https://www.facebook.com/366475320177278/

Nigerian Maritime Organization, Eko (2026)

29/09/2026

Nigeria’s Inland Ports: The Return to NPA Is Only Half the Story

If only one inland port is currently demonstrating meaningful viability, perhaps the bigger question is not who should manage them—but whether we built them in the right places, for the right logistics purpose.

From the Editor’s Desk

The decision to return the management of inland ports to the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) deserves more than a discussion about administrative control.

It should trigger a much bigger conversation about what an inland port is supposed to achieve for Nigeria's logistics economy—and why so many of the facilities conceived as inland ports have struggled to become commercially viable.

The uncomfortable reality is that an inland port cannot become successful merely because government designates a location, builds infrastructure and appoints an operator.

An inland port is fundamentally a logistics business ecosystem.

Its success depends on cargo volumes, proximity to production and consumption centres, road and rail connectivity, customs efficiency, warehousing, terminal operations, shipping-line participation, freight-forwarding activity, security, land availability and, above all, the economics of moving cargo through it.

If only one inland port is presently regarded as genuinely functional and commercially viable, Nigeria should pause before repeating the same planning assumptions.

The question should be:

What should an ideal inland port have looked like from the beginning?

---

An Inland Port Is Not Simply a Port Without Water

This distinction is critical.

An inland port should not be conceived merely as a container yard located hundreds of kilometres away from the coastline.

It should be an extension of the seaport into the hinterland—a strategically located logistics node where cargo can be transferred, consolidated, deconsolidated, cleared, stored and distributed efficiently.

The ideal inland port therefore takes pressure away from the seaport.

It should reduce congestion around the maritime gateway, shorten cargo dwell time, facilitate customs processes, provide warehousing and distribution capacity, and connect importers and exporters more efficiently with their markets.

In other words, the inland port should make the entire port system work better.

That means its location cannot be determined principally by political considerations, geographical convenience or the availability of government land.

Cargo must come first.

---

So, Where Should an Inland Port Be Located?

There are several criteria that should determine the location of an inland port.

1. Proximity to Cargo Generation

This is perhaps the most important consideration.

An inland port should be located close to significant sources of cargo—industrial clusters, agricultural production zones, manufacturing centres, mining areas, major commercial markets and large population centres.

If cargo must travel hundreds of kilometres on congested roads merely to reach an inland port before beginning another journey to the seaport, the economics become questionable.

The first question therefore should be:

What cargo will fill this facility?

Not:

Where do we want to build it?

---

2. Rail Connectivity Should Be Fundamental

A modern inland port without reliable rail connectivity is difficult to justify.

The whole economic logic of an inland port is based on moving large volumes of cargo efficiently between the seaport and the hinterland.

Rail provides the possibility of moving containers in bulk, reducing pressure on highways and lowering logistics costs.

An ideal inland port should therefore either be located directly on an operational railway corridor or be capable of efficient rail integration.

A rail line that exists only on paper does not constitute connectivity.

Infrastructure must be operational, reliable and commercially accessible.

---

3. Road Connectivity Must Complement Rail

Rail cannot do everything.

Trucks remain essential for first-mile and last-mile delivery.

The ideal inland port should therefore sit at the intersection of major road corridors, but not necessarily inside a congested urban centre.

It should have:

- adequate access roads;
- sufficient truck staging areas;
- parking facilities;
- weighbridges;
- security;
- traffic management;
- maintenance facilities; and
- efficient connections to industrial and commercial centres.

The objective should be to prevent the inland port from simply transferring congestion from the seaport to another city.

---

4. Customs and Regulatory Functions Must Be Built Into the Model

An inland port should provide genuine cargo-processing advantages.

If containers still have to undergo multiple physical interventions and bureaucratic procedures at different locations, the inland port becomes another layer of logistics rather than a solution.

Customs, terminal operators, shipping lines, freight forwarders and relevant government agencies should operate through an integrated digital environment.

The cargo owner should be able to track the cargo journey from:

Ship → Seaport → Inland Port → Warehouse/Factory → Final Destination.

This is where Nigeria's broader digitalisation agenda becomes particularly important.

