23/04/2026
AOL posts
Iran
22 April 2026
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked and likely redirected two vessels towards Iran on April 22, likely to enforce Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait to disrupt global shipping and extract US concessions. The IRGC claimed that it “seized” two vessels and directed them to the Iranian coast on April 22. The two vessels — the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Epaminondas and the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca — appear to have been exiting the Strait of Hormuz at the time of the attacks. An IRGC “gunboat” inflicted “heavy damage” to the Epaminondas’s bridge, and an unspecified attack damaged the MSC Francesca’s hull and accommodation. Both vessels changed direction, sailed into Iranian territorial waters, and idled about seven nautical miles off the coast of Iran. Commercially available maritime tracking data showed that the Epaminondas continued to transit north in Iranian territorial waters. It is unclear why the vessels would have changed course and sailed further inland towards the Iranian coast if not under Iranian es**rt. The IRGC also fired on a third vessel, the Panamanian-flagged, Emirati-operated Euphoria, but the vessel continued its transit after the incident. The IRGC has demanded that the United States lift its blockade over the Strait of Hormuz and effectively halted traffic through the strait on April 18 by attacking several vessels. The IRGC likely aims to raise international shipping prices to extract concessions from the United States, such as ending the US blockade or yielding other demands. The IRGC also may have redirected the two vessels in response to the recent US Navy seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska in the Gulf of Oman on April 19. The Iranian regime had pledged to respond to the incident.
The IRGC has also used its “control” over the strait as a means for IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi to flex his own power over internal rivals, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Vahidi and his inner circle recently used the IRGC’s leverage over the strait to exercise influence over Iran’s negotiating position. The United States extended the ceasefire yesterday to allow for Iranian leaders to produce a “unified proposal,” but Iranian leaders remain fragmented over Iran’s negotiating strategy, as noted below.
The IRGC’s attacks on shipping and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s apparent willingness to scrap US-Iran talks indicate that Vahidi is prepared to resume the war if needed. Vahidi currently holds the most influential position in the regime at this time, apart from the Supreme Leader, who is reportedly seriously injured or incapacitated. The IRGC’s recent attacks on commercial vessels suggest that Vahidi is willing to risk incurring a potential US military response to assert Iranian ”control” over the strait and achieve the subsequent intended effects, as described above. Vahidi also may seek to derail the negotiations and may be attempting to do so by introducing preconditions and interfering with efforts to produce a “unified proposal.” These actions suggest that Vahidi and his inner circle have accepted and are prepared for the risks that such actions would lead to the resumption of the war with the United States.
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KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked and likely redirected two vessels towards Iran on April 22, likely to enforce Iranian claims of sovereignty over the strait to disrupt global shipping and extract US concessions. The IRGC also may have redirected the two vessels in response to the recent US Navy seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska in the Gulf of Oman.
• The IRGC’s attacks on shipping and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s apparent willingness to scrap US-Iran talks indicate that Vahidi is prepared to resume the war if needed. Vahidi appears willing to risk incurring a potential US military response to assert Iranian “control” over the strait.
• Iranian decision-making remains fragmented and in disarray, which explains Iran’s inability to formulate and communicate a coherent negotiating position. Iranian officials have not reached a unified decision on whether to return to negotiations in recent days, and competing regime power centers appear to be blocking consensus on core issues. The regime’s formal decision-making and coordinating mechanisms are also not functioning effectively.
• US officials have recently leaked quantitative estimates of the number of different Iranian assets remaining after the ceasefire. It is extremely difficult to deduce the degree of degradation to Iranian forces based on these estimates because the number of remaining systems is only one of many data points required to form a complete evaluation of military strength
21 April 2026
The United States extended its ceasefire with Iran “until such time as [the Iranian] proposal is submitted and discussions are concluded.” US President DonaldTrump stated on April 21 that Pakistani mediators urged the United States not to resume attacks while Iranian leaders work to produce a “unified proposal.” The reference to a ”unified” proposal appears to imply that previous proposals were not unified in some way, which is consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that one challenge with the ongoing negotiations is the divided nature of Iran’s negotiating team. The ceasefire extension comes after a second round of US–Iran negotiations scheduled for April 21 in Islamabad, Pakistan, was cancelled because Iran did not confirm its participation and did not respond to US positions. Trump confirmed that Washington will maintain its blockade of Iranian ports.
Conflicting reports on April 20 and 21 about Iran’s participation in the scheduled negotiations and Iran’s failure to produce a unified proposal reflect the ongoing intra-regime power struggle between Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. The Wall Street Journal, citing unspecified sources, reported on April 21 that Iranian officials initially signaled that they would attend the talks but later introduced a precondition following pressure from the IRGC that the United States lift its blockade before negotiations begin. That the regime then adopted this precondition as official regime policy suggests that senior-most IRGC commander Vahidi and aligned actors currently wield significant influence on Iranian decision-making. This dynamic is consistent with reporting that Vahidi is the only senior official who maintains direct access to Mojtaba Khamenei and relays key decisions, which gives him significant power. Ghalibaf has publicly supported negotiations and has not explicitly called for preconditions. The Trump administration seems to have been willing to negotiate in talks without preconditions.
