05/19/2026
Re: Public Comment on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking — Designation—Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility
Docket No. FAA-2026-4558; Notice No. 26-03; RIN 2120-AL33
91 FR 24650 (May 6, 2026); Comments Due July 6, 2026
Dear Administrator and Docket Operations:
I respectfully submit these comments on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) proposed rule to establish a process for designating Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restrictions (UAFRs) under proposed 14 CFR part 74. I am the owner of Alden Wheeler Detective Agency & GPS, a licensed South Carolina private investigation firm whose service lines include drone-supported field operations (search and rescue, hazardous-materials response support, surveillance, and infrastructure inspection), GPS monitoring, and a Cyber Threat Assessment practice. My current operational fleet includes a DJI Matrice 30T, a Mavic 3T, and a Chasing M1 Pro tethered surface platform, all flown under 14 CFR part 107 with appropriate waivers when required.
I commend the FAA for working to implement section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (FESSA), as amended, and for attempting to balance the legitimate protection of critical infrastructure with the public right of transit under 49 U.S.C. § 40103. The proposed rule reflects substantial coordination with the Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) and a clear effort to apply restrictions only where necessary. The comments below are offered in support of that balance — not against the rule, but to identify specific provisions that, as drafted, would impose disproportionate burdens on small commercial Part 107 operators, public-safety support providers, and licensed investigators without meaningfully advancing the rule’s safety and security objectives.
I. Summary of Comments
My principal points are as follows:
• Scope and cumulative footprint. A program contemplating more than 9,000 designated fixed-site facilities, layered onto existing controlled airspace, restricted areas, and Special Security Instructions, risks an aggregate “patchwork” effect that materially reduces low-altitude airspace available to compliant commercial and public-safety operators. The FAA should publish, before any UAFR program goes live, a national low-altitude availability analysis and commit to revisiting the rule if cumulative coverage in any region exceeds a defined threshold.
• Transit standard in § 74.250 is unconstitutionally vague. The requirement that a Part 91, 107, 108, 135, or 137 operator transit a UAFR “in the shortest practicable time” provides no objective metric, creates strict-liability enforcement exposure, and will chill lawful overflight. The FAA should replace this with an objective standard tied to airspeed, altitude, or duration.
• Notification under § 74.255 must be centralized. Requiring operators to notify a “site manager” at each facility individually is unworkable when a single mission may transit multiple UAFRs. The FAA should adopt a single FAA-hosted notification portal modeled on LAANC, with API access and machine-readable acknowledgments.
• Public-safety, SAR, and exigent operations need an enumerated access pathway. Proposed § 74.250 does not clearly accommodate Public Safety operations conducted under 49 U.S.C. § 44807, Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), or exigent-circumstances SAR and hazmat support. Lives are lost in minutes; access cannot depend on a 5-business-day update cycle or facility-by-facility permission.
• Licensed private investigators conducting lawful, court-authorized investigations should have a defined credibility pathway. The rule asks (Question E) what information an operator should provide to establish credibility. A state-licensed PI with an active Part 107 certificate, registered aircraft, and verifiable insurance is a known, accountable operator who can be vetted in the same manner as Part 135 carriers.
• Remote ID is already mandatory and is sufficient identifying technology. Layering additional broadcast or coordination requirements on lawful operators — while malicious actors will simply disable Remote ID — punishes the wrong population. The FAA should resist proposals to expand Remote ID obligations beyond 14 CFR part 89.
• Notice-and-comment on Special UAFRs must remain the rule, not the exception. The “good cause” carve-out in § 74.6 should be narrowly construed and accompanied by mandatory post-promulgation comment within 30 days, to preserve transparency.
• Sector eligibility criteria should be public and challengeable. Where SRMA security assessments cannot be disclosed in full, the FAA should publish a redacted basis document for each UAFR so commenters can meaningfully evaluate proportionality.
II. Detailed Comments
A. Cumulative Airspace Impact and the 9,000-Facility Scenario
The FAA’s own Regulatory Impact Analysis contemplates a scenario of over 9,000 eligible fixed-site facilities obtaining UAFRs, with annualized program costs of $21–$31 million. While the per-facility lateral footprint is bounded by the property line and an altitude ceiling generally at 400 feet AGL, the cumulative effect on Part 107 commercial operations — utility inspection, real-estate photography, agricultural mapping, journalism, and the rapidly growing SAR and hazmat-support sectors — has not been adequately quantified.
I recommend that the FAA, prior to issuing any final rule, publish a quantitative analysis of: (1) projected cumulative UAFR coverage in representative urban, suburban, and rural counties at 5-year, 10-year, and steady-state buildout; (2) the percentage of low-altitude (≤ 400 ft AGL) airspace expected to be restricted in each; and (3) the projected effect on Part 107 commercial revenue. Without that analysis, the public cannot meaningfully evaluate whether the rule preserves “the public right of transit” mandated by 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2).