An inland port should ultimately be a digitally visible logistics node, not merely a fenced physical facility.

---

5. The Catchment Area Must Be Large Enough

Every inland port needs a viable cargo catchment area.

Before approving one, government should determine:

- the population within its economic catchment;
- industrial activity;
- annual import demand;
- export potential;
- agricultural production;
- container volumes;
- bulk cargo potential;
- existing logistics infrastructure;
- competing facilities; and
- projected cargo growth.

There should be a credible answer to the question:

How many containers or tonnes of cargo will pass through this facility annually—and from where will they come?

Without that answer, an inland port risks becoming a monument to infrastructure planning rather than a productive logistics asset.

---

6. Location Should Be Driven by Logistics Economics

An inland port should reduce the total logistics cost of moving cargo.

That means government should assess the full cost chain:

Port handling + inland transportation + storage + customs + security + delays + road charges + handling + final delivery.

If using an inland port costs more than sending cargo directly from the seaport to the consignee, the market will eventually reject it.

This is why cargo owners—not government alone—must be part of inland-port planning.

---

7. There Must Be Anchor Cargo

Perhaps Nigeria's greatest weakness in inland-port planning has been the tendency to build infrastructure before securing the business.

A viable inland port should have anchor customers and anchor cargo.

Major manufacturers, agricultural exporters, distributors, retailers, mining companies, shipping lines and logistics companies should be engaged before substantial investment is made.

The facility should not be asking:

“How do we attract cargo after construction?”

The better question is:

“What cargo commitments justify construction?”

---

8. Warehousing and Logistics Must Be Part of the Ecosystem

An inland port should not end at the container terminal.

It should ideally support:

- bonded warehouses;
- cold-chain facilities;
- distribution centres;
- truck terminals;
- container depots;
- consolidation and deconsolidation;
- value-added logistics;
- packaging;
- light processing;
- e-commerce distribution;
- agricultural logistics; and
- export aggregation.

That is what transforms an inland port from a dry container yard into a logistics hub.

---

9. Land Matters—But Strategic Land Matters More

An inland port requires significant land for present operations and future expansion.

However, cheap land should not become the primary reason for selecting a location.

The cheapest land may ultimately produce the most expensive logistics system.

Land should be assessed against:

connectivity + cargo + expansion + security + environmental considerations + urban growth + logistics cost.

The facility should also have enough surrounding land for private-sector logistics development.

---

10. An Inland Port Needs a Business Model

This is perhaps where the conversation needs to become more serious.

Government can facilitate infrastructure, regulation and connectivity.

But an inland port must ultimately operate according to commercial principles.

There should be a clear answer regarding:

- who owns the infrastructure;
- who manages it;
- who invests;
- who operates the terminal;
- how tariffs are determined;
- how private logistics companies participate;
- what cargo services are offered;
- what level of throughput is required for profitability; and
- how expansion will be financed.

Returning management to NPA may help establish clearer institutional responsibility.

But management structure alone will not create cargo.

---

What Should NPA Do Differently?

If inland ports are returning to the NPA, this should not simply mean taking over existing facilities and continuing business as usual.

It should be an opportunity to re-engineer the inland-port strategy.

NPA should consider conducting a comprehensive viability audit of every designated inland port.

Each facility should be assessed against a common scorecard:

Criterion| Question
Cargo| Is there sufficient cargo in the catchment area?
Rail| Is reliable rail connectivity available?
Road| Can trucks access the facility efficiently?
Customs| Can cargo clearance occur efficiently?
Shipping lines| Are major carriers willing to use it?
Warehousing| Is adequate storage/distribution available?
Location| Does it minimise total logistics cost?
Land| Is there room for expansion?
Security| Can cargo move safely?
Digitalisation| Can cargo be tracked end-to-end?
Investment| Is the business commercially sustainable?
Market| Are there committed users/anchor customers?
Export| Can it support Nigerian exports?
Governance| Are roles between agencies clearly defined?

Facilities that pass the test should receive targeted investment.

Those that fail should not automatically receive additional public money simply because infrastructure has already been constructed.

Sunk cost should not become a justification for continued inefficiency.

---

The Bigger Opportunity: Build a National Inland Logistics Network

Nigeria should stop thinking about inland ports as isolated projects.