Iranian officials and IRGC-affiliated media are signaling readiness for the imminent resumption of war. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on April 21 that Iran has prepared for a new phase of fighting. Tasnim added that Iran has assessed the likelihood of renewed conflict as high over the past two weeks and has conducted certain military redeployments and prepared new target lists accordingly. Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately assessed on April 21 that the likelihood of renewed US and Israeli attacks is high and emphasized the need for preparation. An unspecified senior Israeli security official told Israel’s state broadcaster on April 21 that Israel is preparing for the resumption of fighting with Iran as well. The official assessed that the United States and Iran will fail to reach any understanding and noted that Israel is ready to immediately resume the war.
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* The United States extended its ceasefire with Iran “until such time as [the Iranian] proposal is submitted and discussions are concluded.” Trump confirmed that Washington will maintain its blockade of Iranian ports.
* Conflicting reports on April 20 and 21 about Iran’s participation in the scheduled negotiations and Iran’s failure to produce a unified proposal reflect the ongoing intra-regime power struggle between Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment.
* Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted up to half of the roughly 1,000 drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia during the war, according to unnamed sources speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 21. ISW-CTP previously assessed that it is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.
* Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel for the first time since the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire took effect on April 16. The IDF struck the Hezbollah rocket launcher responsible for the attack on Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine.
20 April 2026
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious intra-regime debate with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior regime officials opposed to negotiations with the United States. Ghalibaf publicly defended negotiations on Iranian state television on April 18, arguing that diplomacy with the United States, alongside military power, is necessary to secure Iran’s objectives. Ghalibaf also reportedly criticized hardline officials, including Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti, for their opposition to negotiations during a meeting with advisers, but his criticisms were likely implicitly directed at Vahidi. US officials separately told Axios on April 20 that the US negotiating delegation thought it was “negotiating with the right people“ in Islamabad on April 11 and 12 but that the IRGC effectively told the Iranian negotiating delegation upon their return to Tehran that they ”don’t speak for” the IRGC. Senior regime officials, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb, reportedly called the Iranian negotiating delegation back to Tehran after it surpassed its mandate. A second US official told Axios that “we aren’t sure who’s in charge and neither do they.” This report is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that there is a division between Vahidi and his inner circle and members of Iran‘s negotiating team over Iran’s negotiations policy. This report is also consistent with ISW-CTP's assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not played the role of cohering and arbitrating between various factions as his father used to do, which has likely exacerbated intra-regime fighting.
Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. Vahidi is reportedly the only Iranian official with direct access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, according to Israeli media on April 19. Israeli media also reported on April 19 that Iranian officials‘ inability to contact Mojtaba is a significant obstacle to continued US-Iran negotiations. Ghalibaf’s push for diplomacy and apparent effort to reach a deal may also be a bid to protect his domestic position and maintain credibility. Ghalibaf reportedly fears that both his and Araghchi’s positions are at risk if the IRGC consolidates control. Ghalibaf’s removal as the parliament speaker would represent a major defeat for Ghalibaf and his domestic positions and signify a victory for Vahidi. These reports are consistent with ISW-CTP's ongoing assessment that Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely consolidated control over not only Iran’s military response in the conflict but also Iran’s negotiations policy.
US and Iranian delegations will reportedly meet in Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of talks in the coming days. Two US officials speaking to the New York Times on April 20 stated that US Vice President JD Vance will travel to Pakistan on April 21. Two Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led the Iranian delegation in the first round of talks, would attend the upcoming talks if Vance attended. US and Iranian demands appear to have largely stayed the same. US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal stated that the US delegation is pushing for the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a pause in Iranian uranium enrichment for at least 20 years, and the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran. The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran’s demands are Iranian ”control” over the strait, the lifting of sanctions on Iran, and a shorter pause in uranium enrichment. US President Donal
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* Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be engaged in a serious intra-regime debate with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and other senior regime officials opposed to negotiations with the United States.
* Vahidi appears to have the upper hand over Ghalibaf at the moment. Vahidi is reportedly the only Iranian official with direct access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, according to Israeli media on April 19.
* US and Iranian delegations will reportedly meet in Islamabad, Pakistan, for a second round of talks in the coming days. US and Iranian demands appear to have largely stayed the same, however.
* The US Navy continued to enforce its blockade of Iranian ports, directing 27 vessels to change course since the start of the blockade. US forces likely forced two Iranian-linked vessels attempting to violate the Navy’s blockade to turn around.
