the corporation’s current business units. Otherwise, Horizon 2–3 ventures will once again be reduced to incremental improvements to the core business.
The following integrated model appears particularly logical:
1. The corporation defines strategic focus areas and provides technologies, IP, data, expertise and market access.
2. The CVC invests in an independent sector-focused Venture Builder or becomes an anchor investor in a thematic vehicle managed by it.
3. The Venture Builder develops platform theses, evaluates corporate assets, identifies external technologies and recruits entrepreneurial teams.
4. The CVB creates new companies while also receiving the ability to invest in existing startups required to build the platform.
5. The CVC participates in financing selected companies while preserving an independent investment process.
6. External investors join subsequent rounds and confirm the market viability of the assets being created.
7. The Venture Builder is accountable not only for individual companies but also for growth in the combined value of the portfolio and the platforms it creates.
This model combines the strengths of both instruments:
**CVC provides investment capital.
The Venture Builder creates and assembles the assets in which that capital can be invested.**
The CVC may therefore invest at three levels:
* in the Venture Builder itself;
* in a specialised Venture Building vehicle;
* in the companies and platforms created or assembled by the Venture Builder.
14. Remote Health Monitoring as a practical example
This issue becomes particularly interesting when applied to remote health monitoring — one of the priority areas identified by Bosch Business Innovations.
Bosch explicitly acknowledges that this market is growing rapidly but remains fragmented.
The company has significant advantages:
* expertise in MEMS sensors;
* technologies and IP;
* Robert Bosch Hospital;
* partnerships with other hospitals;
* engineering and manufacturing capabilities;
* an international presence.
But remote health monitoring is not simply a sensor or connected device.
Medical data alone is not yet medical care. It is also necessary to:
* collect and interpret signals;
* identify clinically significant changes;
* define escalation rules;
* involve a medical professional;
* organise a medical intervention;
* integrate with clinical workflows;
* address data protection, quality and use;
* build relationships with insurers and care providers;
* develop a sustainable reimbursement and payment model.
A fragmented market cannot therefore be united through another isolated device. It requires a platform approach.
At 4PM Ventures, we are exploring several interconnected platform concepts:
* Homecare and Hospital at Home;
* continuous patient monitoring;
* Medical Assistance as the operational layer between data and medical action;
* connected medical devices;
* HEALDEX as a governed environment for access to medical data;
* collaboration with hospitals, insurers and care providers.
In such a model, Bosch could contribute sensors, technologies, IP, clinical relationships and industrial scaling.
A sector-focused HealthTech Venture Builder could add:
* the platform thesis;
* sector-specific market intelligence;
* external technology and startup scouting;
* recruitment of entrepreneurial teams;
* clinical validation pathways;
* partnerships with hospitals, Medical Assistance companies, insurers and care providers;
* business-model development;
* the integration of several solutions into an independent PlatformCo.
This leads to a specific question for Axel Deniz and Bosch Business Innovations:
**If the remote health monitoring market remains fragmented, is it sufficient to create individual sensor-based startups — or does Bosch need a sector-focused Venture Builder capable of combining devices, medical data, clinical workflows, Medical Assistance, insurers and care providers within a platform business model?**
15. Questions for the participants in this discussion
I would like to address these questions to Axel Deniz, Ralph Wilson, Jim Adler and Maija Palmer, as well as to other CVC and Corporate Innovation leaders.
How have you addressed or how would you recommend addressing - the challenge of creating a Corporate Venture Builder team?
Should a corporation:
* assemble such a team from scratch;
* partner with an independent sector-focused Venture Builder;
* invest in an existing team;
* acquire one while preserving its operational independence;
* establish a joint vehicle in which the corporation provides capital and assets, while an external team takes responsibility for Venture Building?
I would also add several questions about the relationship between CVC and CVB:
* Can a CVC invest not only in startups but also in an independent Venture Builder that creates new deal flow for it?
* Should the CVB team receive a dedicated investment mandate to construct a thematic portfolio?