They should form part of a national logistics network connecting:

Seaports → Rail → Inland Ports → Industrial Clusters → Agricultural Zones → Markets → Export Corridors.

That is the real opportunity.

Lagos should not be expected to carry the entire national logistics burden.

A properly designed inland-port network could help distribute cargo flows across the country, support industrialisation outside the coastal corridor, improve export logistics and reduce the number of trucks converging on Lagos.

It could also make Nigerian ports more competitive against regional alternatives.

---

And There Is a Digital Dimension

This is where Nigeria could leapfrog some of the traditional problems.

Every cargo moving through the system should have a digital identity and an auditable logistics trail.

The system should allow stakeholders to know:

Where is the cargo?
Who has custody?
What documentation is outstanding?
What charges have been incurred?
What transport is available?
When will it arrive?

A properly integrated digital platform could connect shipping lines, NPA, customs, inland terminals, truckers, freight forwarders, cargo owners and other authorised stakeholders.

This would complement—not replace—the statutory functions of the various regulators and agencies.

The objective should be simple:

One cargo. One digital trail. Multiple authorised stakeholders.

---

The Real Test Is Not Construction—It Is Utilisation

Nigeria has often measured infrastructure success by what has been constructed.

The better measure is what is being utilised.

An inland port should ultimately be judged by:

throughput, turnaround time, cargo dwell time, rail utilisation, truck efficiency, customs processing time, logistics cost, revenue generation and customer satisfaction.

If these indicators do not improve, the facility has not achieved its purpose.

---

A Chance to Correct the Past

The return of inland-port management to NPA therefore presents an opportunity—but only if it is treated as a strategic reset rather than an administrative transfer.

Government should resist the temptation to simply revive every existing facility.

Instead, Nigeria should ask:

Which locations actually make economic sense?

Which have sufficient cargo?

Which can connect to rail?

Which can serve genuine industrial and agricultural catchment areas?

Which can attract private investment?

Which can become export logistics hubs?

And perhaps most importantly:

Which inland ports can reduce, rather than merely relocate, Nigeria's logistics costs?

That is the standard that should guide the next phase.

The Editor’s View

Returning inland ports to the Nigerian Ports Authority may put the institutional architecture in better perspective.

But ownership and management are only part of the equation.

The real challenge is to put the economics, logistics and cargo first.

Nigeria does not need inland ports because other countries have them.

It needs inland ports that solve specific logistics problems, move identifiable cargo, connect efficiently to seaports and markets, and operate on commercially sustainable principles.

If only one existing facility is currently demonstrating meaningful viability, perhaps that is not a reason to abandon the inland-port concept.

It is a reason to rethink it properly.

The next generation of inland ports should not be selected because a location is politically attractive, land is available or infrastructure has already been built.

They should be selected because the cargo is there, the connectivity works, the economics make sense and the market needs them.

That is how Nigeria can turn inland ports from stranded infrastructure into engines of trade, industrialisation and national logistics competitiveness.

24/09/2026

World Maritime Day 2026: From Policy to Practice — The Time for Maritime Action

Today, as the global maritime community marks World Maritime Day, the theme “From Policy to Practice: Powering Maritime Excellence” comes with a message that should resonate particularly strongly in Nigeria.

It is a simple message: maritime excellence cannot be achieved by policies, conventions and regulations alone. It is achieved when those policies work in practice.

For decades, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and national governments have developed rules covering safety, security, environmental protection, seafarer welfare, port efficiency and maritime governance. But the real test is not how many regulations we have. The real test is how effectively they are implemented, enforced and translated into measurable results.

For Nigeria, this is an important moment for reflection.

Do our maritime policies consistently produce safer ships, more efficient ports, stronger indigenous shipping capacity and better conditions for seafarers?

Are regulations enforced predictably?

Are our institutions sufficiently coordinated?

Are investments in digitalisation, infrastructure, ship financing, training and maritime security producing the outcomes our policies promise?

And perhaps most importantly: are we measuring implementation by results rather than by announcements?

The journey from policy to practice requires more than government action. It requires regulators, port authorities, shipowners, seafarers, financiers, technology providers and other industry stakeholders to work from the same objective.