* The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters claimed that the April 19 seizure of the Iranian-flagged, US-sanctioned Touska by the US Navy violated the US-Iran ceasefire. Unspecified security sources told Reuters that the Touska was likely transporting dual-use items from China to Iran.
* The Iranian Parliament is attempting to formalize Iranian “control” over the Strait of Hormuz by drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they paid reparations to Iran.
19 April 2026
Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Iran has repeatedly claimed sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, but Iran has no legal claim to the strait, which international law defines as an international waterway. Iran has repeatedly attempted to regulate traffic through the strait by directing vessels through Iranian territorial waters, extracting fees, and attacking and threatening maritime traffic. Recent Iranian proposals to the United States have also implicitly demanded that the United States and international community recognize Iran’s “control” over the strait. Iran has offered to “let” vessels transit the strait in these proposals, but Iran’s “letting” traffic through the strait implies that Iran can “let” traffic through an international waterway. These proposals are consistent with persistent Iranian messaging throughout the war that Iran seeks to impose a new status quo for transit through the strait. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. A senior Iranian official told CNN on April 18 that vessels that pay “security fees” and comply with the IRGC’s protocols will receive priority transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while those that refuse to pay will face delayed passage. Iran has reportedly charged vessels around $2 million USD to transit the strait.Extracting fees from commercial vessels enables Iran to earn income amid the United States’ efforts to impose economic pressure on Iran through its blockade of Iranian ports.
The IRGC has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait. Bloomberg reported on April 18 that at least five liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers reversed course after Iran warned the vessels’ captains that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz. No LNG tankers have exited the Strait of Hormuz since the war began in February. Iranian media separately reported on April 19 that the IRGC forced the Botswana-flagged Meda and the Angola-flagged G Summer to change course after the vessels attempted to cross the Strait of Hormuz. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the G Summer later transited the Strait of Hormuz via the Iranian-approved route on April 19.
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* Any US settlement or resolution of the conflict that enables Iran to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would represent a major US defeat and set a precedent with critical implications for global trade, given the strait’s role as a critical energy chokepoint. Any US acceptance of Iran’s ability to regulate transit would undermine the principle of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and enable Iran to condition access to the strait on compliance with its demands, thereby enabling Tehran to exert persistent pressure on the global economy and the United States and its allies.
* Iran is attempting to establish a protection racket in the Strait of Hormuz by granting priority transit to vessels that pay fees and comply with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) protocols as part of its effort to try to consolidate control over the strait. Iran has also continued to prevent non-Iranian-linked vessels from transiting the strait.
* US forces seized an Iranian-flagged container ship for the first time during the war. Commercially available shipping data indicates that the US Navy also forced at least three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships to change course toward Iranian ports on April 19.
* US Vice President JD Vance, US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner are expected to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan, to engage in negotiations with Iran on April 21. ISW-CTP has not observed any Iranian sources confirming Iran’s participation in the negotiations as of 6:00 PM ET on April 19, however.
* Incomplete reporting about the damage that the US-Israeli combined force inflicted on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programs precludes the development of a quantitative assessment about the threat that Iranian missiles and drones still pose.
* A statement released by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah on April 18 appears to confirm that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani discussed preparations for renewed conflict with the United States and Israel during his meetings with Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad on April 18. Ghaani may have specifically discussed enhancing coordination between Iraqi militias and other Axis of Resistance groups against the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states in the event of renewed conflict.
19 April 2026
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. Traffic through the strait has virtually halted as of this writing except for Iranian vessels, according to maritime tracking data. No Iranian vessels have approached the US blockade line, however. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands. The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently is.
Regime institutions aligned with Vahidi are presenting a cohesive front against Araghchi and in support of the IRGC’s actions to halt traffic in the strait. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, cited the US naval blockade on Iranian ports as the reason for the IRGC’s reimposition of “control” over the strait. Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving the regime’s military decision-making, according to anti-regime media on April 7. A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) previously warned IRGC-affiliated Fars News on April 17 that Iran would “close” the strait if the United States continued its blockade. The SNSC released a statement on April 18 that Iran will “exercise supervision and control” over traffic in the strait until the war ends. The SNSC would almost certainly not have released this statement without the approval of SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, which indicates that Zolghadr supports the IRGC’s actions in the strait. Zolghadr, who is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran’s security and judicial apparatuses, was appointed to his position during the war after Vahidi reportedly pressured Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint him.
Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. Vahidi attempted to insert Zolghadr into the Iranian negotiating team in Islamabad despite protests from delegation leaders Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Araghchi over Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations. Vahidi presumably wanted to send Zolghadr to keep an eye on the negotiations and to inform leaders in Tehran if the negotiating delegation strayed from his or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s directives. Zolghadr sent a complaint to senior IRGC leaders, almost certainly including Vahidi, that Araghchi had surpassed his mandate during the negotiations by expressing flexibility regarding Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance. Zolghadr’s anger caused senior leaders in Tehran, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief and long-time member of Mojtaba’s inner circle, Hossein Taeb, to call the negotiating delegation back to Tehran.