B. The “Shortest Practicable Time” Transit Standard (§ 74.250)
Proposed § 74.250 permits a Part 91, 107, 108, 135, or 137 operator to transit a Standard UAFR provided the operator broadcasts Remote ID and transits “in the shortest practicable time.” This phrase is undefined. In an environment where a single enforcement action can result in suspension of a Part 107 certificate under FAA Order 2150.3C and civil penalties under 14 CFR part 13, vague terms invite selective enforcement and discourage lawful flight in or near a UAFR even when transit is otherwise permitted.
I recommend the FAA replace the phrase with an objective standard, such as:
• Direct routing at or above the operator’s normal en-route ground speed for the aircraft class, not to exceed a defined maximum dwell time (e.g., 90 seconds) within the UAFR; or
• A maximum lateral deviation from the great-circle transit path of, e.g., 200 feet, absent ATC instruction or operational necessity (wind, obstacles, emergency).
Either approach would give operators an objective compliance target and give enforcement personnel a defensible metric.
C. Notification Mechanics (§ 74.255)
Requiring case-by-case notification to a designated site manager at each UAFR is operationally infeasible for any mission that traverses more than one UAFR — a routine occurrence on linear-infrastructure inspections (pipelines, rail corridors, transmission lines) and on SAR or hazmat operations that may cross multiple energy and water-sector facilities in a single sortie.
I recommend a single, FAA-hosted notification mechanism modeled on the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC). The system should: (1) accept machine-to-machine notifications; (2) automatically route them to the registered site manager(s) of each UAFR transited; (3) return a digital acknowledgment that satisfies the operator’s recordkeeping obligation; and (4) be available 24/7 with documented uptime targets. Building one durable national system is more efficient than requiring tens of thousands of independent operator-to-facility communication channels.
D. Public-Safety, SAR, Hazmat, and Exigent-Circumstance Operations
Proposed § 74.250 lists Parts 91, 107, 108, 135, and 137 as allowed-operation categories. It is silent or unclear regarding: (1) Public Safety entities operating under a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) or under 49 U.S.C. § 44807; (2) operators supporting state or county Emergency Management or Hazmat teams on a contract basis; and (3) any operator responding to an exigent SAR or life-safety emergency.
Lives can turn on minutes. A drowning, a wildland search, a chlorine release at a water-treatment plant, a derailment with multiple casualties — in each of those scenarios, a five-business-day update cycle and a static notification list are inadequate. I recommend the FAA add an explicit § 74.250 paragraph that authorizes exigent-circumstance access for:
• Aircraft operating in direct support of a federal, state, tribal, or local Public Safety entity actively responding to a life-safety, SAR, or declared emergency incident, provided Remote ID is broadcast and the incident commander or appropriate ATC facility is notified as soon as practicable; and
• Aircraft operating under an active Public Safety COA or 49 U.S.C. § 44807 authorization, when transiting in support of the authorized mission.
This pathway is consistent with the FAA’s long-standing practice of authorizing Public Safety operations in otherwise restricted airspace and would not undermine the rule’s security purpose.
E. Credibility Pathway for Licensed Private Investigators and Small Commercial Operators
The FAA expressly invites comment (Executive Summary, Section F) on what information an operator should provide to establish credibility and demonstrate they are not a security threat. From the perspective of a licensed investigative firm, the following identifiers are already verifiable through existing federal and state systems and should be sufficient, individually or in combination:
• An active 14 CFR part 107 Remote Pilot Certificate, with TSA Security Threat Assessment on file (already required for issuance);
• An aircraft registered under 14 CFR part 47 or 48 with broadcast Remote ID per part 89;
• A state-issued private investigator license in good standing (verifiable through the issuing state agency — in South Carolina, through SLED);
• Evidence of commercial aviation liability insurance at a defined minimum (e.g., $1,000,000 per occurrence) naming the FAA or facility as additional certificate holder, where applicable;
• For Public Safety support contracts, a letter of designation from the contracting public agency.
Verification of these credentials should be a one-time enrollment in a national “Trusted Operator” registry, not a per-facility, per-flight ordeal. Operators in the registry would be eligible to transit UAFRs subject to the notification and Remote ID requirements above.
F. Remote ID Is Sufficient; Do Not Layer Additional Broadcast Mandates
The FAA expressly asks (§ 74.56 commentary) whether more stringent Remote ID requirements should apply to operations within a UAFR beyond 14 CFR part 89. My answer is no, for two reasons. First, lawful operators are already burdened with the cost and complexity of compliant Remote ID modules; the marginal security benefit of imposing further broadcast requirements on this population is minimal. Second, and more important, malicious operators — the population the rule purports to address — will simply disable Remote ID, fly a non-compliant aircraft, or modify a compliant one. Adding requirements that only the law-abiding will follow is a classic case of regulatory mismatch. Resources are better spent on detection, attribution, and counter-UAS authority for the facilities that need it.