Nigeria does not lack maritime potential. What has often been missing is the consistent conversion of policy ambition into operational reality.

This World Maritime Day should therefore be more than a celebration. It should be a call to action.

Let policies become functioning systems.
Let regulations become effective enforcement.
Let maritime strategies become investment.
Let digitalisation become operational efficiency.
Let training become competence.
And let our enormous maritime potential become measurable economic value.

From Policy to Practice is ultimately a question of ex*****on.

And in maritime affairs, ex*****on is where excellence begins.

Happy World Maritime Day 2026.

23/09/2026

From Cargo to Ships: Why Dangote and other Giant Industries can Help Build Nigeria’s Indigenous Fleet

Nigeria does not necessarily have a ship-financing problem. It has a bankable-cargo problem.

There is an idea now on the table that deserves considerably more than polite industry applause.

Nigerian shipowners are asking major cargo interests, particularly the Dangote Group, to commit portions of their cargo requirements to qualified Nigerian shipping companies through long-term Contracts of Affreightment (CoAs).

We strongly support this proposal.

In fact, we believe it should become one of the most important conversations in Nigeria's attempt to rebuild an indigenous commercial fleet.

The logic is simple:

Cargo creates the contract.
The contract creates predictable revenue.
Predictable revenue makes the vessel bankable.
The bankable vessel attracts finance.
Finance produces the vessel.
The vessel generates Nigerian maritime capacity.

That is the missing connection.

The industry has been looking at the problem from the wrong end

For years, the Nigerian maritime conversation has repeatedly returned to the same question:

How do we get Nigerian shipowners to acquire more vessels?

But perhaps that is not the first question.

The first question should be:

What cargo can be committed to those vessels over a sufficiently long period to justify their acquisition?

Shipping is not an ordinary business. A vessel can cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, depending on type, size and specification.

No sensible bank or institutional financier should be expected to finance such an asset merely because an entrepreneur has a good idea and a Nigerian flag.

The financier wants to know:

What will the vessel carry?
For whom?
For how long?
At what rate?
With what counterparty?
And how secure is the cash flow?

This is precisely why the proposal for long-term CoAs is so important.

The recent call from indigenous shipowners argues that cargo, contracts, finance and vessels must be treated as one interconnected ecosystem rather than four separate issues.

We believe this is exactly right.

Dangote can be a catalyst — not simply a customer

The significance of Dangote in this discussion cannot be overstated.

The Group is no longer simply a cement company. Its industrial footprint encompasses refining, cement, fertiliser and other major commodity flows. Its refinery alone is operating at enormous scale and is expanding its regional and international ambitions. Current plans include expanding refining capacity substantially, while the Group continues to develop its wider African industrial footprint.

That means something strategically important for Nigeria's maritime industry:

Dangote controls or generates cargo.

And cargo is the foundation upon which shipping capacity can be built.

If even a strategically selected portion of those cargo movements can be placed under properly structured, competitive and transparent long-term CoAs with qualified Nigerian operators, the consequences could extend far beyond the individual contracts.

It could help create an indigenous fleet.

This is not a request for charity

This distinction is critical.

Nigerian shipowners should not be asking Dangote to subsidise inefficient operators.

Nor should Dangote be expected to award contracts simply because a company is Nigerian.

That would ultimately weaken both the cargo owner and the shipping industry.

What should be created instead is a commercially rigorous indigenous fleet-development programme.

Qualified Nigerian shipping companies should compete for defined cargo packages.

They should demonstrate:

- technical competence;
- financial capacity;
- vessel specifications;
- safety and compliance standards;
- insurance;
- professional management;
- operational track record;
- competitive freight economics; and
- credible financing arrangements.

The strongest operators should then receive multi-year cargo commitments.

That is not protectionism.

That is industrial policy through commercial contracts.

The CoA can become the missing bridge to finance

This is where the idea becomes particularly powerful.

Imagine a Nigerian shipping company approaches a financial institution to acquire a tanker.

Instead of presenting only a business plan saying:

«“We intend to find cargo after acquiring the vessel.”»

the company presents:

«“We have a five-year Contract of Affreightment with a major Nigerian industrial cargo owner, covering defined annual cargo volumes, subject to agreed commercial and performance conditions.”»