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* Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands.
* Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran’s negotiations after the Islamabad talks.
* The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated.
* The IRGC attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran’s negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver. The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran’s negotiations policy.
* The US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place as of April 18. US CENTCOM said that it forced two ships to turn around and return to Iran between April 17 and 18. The US Navy has forced 23 ships to turn back since the United States began the blockade. No Iranian vessels have attempted to approach or test the blockade line as of this writing.
18 April 2026
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait. IRGC- and Armed Forces General Staff- affiliated media emphasized that the “temporary opening” of the strait is contingent upon vessels meeting certain conditions. An informed source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) told IRGC-affiliated Fars News that Iran’s conditions include:
1. Only commercial vessels can transit the strait, and military vessels are prohibited from doing so. Vessels and the cargo they carry cannot “be related to belligerent countries.”
2. Ships must pass through the Iranian-approved transit route, which forces vessels to transit the strait through Iranian territorial waters.
3. Vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces, particularly the IRGC Navy.
These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States. The source close to the SNSC added that Iran will “close” the strait again if the naval blockade continues. Iranian forces have not conducted an attack on international shipping since April 7. Ten non-Iranian-linked vessels transited along the Omani coast outside the Iranian-approved transit route on April 17, and CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of the IRGC attempting to disrupt these vessels’ movements.
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* The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is the Iranian entity that has disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during the war, outlined specific conditions on April 17 for vessels to transit the strait that amount to Iran retaining control over maritime traffic through the strait. These conditions include: 1) only commercial vessels not “related to belligerent countries” may transit the strait, 2) vessels must transit the strait via Iran’s approved transit route through Iranian territorial waters, and 3) vessels must coordinate their passage through the strait with Iranian forces. These conditions indicate that the IRGC seeks to retain operational control over transit through the strait, likely to continue to use the strait as a point of leverage to try to extract concessions from the United States.
* The IRGC harshly criticized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi after Araghchi announced on X that the Strait of Hormuz is “completely open.” The IRGC’s criticism of Araghchi is reflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime, which CTP-ISW has consistently reported on in recent weeks.
* Commercially available maritime data shows that no Iranian-linked vessels approached the US blockade line on April 17, and US officials have stated that US forces will engage Iranian-linked vessels beyond this line. CENTCOM announced on April 17 that 19 vessels have complied with US direction to turn around and that zero vessels have successfully breached the blockade. Commercially available maritime data shows that some non-Iranian-linked vessels have approached the US blockade line to exit the strait. These ships do not fall under the US blockade and are able to freely transit in and out of the strait.
* There continue to be significant gaps between the US and Iranian negotiating positions, and the status of the negotiations remains unclear. The two sides disagree on several core issues, according to US, Iranian, and other officials and sources on April 16 and 17.
* Some Iranian regime officials seek a preliminary agreement to extend the ceasefire to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement. CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile force, and Iran would almost certainly continue to do so if the United States and Iran agreed to a preliminary agreement and extended the ceasefire.
17 April 2026
Iran is leveraging its position over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions while maintaining its claim to control access to the waterway. Reuters reported on April 15 that Iran has proposed allowing ships to transit through the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz without interference if the United States agrees to conditions that prevent renewed conflict and meet Iranian demands. Iran has linked increased maritime access to broader negotiations, including demands to unfreeze Iranian funds, and a permanent end to US and Israeli strikes both in this war and for posterity. The implication of Iran’s “concession” is that it could threaten ships to discourage them from transiting the Omani side of the Strait unless the United States grants Iran significant concessions. Agreeing to Iranian demands along these lines would show Iran that it can coerce the United States using the Strait of Hormuz both now and in the future.
The main sticking point in current US-Iran negotiations is reportedly Iran’s enrichment of uranium and its highly enriched uranium stockpile. The United States has proposed a 20-year pause to enrichment, while the Iranians offered a 3- to 5-year pause, according to Iranian sources speaking to Reuters. The United States wants Iran to remove all of the highly enriched uranium from Iran, whereas Iran has proposed down-blending it or only moving part of its highly enriched uranium to another country, but not all of it, according to Iranian sources speaking to Western media in recent days. Iran could still enrich the remaining stockpile relatively quickly if it retained some highly enriched uranium, and it could use a 5-year pause to improve centrifuges and build or repair them. A Western diplomat told Reuters on April 16 that the nuclear issue “remains a core obstacle.” An unspecified source also told Reuters that a Pakistani mediator had made a breakthrough on “sticky issues,” but the negotiating parties have not resolved issues over Iran’s nuclear program. An Iranian source told Reuters on April 16 that Iran is not ready to send all of its highly enriched uranium stockpile abroad, but it could send “part of it” to a third-party country. The source claimed that Iran needed to retain some of the stockpile because Iran needs the remaining stockpile for medical purposes at a research reactor in Tehran. This research reactor runs on only a few tens of kilograms (kg) of 20 percent enriched uranium instead of 10,000kg of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, according to nuclear expert David Albright. Only a small portion—roughly 400kg—of the 10,000kg Albright references is highly enriched uranium (60%). US objectives appear to remain at zero enrichment on Iranian soil, however. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated on April 15 that Israeli and US objectives in Iran are identical and include the removal of Iranian highly enriched uranium, the “dismantling” of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities, and “reinstating” a nuclear deal.