* Could a Venture Builder manage part of a CVC in order to invest in external startups required to build a platform?
* How should the Venture Builder’s operating budget be separated from its investment capital?
* How can conflicts of interest be avoided when a CVB creates a company and an affiliated CVC decides whether to invest in it?
* Should the Venture Studio invest its own capital?
* How should its partners be given long-term financial incentives?
* How can corporate strategic alignment be balanced with entrepreneurial independence?
* How should a CVB team be assessed before its first ventures have been created?
* Should CVB performance be evaluated through individual exits or through growth in the combined value of its portfolio and platforms?
* Can a sector-focused Venture Builder become an operating partner within a larger corporate Venture Building system?
Perhaps the next stage in the evolution of Corporate Venture Building is precisely the transition from creating individual corporate spin-outs to constructing platform portfolios that combine internal corporate assets, external startups and newly created companies.
The 4PM Ventures perspective
At 4PM Ventures, we believe that the principal asset of a Venture Builder is neither its legal structure, innovation framework nor collection of corporate procedures.
The principal asset of a Venture Builder is its motivated entrepreneurial team.
The corporation can provide capital, IP, technology, data, expertise, manufacturing capabilities and market access.
But the entrepreneurial function should remain with a team capable of:
* developing an independent sector vision;
* identifying technologies and founders;
* validating hypotheses quickly;
* stopping weak projects;
* creating companies;
* attracting external capital;
* accepting responsibility for financial outcomes;
* investing in promising external startups;
* combining complementary companies into platforms.
This does not mean that a corporation should outsource all of its innovation activity to an external partner.
It means establishing a clear division of roles.
The corporation contributes its strongest assets. The CVC provides investment capital and financial expertise. An independent sector-focused Venture Builder performs the role of technology entrepreneur and Platform Architect. Founders receive autonomy and meaningful ownership in the companies being created. External investors validate their viability and provide the capital required for further scaling.
4PM Ventures is developing precisely this approach in healthcare, drawing on its accumulated experience, TPRL and Team360 methodologies, Future Health Lab, sector-focused scouting and its own Platform Architecture Engine.
We do not position ourselves as a consultant delivering a temporary innovation programme, nor as an individual startup seeking corporate funding.
Our potential role is that of an independent, sector-focused HealthTech Venture Builder and operating partner capable of connecting corporate assets, external technologies, entrepreneurs, hospitals, universities, insurers, Medical Assistance companies and investment capital.
Axel, the Bosch model demonstrates that a corporation can provide technology, capital and industrial strength while entrusting a substantial part of Venture Building to independent entrepreneurial teams.
The next question is how Bosch will identify and assess those teams — particularly in specialised and regulated sectors such as healthcare.
Could a sector-focused HealthTech Venture Builder become an operating partner within this model, particularly in remote health monitoring?
The 4PM Ventures team is open to discussing this approach and is ready to contribute its experience, tools, sector vision and developing platform concepts to corporations seeking to create new healthcare businesses, services and platforms based on emerging technologies.
I would greatly appreciate the participants in this discussion and other practitioners - sharing their experience and perspectives.
References:
* [Beyond the Venture Building Silo: How Bosch, Arup and Toyota Connect the Dots](https://globalventuring.com/corporate/overview/venture-building-silo-bosch-arup-toyota/)
* [Bosch Is Investing in Its Future Fields of Business](https://www.bosch-presse.de/pressportal/de/en/bosch-is-investing-in-its-future-fields-of-business-282442.html)
* [Axel Deniz: Venture Building, Spinouts and How Corporates Can Power Europe’s Deep-Tech Wave](https://www.eu.vc/p/axel-deniz-ceo-bosch-business-innovations-venture-building-spinouts-how-corporates-can-power-europe)
* [Interview with Axel Deniz: Why Ventures Cannot Be Built Within Conventional Corporate Logic](https://brutkasten.com/artikel/bosch-venture-builder-axel-deniz-innerhalb-einer-konzernlogik-kann-man-keine-ventures-bauen)