That is a completely different financing proposition.

The lender can begin modelling:

Cargo volume → freight revenue → operating expenses → debt service → cash flow → residual value.

The risk has not disappeared.

But it has become structured and measurable.

That is the difference between an interesting maritime proposal and a potentially bankable shipping project.

The four-pillar model deserves serious attention

The proposed model of:

Cargo → Contract → Finance → Vessel

could become a practical framework for Nigerian fleet development.

1. Cargo

Major Nigerian cargo owners identify predictable maritime transportation requirements.

2. Contract

Those requirements are converted into competitive, multi-year CoAs with qualified indigenous operators.

3. Finance

Banks, development finance institutions, leasing companies, export-credit agencies and other financiers assess the contracted cash flow.

4. Vessel

The Nigerian operator acquires or charters the appropriate vessel and performs the contract.

This reverses the traditional Nigerian problem.

Instead of:

Buy ship → look for cargo → struggle with debt

we move toward:

Secure cargo → secure contract → secure finance → acquire ship.

That is a much more rational sequence.

And this is where CVFF could become much more intelligent

Nigeria has spent years debating maritime finance, particularly the use of the Cabotage Vessel Financing Fund.

But finance without commercially sustainable employment can merely transfer the problem from ship acquisition to debt repayment.

A vessel is not made viable because it was financed.

It is made viable because it earns.

This is why long-term cargo contracts could potentially complement any future vessel-financing architecture.

Instead of asking only:

«“Who qualifies for maritime finance?”»

Nigeria should increasingly be asking:

«“What vessel is required, what cargo will it carry, who has contracted that cargo, and does the resulting cash flow support the financing?”»

That is a much stronger credit philosophy.

It also offers an opportunity to make maritime finance considerably more disciplined.

Dangote should not be alone

While Dangote is an obvious candidate because of the scale and diversity of its cargo requirements, the principle should extend much further.

Nigeria has major cargo interests across:

- oil and gas;
- refined petroleum products;
- cement;
- fertiliser;
- agricultural commodities;
- steel;
- mining;
- construction materials;
- chemicals;
- containerised cargo; and
- project cargo.

The question should therefore become:

Can Nigeria build a national cargo-to-fleet pipeline?

Major cargo owners could identify the shipping services they expect to require over the next five, seven or ten years.

Indigenous operators could then compete to service those requirements.

Financial institutions could finance vessels against demonstrable commercial employment.

Government agencies could provide the appropriate regulatory and financing environment.

That would be a genuine maritime industrial strategy.

There is another enormous benefit: Nigerian cargo should increasingly create Nigerian shipping capacity

There is something fundamentally uncomfortable about a country generating enormous volumes of maritime cargo while much of the economic value of transporting that cargo leaves the country through foreign-controlled shipping capacity.

The objective should not be to exclude international shipping.

Nigeria will continue to need international shipping companies, global technical expertise and foreign capital.

The objective should be different:

Nigeria should progressively capture a meaningful share of the value chain generated by its own cargo.

Cargo ownership should therefore become a strategic starting point for fleet development.

If Nigerian cargo can support Nigerian-owned or Nigerian-controlled vessels, those vessels can employ Nigerian seafarers, use Nigerian maritime services, generate Nigerian professional opportunities and retain more shipping-related value within the economy.

That is what the blue economy should mean in practical terms.

But there must be discipline

There is an important caveat.

A CoA should never become another mechanism for creating politically connected but commercially weak shipping companies.

The cargo owner must be protected.

The financier must be protected.

The Nigerian taxpayer must be protected.

And ultimately, the reputation of the Nigerian maritime industry must be protected.

Therefore, any such programme should be based on competitive procurement, transparent qualification, performance guarantees, international safety standards and commercially defensible freight rates.

The objective should be to create competitive Nigerian shipping companies, not merely Nigerian-registered vessels.

That distinction is fundamental.

Imagine the signal to international finance

Suppose Nigeria could demonstrate that several major industrial cargo owners have committed substantial volumes under long-term contracts to competent indigenous operators.