Iran appears not to have compromised on its stance over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, despite Iranian sources attempting to illustrate that Iran has compromised and the two sides have made progress in negotiations, however. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated media on April 16 denied all recent Reuters reporting citing Iranian sources. The same IRGC-affiliated outlet had cast doubt on progress in future US-Iran talks, due to Iran‘s distrust of the United States and US “excessive demands” earlier on April 16. These conflicting reports on Iranian stances in these negotiations corroborate CTP-ISW’s continued observation that the Iranian negotiating council is not unified. This disunity will make it harder for Iran to make decisions and implement decisions throughout this negotiating process.
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* The main sticking point in current US-Iran negotiations is reportedly Iran’s enrichment of uranium and its highly enriched uranium stockpile. The IRGC appears to be playing an outsized role in Iranian decision-making in these negotiations, traditionally meant for civilian leadership.
* Iran appears to have not compromised on its stance over the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program, despite Iranian sources attempting to illustrate that Iran has compromised and the two sides have made progress in negotiations, however. Iran is leveraging its position over the Strait of Hormuz to extract concessions while maintaining its claim to control access to the waterway.
* US President Donald Trump stated on April 16 that the United States is “very close” to reaching a deal with Iran. Trump stated that Iran “has agreed to almost everything” and added that Iran has agreed to hand over its enriched uranium stockpile. Iran has not publicly confirmed Trump’s remarks at the time of this writing.
* The United States is targeting materiel support to Iran’s armed forces and military capabilities through the blockade. The blockade also continues to impose economic costs on Iran.
* The Iranian missile force is exploiting the current ceasefire to reconstitute its tactical and operational-level units, but rebuilding the industrial facilities and other components that sustain the missile force at the strategic level will be extremely challenging.
* US President Donald Trump announced that Lebanon and Israel have agreed to a 10-day ceasefire beginning at 5:00 PM ET on April 16. Netanyahu stated that Lebanon must disarm Hezbollah and establish a ”lasting peace agreement” with Israel.
16 April 2026
US naval forces continued to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on April 15 that no vessels had breached the blockade on Iranian ports during the first 48 hours of enforcement. CENTCOM stated that nine vessels complied with the US direction to turn around and return to Iranian ports or coastal areas. CENTCOM added that US forces have halted economic maritime trade to and from Iran and are prepared to act against any vessels attempting to violate the blockade. Additional CENTCOM reporting indicates that the US forces redirected at least one Iranian-flagged cargo vessel after it departed Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.
The United States has reportedly set two preconditions for another round of negotiations: first, Iran must fully “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz, and second, the Iranian negotiating delegation must have “full authority” to finalize a deal. Iran has not conducted any kinetic activity targeting international shipping since April 7. Iran does not need to conduct attacks against vessels to maintain the threat to international shipping, however. The decision for vessels to transit the strait is for the shipping companies, which will likely be hesitant to move vessels through the Strait until Iran provides reassurance that it does not pose a threat to their vessels and cargo.
The second precondition, which demands that Iran‘s delegation have “full authority“ from Iran’s senior leadership (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)) to finalize a deal, corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a divided council of hardliners and pragmatists rather than a singular, unified authority. US Vice President JD Vance stated on April 14 that he believed that the Iranian negotiators in Islamabad wanted to make a deal, which implies that he assesses that the hardliners in Tehran were responsible for Iran’s reticence to make a deal. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 14 that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr was furious when Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi allegedly appeared open to compromising on halting Iranian funding for the Axis of Resistance at the US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad on April 11. Zolghadr then reportedly briefed Araghchi’s “deviation” to senior leadership, including by sending messages to IRGC officials and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s close affiliate Hossein Taeb, which resulted in the leadership ordering the delegation to leave after 21 hours of negotiations. Zolghadr was one of the founding members of the IRGC Quds Force and helped establish some of the groups that now comprise the Axis of Resistance. Unspecified mediators speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 15 confirmed that Zolghadr has been “highly influential” in Iranian decision-making in US-Iran negotiations. These reports follow previous anti-regime media reports on April 10 that IRGC Commander and key decisionmaker Major General Ahmad Vahidi pushed to get Zolghadr on the Iranian delegation to Islamabad, but the delegation leaders Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf pushed back due to Zolghadr’s lack of diplomatic experience. The senior leadership’s response to withdraw the delegation after Araghchi’s reported openness to discussing Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance shows how unwilling the hardliners are to compromise on Iranian positions and how much sway they have over Iranian decision-making.