G. Special UAFRs (§ 74.6): Preserve Notice-and-Comment as the Default
I support the proposed framework for Special UAFRs as a transparent, durable alternative to repeated short-term 14 CFR § 99.7 Special Security Instructions. I urge the FAA, however, to construe the “good cause to forgo notice and comment” exception narrowly. Where good cause is invoked, the FAA should commit to: (1) publishing a redacted basis document at promulgation; (2) opening a 30-day post-promulgation comment period; and (3) sunset review of every Special UAFR at year three of its five-year term.
H. Sector-Specific Criteria Should Be Publicly Reviewable
The preamble correctly notes that classified threat information may limit the FAA’s ability to publish sector-specific eligibility criteria in full. Where that is the case, I recommend the FAA, in coordination with the relevant SRMA, publish a redacted basis document at the NPRM stage for each requested UAFR. Without some publicly reviewable articulation of the threat and the proposed remedy, the 30-day comment period contemplated by § 74.15 is reduced to a formality. The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment obligations are not satisfied by an opportunity to comment on an undisclosed factual record.
I. Obligation to Update (§ 74.20) and Cyber Considerations
The five-business-day update obligation in § 74.20(a) is reasonable in concept, but the rule does not address the cybersecurity of the system into which those updates are filed, nor the cybersecurity of the notification system contemplated in § 74.255. A centralized notification system that announces, in near-real time, that a particular drone is about to overfly a particular hardened facility is itself a target. I recommend the FAA: (1) require the operating system to meet, at a minimum, FedRAMP Moderate; (2) restrict site-manager access to the minimum required information; (3) prohibit retention of operator flight data beyond a defined period; and (4) subject the system to annual third-party pe*******on testing with summary results published. As an operator who provides cyber threat assessment services, I view this as a foreseeable and meaningful risk, not a theoretical one.
J. Environmental Review (§ 74.70)
I support a streamlined NEPA approach for UAFRs that, by design, do not authorize any new physical activity. The principal environmental considerations — noise and wildlife disturbance — are unaffected by adding a UAFR, because the rule restricts overflight rather than authorizing it. A categorical exclusion with documented findings is appropriate for the typical UAFR. Where a particular facility raises unique environmental considerations (e.g., overlap with a designated wilderness area or critical habitat), an Environmental Assessment should be required.
III. Direct Responses to Questions Posed by FAA
Question: What additional types of unmanned aircraft operations should FAA allow through a UAFR?
In addition to Parts 91, 107, 108, 135, and 137: (a) operations under an active Public Safety COA or 49 U.S.C. § 44807 authorization; (b) operations by, or under direct contract to, a federal, state, tribal, or local public-safety agency for SAR, hazmat, fire, or law-enforcement support; (c) operations by Trusted Operator registrants (see Section II.E above); and (d) exigent-circumstance overflights tied to a documented life-safety emergency.
Question: What is the economic impact to commercial UAS operators if they cannot transit UAFRs?
For my agency specifically, projected revenue losses from inability to transit critical-infrastructure UAFRs on linear-corridor inspection, SAR support contracts, and insurance-related investigative work would meaningfully impact a small-business gross margin, in addition to displaced indirect spending on aircraft, batteries, training, insurance, and connectivity (Starlink). Scaled across the Part 107 commercial population, the aggregate effect of the 9,000-facility scenario is likely to be substantial. The FAA should quantify this directly in the final Regulatory Impact Analysis, including impacts to small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Question: What information should an operator provide to establish credibility?
See Section II.E above. In brief: Part 107 certificate (with TSA STA on file), aircraft registration and Remote ID, state PI license (where applicable), commercial aviation liability insurance, and — for Public Safety contracts — a letter of designation from the contracting agency. These data are already collected by federal and state systems; the FAA should leverage existing records rather than build duplicative ones.
Question: Are additional technological or procedural requirements appropriate (e.g., Remote ID, site coordination, law-enforcement coordination)?
Beyond the existing Remote ID broadcast requirement under 14 CFR part 89, the FAA should consider: (a) a machine-readable LAANC-style notification with digital acknowledgment; (b) a Trusted Operator registry; and (c) optional voluntary coordination with local law enforcement for sensitive missions. The FAA should not impose additional broadcast or transponder requirements that exceed part 89, for the reasons set out in Section II.F.
IV. Conclusion
Section 2209 of FESSA reflects a legitimate congressional judgment that certain fixed-site facilities deserve a defined process for restricting unmanned-aircraft overflight. The FAA’s proposed rule is, on the whole, a thoughtful implementation of that mandate. With the targeted refinements outlined above — an objective transit standard, a centralized notification system, an enumerated Public Safety and exigent-circumstance pathway, a Trusted Operator credibility track for state-licensed investigators and small commercial operators, narrow construction of the Special UAFR good-cause exception, and meaningful cybersecurity safeguards around the notification system — the final rule can fairly protect critical infrastructure without unduly burdening the lawful commercial and public-safety operators on whom communities increasingly rely.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment and am available to discuss any of the foregoing in greater detail.
Respectfully submitted,
Alden Wheeler
Owner, Alden Wheeler Detective Agency & GPS