Suddenly, the conversation with international finance changes.

Nigeria is no longer saying:

“Please finance our shipowner.”

It is saying:

“Here is the cargo. Here is the contract. Here is the vessel requirement. Here is the projected cash flow. Here is the operator. Here is the equity contribution. Here is the security package.”

That is how shipping finance works.

And that is precisely the conversation Nigeria needs to start having.

Dangote has an opportunity to make history

The request to Dangote should therefore not be interpreted simply as Nigerian shipowners asking one large corporation for business.

It is potentially an invitation to participate in the rebuilding of an entire Nigerian maritime asset base.

Dangote has already demonstrated that Nigerian capital can build industrial assets on a scale previously considered impossible.

The next question is whether Nigerian industrial cargo can help create the shipping assets required to move that cargo.

That would be a powerful extension of the industrialisation story.

Build the refinery.
Build the cement plants.
Build the fertiliser capacity.
Build the cargo base.
Now help build the ships that move the cargo.

That is a complete industrial ecosystem.

The time has come to connect the dots

Nigeria has discussed indigenous shipping for decades.

We have discussed vessel acquisition.

We have discussed the CVFF.

We have discussed access to finance.

We have discussed cabotage.

We have discussed the blue economy.

We have discussed the absence of Nigerian-controlled tonnage.

Perhaps the answer has been sitting in front of us all along.

Cargo.

The Nigerian maritime industry does not necessarily need another round of conferences telling us that we need more vessels.

It needs commercially bankable pathways for acquiring them.

And long-term cargo contracts may provide exactly that bridge.

Our position from the Editor's Desk

We emphatically support the call for major Nigerian cargo owners, led by companies of Dangote's scale, to consider structured long-term CoAs with qualified indigenous shipping companies.

But we would go further.

Let this not be a one-off arrangement.

Let it become a model.

Let major cargo owners publish medium- and long-term shipping requirements.

Let Nigerian shipowners compete transparently for them.

Let banks and development financiers assess the contracts.

Let appropriate government financing mechanisms complement—not replace—the commercial foundation.

Let vessels be acquired against real cargo rather than speculation.

And let Nigeria finally begin building a fleet because the cargo is there to pay for it.

The central lesson is brutally simple:

Do not finance the ship first and then search for the cargo.

Secure the cargo, contract the cargo, finance the ship — and let the ship earn its way home.

That may be one of the most practical routes yet proposed for turning Nigeria's long-running ambition for an indigenous merchant fleet into a commercially sustainable reality.

07/09/2026

AfCFTA Is Opening Africa’s Market — But Who Will Own the Ships?

Nigeria’s fleet deficit could become the hidden weakness in its AfCFTA ambition. The CVFF now offers an opportunity to change that — but only if Nigeria treats vessel financing as a national trade strategy, not merely a loan scheme.

Africa is opening its internal market. Nigeria wants to lead it.

But there is an uncomfortable question that deserves much more attention:

When African trade expands under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), who will own the vessels that move the cargo?

This is where Nigeria’s maritime ambition meets its fleet deficit.

AfCFTA is no longer simply an aspiration on paper. Intra-African trade reached about $220.3 billion in 2024, up 12.4% from 2023, according to Afreximbank’s African Trade Report 2025. Nigeria has also begun actual trading under AfCFTA preferences, while the country is positioning itself for an even greater role in continental commerce.

Nigeria will host the 2027 Intra-African Trade Fair, with the organisers targeting more than $50 billion in trade and investment deals. That is a major opportunity — but it also raises a fundamental logistics question.

Can Nigeria become a major African trading hub without developing the shipping capacity to carry a meaningful share of that trade?

Our answer is: not sustainably.

The AfCFTA opportunity is bigger than tariffs

The usual conversation around AfCFTA focuses on tariff reduction, market access, rules of origin, customs procedures and manufacturing.

All of these matter.

But there is another infrastructure beneath the entire trading architecture:

transportation.

A manufacturer in Nigeria may secure a buyer in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon or elsewhere. An agricultural processor may find markets for its products. A Nigerian industrial company may finally gain access to a continental market of enormous scale.

But the transaction is not complete until the cargo moves.