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* US naval forces continued to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on April 15 that no vessels had breached the blockade on Iranian ports during the first 48 hours of enforcement.
* The United States has reportedly set two preconditions for another round of negotiations: first, Iran must fully “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz, and second, the Iranian negotiating delegation must have “full authority” to finalize a deal. The second precondition comes amid reports of intra-regime conflict and corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a divided council of hardliners and pragmatists rather than a singular, unified authority.
* Some Iranian officials have signaled different levels of willingness to compromise on Iran’s nuclear program in negotiations with the United States. These statements, at least to some extent, reflect internal disagreement over Iran’s negotiating position.
* Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on April 14 that the United States and Israel have decided that removing the enriched uranium from Iran is a “threshold condition” for ending the US-Israeli campaign.
* The US Treasury sanctioned 29 targets, including three individuals, 17 companies, and nine vessels on April 15, which are tied to Iranian oil smuggling and associated financing networks as part of the United States’ broader economic pressure campaign on Iran.
* Pakistan is reportedly pushing the United States and Iran to extend the ceasefire by 45 days. US President Donald Trump told ABC News on April 14 that he is not considering extending the ceasefire that ends on April 22.
* Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces program on the tactical level by attempting to reopen tunnel entrances at missile bases.
* Iran reportedly utilized an advanced reconnaissance satellite purchased from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2024 to target US military assets and bases across the Middle East during the war.
* The Israeli Security Cabinet reportedly held a meeting on April 15 to discuss a possible ceasefire in Lebanon, amid recent direct talks between Israel and Lebanon under US auspices. Israeli officials have not announced the outcome of the security cabinet meeting at the time of this writing, however.
15 April 2026
US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that no vessels have breached the US blockade on Iranian ports since CENTCOM implemented the blockade on April 13. CENTCOM implemented a blockade on April 13 against all vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports. The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port. US forces have previously demonstrated their ability to interdict vessels in international waters. US officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that US forces will likely attempt to intercept or “quarantine” any vessels that violate the blockade in the Arabian Sea to limit the threat of attacks from the Iranian coast. Vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz are therefore not automatically breaching the US blockade. Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least eight vessels departed the Strait of Hormuz, including six Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, on April 14. One of the vessels, the US-sanctioned Rich Starry oil tanker, departed from Amjan Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on April 13. Other Iranian or Iranian-linked vessels, including the Elpis and Christianna, also left the strait after departing Iranian ports. Commercially available maritime data also indicates that at least nine vessels entered the Strait of Hormuz, including three Iranian or Iranian-linked ships. One of the entering vessels was the Ocean Energy cargo ship, which docked at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Port on April 13. It is unclear whether this vessel was exempted from the blockade. Reuters reported that a US military notice sent to mariners exempts humanitarian shipments to Iran from the US blockade. CENTCOM also announced that six merchant vessels complied with the US direction to return to an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman. CENTCOM has not interdicted any vessels at the time of this writing.
The United States’ decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, which is set to expire on April 19, will further constrain Iran’s ability to export oil in addition to the US blockade on Iranian ports. Two US officials told Reuters on April 14 that the US Treasury Department will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil after April 19. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also told reporters on April 14 that the US blockade on Iranian ports will ensure that no vessels from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are “able to get their [Iranian] oil.” The PRC purchases more than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports. A sanctions-focused US analyst estimated on April 13 that a successful blockade on Iranian ports would cost the regime around $435 million USD per day, leaving Iran with few alternatives to export and import goods.
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* US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that no vessels have breached the US blockade on Iranian ports since CENTCOM implemented its blockade on April 13. The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port. It is unclear whether any of the vessels that left Iranian ports on April 14 were authorized to do so under CENTCOM’s “limited grade period.”
* The United States’ decision not to renew a 30-day sanctions waiver for Iranian oil exports, which is set to expire on April 19, will further constrain Iran’s ability to export oil in addition to the US blockade on Iranian ports. Two US officials told Reuters on April 14 that the US Treasury Department will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil after April 19.
* Iran is reportedly considering temporarily pausing shipments to avoid testing the US blockade on Iranian ports and raising tensions ahead of possible talks, according to a person familiar with Iranian decision-making on the Strait of Hormuz speaking to Bloomberg on April 14. Iran would only be able to pause shipments for a limited period of time before it would start to run out of room to store oil. Iran could also pursue several other courses of action in response to the US blockade, including agreeing to a deal acceptable to the United States, attempting to run the blockade, or resuming the war.
* Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber warned that Iran will “open new fronts” and “increase economic pressures” on US allies and regional countries in response to the US blockade on Iranian ports, likely to try to coerce the United States to end its blockade. Mokhber may have been referring to the Houthis, which has not conducted attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea during the war thus far. Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that Iran is pressuring the Houthis to “close” the Bab al Mandeb Strait.
* US President Donald Trump stated on April 14 that the United States and Iran may hold another round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, “over [the] next two days.” A senior Iranian source told Western media on April 14 that the United States and Iran are keeping April 17 through 19 open for possible talks, but that no date has been confirmed.
14 April 2026
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted seven “Iranian” drones on April 13. Bahrain did not specify from where the drones were launched. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias use some of the same types of drones as Iranian forces do because the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supplies drones to its Iraqi militia partners. It is therefore possible that the Bahrain Defense Force’s use of the term “Iranian” drones refers to Iranian drones used by Iraqi militias. Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry also summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states. Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups have claimed multiple drone attacks targeting US bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait since the start of the war.
It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias answer to the IRGC, which provides guidance and support for their attacks. The IRGC has previously demonstrated its ability to force Iraqi militias to halt their attacks, such as when IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to halt their attacks against US forces in January 2024. The fact that Iraqi militias continue to attack the Gulf states, therefore, suggests that Iran has not directed the militias to halt these attacks.
Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to attack regional states despite the Shia Coordination Framework’s efforts to push the militias to agree to a “truce.” An informed source told Iraqi media on April 5 that the framework authorized Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri to negotiate a “temporary truce” with the militias. The source stated that Ameri’s negotiations focused on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are more loyal to Iran and are less responsive to domestic pressure than other Iraqi militias. Framework member Amer al Fayez told Iraqi media on April 12 that Ameri’s committee successfully negotiated a “conditional truce” with the militias. Fayez stated that the truce stipulated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would halt attacks on US interests and diplomatic facilities in exchange for a commitment from the United States and Israel to stop striking Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and militia bases in Iraq. It is unclear whether the truce required the militias to halt attacks against US interests across the region, or only in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple brigades within the PMF. It is unclear which militias agreed to this truce.
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* Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.
* The US negotiating delegation demanded a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, and unfettered freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations in Pakistan. Iran countered the 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a “single-digit” number of years and offered to downblend its HEU instead of handing over its HEU stockpile. It is unclear whether the three US demands and the Iranian counterproposal represent the full scope of each side’s demands.
* US Central Command (CENTCOM) is simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and vessels while taking steps to open the official transit route through the Strait of Hormuz for vessels transiting to or from non-Iranian ports. CENTCOM implemented its blockade on Iranian ports and vessels at 10:00 AM ET on April 13.
* Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels continued to use the Iranian-approved transit route to cross the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade went into effect on April 13, but more vessels transited outside this route near the Omani coast than on April 12. At least two oil tankers destined for China via the Iranian-approved transit route turned around after CENTCOM began blockading Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping.
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13 April 2026
TOPLINES
The US Navy is attempting to prevent Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels from entering and exiting the Strait, while Iran prevents all other vessels from entering and exiting the Strait. The only vessels moving through the Strait at this time are Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels. These Iranian-approved vessels are acceding to Iran’s protection racket and using Iran’s unilaterally imposed traffic separation scheme that forces vessels into Iranian territorial waters. Very few ships are transiting the Strait other than the ships moving through Iran’s territorial waters. Only one ship transited the Strait on April 12 and did not use the Iranian-approved shipping lanes by skirting the southern edge of the Iran-declared hazardous area. US President Donald Trump said on April 12 that the US Navy will “interdict every vessel” that has paid Iran for passage and indicated that enforcement of the blockade will begin soon. Iran has used threats of attacks and a limited number of mines to declare a “hazardous area” across the entire Strait of Hormuz except for Iranian territorial waters, where Iran then imposes fees. The US Navy has deployed ships to clear the remaining naval mines and restore freedom of navigation. Some Gulf countries are also supporting mine-clearing efforts, according to Trump. Two US Navy destroyers transited the Strait on April 11 to set conditions for clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy threatened the destroyers but did not attack them. The IRGC Navy has threatened that any military vessels in the Strait will be subject to a “decisive response.”
The United States and Iran did not reach an agreement during talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11 and 12. Two Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on April 12 stated that US-Iran talks failed to reach an agreement over Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), Iran’s “control” over the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s demand that $27 billion in frozen revenues held abroad be released. The two officials stated that the United States demanded that Iran immediately open the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, but Iran countered that it would only allow unfettered traffic in the Strait after a final peace deal. The lack of a public, mutually agreed-upon document establishing the ceasefire requirements makes adherence to the ceasefire difficult to establish, but US officials said after the two-week ceasefire agreement that the ceasefire required Iran to reopen the Strait. The officials added that the US delegation demanded that Iran “hand over or sell” its entire HEU stockpile, to which Iran made an unspecified counterproposal that the United States did not accept. The officials stated that the US side refused Iran’s requests for war reparations from frozen oil revenue in various countries. US President Donald Trump emphasized on April 12 that Iran’s delegation did not make compromises on its nuclear program, but that he believed Iran would return to negotiations. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who was the head of the Iranian delegation and has accumulated substantial power within the Iranian system in the last year, blamed the US side for the failure of the negotiations and stated that the United States must “earn” Iran’s trust, however
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* The US Navy is attempting to prevent Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels from entering and exiting the Strait, while Iran prevents all other vessels from entering and exiting the Strait. The only vessels moving through the Strait at this time are Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels. Very few ships are transiting the Strait other than the ships moving through Iran’s territorial waters.