And that is precisely where maritime transport becomes strategic.

Afreximbank has previously warned that Africa's maritime and logistics infrastructure requires urgent upgrading and that the continent has suffered from high transportation and transaction costs. The bank has also observed that much African infrastructure historically developed around moving African commodities outward to global markets rather than facilitating trade between African countries themselves.

This is the paradox.

AfCFTA is creating the market. But Africa still needs the ships, ports, waterways, logistics systems and finance to physically connect that market.

Nigeria's fleet deficit is therefore not just a maritime problem

It is an AfCFTA problem.

It is an industrialisation problem.

It is an economic sovereignty problem.

And ultimately, it is a trade competitiveness problem.

Nigeria can produce the cargo, sell the cargo and export the cargo — yet if foreign-owned vessels dominate the transportation chain, a significant portion of the value created by that trade leaves the Nigerian economy.

That is precisely why the current debate about Nigeria's fleet deficit deserves to be elevated beyond the traditional shipowner-versus-government argument.

The issue is no longer simply:

How many Nigerian-owned vessels do we have?

The bigger question should be:

How much of Africa's emerging intra-African trade can Nigerian-controlled shipping actually carry?

This is where the CVFF becomes strategically important

The Cabotage Vessel Financing Fund was established precisely to build indigenous vessel acquisition capacity.

NIMASA states that the CVFF is intended to provide credit facilities to local maritime operators and support indigenous operators in acquiring vessels. Its Cabotage Department also identifies CVFF disbursement as a mechanism for building tonnage capacity.

The Federal Government has now moved further by launching the CVFF application portal in January 2026.

The Ministry described the fund as a strategic instrument for strengthening indigenous ship ownership, reducing dependence on foreign-flagged vessels, retaining value domestically and creating employment for Nigerian seafarers.

That is the right direction.

But we should think bigger.

The CVFF should not be regarded simply as a fund from which individual shipowners obtain loans to buy individual vessels.

It should become part of Nigeria's AfCFTA maritime strategy.

From CVFF applicants to an African trade fleet

The most important change in thinking is this:

Do not finance ships first and look for cargo later.

Identify the emerging cargo corridors first.

Then finance the vessels required to serve them.

Recent industry commentary has made precisely this point. Captain Ladi Olubowale argued that a facility of up to $25 million could finance a sizeable vessel where there is identifiable cargo and a long-term trade contract. He stressed that vessel acquisition should be driven by the trade opportunity rather than simply the availability of financing.

We strongly agree.

Imagine a CVFF strategy built around actual African trade corridors:

Nigeria → Ghana → Côte d'Ivoire → Senegal

Nigeria → Cameroon → Gabon → Central Africa

Nigeria → Benin → Togo → Ghana

Nigeria → East African markets

Nigeria → North African markets

The exact corridors would need to be determined through detailed cargo-flow analysis.

But the principle is straightforward:

Cargo first. Contract second. Vessel third. Finance fourth.

Not the other way around.

Nigeria should finance fleets around cargo segments

The next generation of Nigerian shipping should not consist of a random collection of vessels.

It should be commercially designed.

For example:

• Container vessels for manufactured goods and SME exports.

• Multipurpose vessels for mixed African cargoes.

• Bulk carriers for agricultural and mineral commodities.

• Tankers for petroleum products and energy-related trade.

• Ro-Ro vessels for vehicles and rolling cargo.

• General cargo vessels for the many commodities that cannot efficiently move by container.

• Feeder vessels connecting Nigerian ports with regional African ports.

• River and coastal vessels supporting inland and short-sea trade.

This is where the CVFF can become much more than a financing programme.

It can become a fleet development architecture.

And Nigeria does not have to do this alone

There is already evidence that African institutions understand the connection between trade and transport infrastructure.

Afreximbank has supported initiatives aimed at improving Nigeria's inland waterways and developing the Lower Niger-Benue corridor specifically to facilitate intra-African trade. It has also supported digital trade infrastructure designed to connect buyers, sellers, financial institutions and logistics providers across Africa.

This suggests an important opportunity:

CVFF + AfCFTA + Afreximbank + NEXIM + commercial banks + Nigerian shipowners

could potentially create a much broader African maritime trade-financing ecosystem.

The objective should be to finance trade corridors, not merely vessels.

But there is a warning

The CVFF itself must not become another bureaucratic success story without ships actually entering service.

As of July 2026, reports indicated that 70 applications had been received, with only 20 applicants having passed the eligibility stage and proceeding to Primary Lending Institutions.

There have also been industry concerns about delays in actual disbursement.

This is precisely where urgency is required.

Africa's trade integration will not wait for Nigeria's bureaucracy.

If Nigerian businesses cannot obtain competitive shipping capacity, foreign shipping interests will provide it.

And there is nothing inherently wrong with foreign shipping participating in African trade.

The problem arises when Nigeria aspires to be a continental commercial hub while remaining structurally dependent on foreign vessels to transport the resulting trade.

The real measure of CVFF success

We should therefore stop measuring CVFF success merely by:

• how much money is disbursed;

• how many applications are approved;

• how many shipowners receive financing; or

• how many vessels are purchased.

Those are inputs.

The real outputs should be:

How much Nigerian cargo is carried by Nigerian-controlled vessels?

How much intra-African trade revenue is retained in Nigeria?

How many African trade corridors are served by Nigerian operators?

How many Nigerian seafarers are employed?

How much foreign exchange does the Nigerian fleet retain or earn?

How much new Nigerian maritime capacity is created?

That is the scorecard that matters.

A digital dimension should also be added

This is an area where Nigeria could potentially leapfrog.

Nigeria should develop a national/continental digital cargo-and-vessel intelligence platform that maps:

Cargo → Origin → Destination → Volume → Laycan → Vessel → Capacity → Freight → Contract → Financing.

Such a system could help identify where cargo exists, where vessels are required and where financing can produce commercially viable returns.

It would also make the CVFF more data-driven.

Instead of asking:

Who wants a vessel?

the system should help answer:

What cargo is available, where is it going, what vessel is required, what contract supports it, and what financing structure can make the operation bankable?

That is a fundamentally different philosophy.

Nigeria's geographic advantage must become a shipping advantage

Nigeria possesses enormous advantages:

A large domestic market.

A major population base.

Oil and gas resources.

Agricultural production.

Manufacturing capacity.

Multiple seaports.

A developing deep-sea port ecosystem.

A long coastline.

Inland waterways.

And a strategic position on the Gulf of Guinea.

But geography alone does not create maritime power.

Ships do.

Ports do.

Cargo does.

Capital does.

Digital infrastructure does.

And commercially competent Nigerian shipping companies do.

The choice before Nigeria

AfCFTA is effectively creating a new economic geography for Africa.

The winners will not necessarily be the countries that produce the most.

They will increasingly be the countries that can connect production to markets efficiently and competitively.

Nigeria has an opportunity to become one of those connectors.

But that requires us to stop seeing the Nigerian fleet as an isolated maritime-sector concern.

The Nigerian fleet is part of Nigeria's trade infrastructure.

And the CVFF, if properly structured, can become one of the instruments through which Nigeria builds that infrastructure.

The question is therefore no longer whether Nigeria needs more ships.

It is:

Can Nigeria deploy the CVFF quickly and intelligently enough to capture the African trade opportunity that AfCFTA is creating?

Because the danger is obvious.

AfCFTA may open Africa's markets. Nigerian producers may fill those markets. Nigerian ports may handle the cargo.

But if foreign vessels continue to carry the overwhelming share of the trade, Nigeria may once again find itself providing the cargo while others capture the transportation value.

That would be a familiar story.

This time, Nigeria has the opportunity to write a different one.

Our position from the Editorial Desk

The CVFF should now be repositioned as an AfCFTA strategic fund — financing commercially viable Nigerian-controlled tonnage specifically designed to capture identifiable African trade flows.

The objective should not simply be “more Nigerian vessels.”

It should be:

“More Nigerian-controlled shipping carrying more African trade.”

That is how vessel finance becomes trade policy.

And that is how Nigeria can convert its enormous AfCFTA market opportunity into genuine maritime and economic power.

Address

Eko

Website

facebook.com

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Nigerian Maritime Organization posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Nigerian Maritime Organization