* The United States and Iran did not reach an agreement during talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11 and 12. US President Donald Trump emphasized on April 12 that Iran’s delegation did not make compromises on its nuclear program, but that he believed Iran would return to negotiations.
* Iran sought an all-encompassing agreement that would have transformed US-Iran relations in fundamental ways, while the United States appeared focused on specific issues related to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program. The multiple competing Iranian factions with divergent priorities and objectives in negotiations that were part of the Iranian delegation also likely made reaching an agreement exceptionally difficult.
* Iran has not fired any munitions targeting the Gulf states since ISW-CTP’s last data cut off on April 11. Iranian fired a declining rate of missiles and drones targeting Gulf states since the ceasefire went into effect on April 8.
12 April 2026
Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees. The Iranian delegation is explicitly framing the talks as leverage for a broader reset in the US-Iran relationship. Iranian demands include sovereignty claims over the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and a region-wide ceasefire across the “Axis of Resistance,” which creates an imbalance in expectations that sets the talks up for deadlock. Two people briefed on negotiations told the Financial Times that the April 11 negotiations have reached a ”stalemate” over the main sticking point — the status of the Strait of Hormuz.
The composition of Iran’s at least 70-person delegation, headed by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, underscores Iran’s wide-ranging negotiating intentions. The large and heavily securitized team blends diplomats, parliamentarians, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-adjacent figures, and high-level economic technocrats, indicating that Iran is pressing a long list of demands across a range of issue areas. The inclusion of the Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati and economic specialists points to a focus on sanctions architecture, frozen assets, and alternative financial mechanisms, suggesting preparation for prolonged economic and strategic bargaining rather than confidence-building compromise.
The unusually large size of the Iranian delegation likely also reflects internal divisions and deep mutual distrust among regime power centers, rather than a unified negotiating strategy. There was reportedly infighting between the regime factions before the negotiations. Ghalibaf and Araghchi reportedly clashed with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi over Vahidi’s effort to insert longtime IRGC affiliate and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr into the talks, despite Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations. An IRGC-affiliated media outlet reported on their English language X account that Zolghadr was in the delegation in Islamabad, along with Defense Council Secretary IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, but Iranian Persian-language media did not disclose if Zolghadr was present. The presence of overlapping political, security, and economic actors suggests a need for constant internal monitoring.
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* Iran and the United States have fundamentally different interpretations of the ongoing negotiations, which will generate friction. Iran seeks an all-encompassing agreement that will end the threat of war with the United States, while the United States seeks a much narrower agreement centered on the current war. The US delegation, led by US Vice President JD Vance and including US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to be pursuing a narrow, issue-specific negotiation focused on de-escalatory mechanisms around the Strait of Hormuz, and reportedly secondary matters like detainees.
* Iran is using the existence of an unknown number of naval mines it laid in the Strait of Hormuz to force ships to use Iranian territorial waters to traverse the Strait, which enables Iran to shakedown these ships for fees while the ships are in Iranian territorial waters. This protection racket is illegal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Iran likely designed its threatening behavior and its shakedowns to disrupt the global economy, which Iran calculates will enable it to extract concessions from the United States.Iran warned merchant ships that mines could exist in a “hazardous area” that covers 1,394 sq km of the Strait, including the normal traffic separation scheme (shipping lanes) that ships use to transit the Strait.
* The current ceasefire will provide Iran an opportunity to reorganize its missile force and recover from the temporary disruption wrought to the missile force during constant US and Israeli operations. Consistent US and Israeli operations over Iran had suppressed Iran’s missile force by preventing Iran from digging out launchers, disrupting command-and-control, and creating pervasive fear in military units that made them unwilling or unable to conduct attacks, as ISW-CTP has previously assessed.
* Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei continues to recover from severe facial and leg injuries that he sustained in the February 28 strike on the supreme leader’s compound in Tehran Province. Three unspecified individuals close to Mojtaba’s inner circle told Reuters on April 11 that the strike disfigured Mojtaba’s face and injured one or both of his legs.
* The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran to reconstitute some of its degraded air defense capabilities during the current ceasefire. The PRC is preparing to deliver man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran within the coming weeks, according to three sources familiar with recent US intelligence assessments.
